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PREFACE
In Henrv Fielding's Torn Jones: The Novelist as Moral 
Philosopher (Sussex University, 1975), Bernard Harrison dis­
tinguishes his approach from other “scholarly literary his­
tory* that deals with “philosophical and theological influ­
ences . “
An idea is not a self-contained item of negotiable in­
tellectual currency: it does not have a settled value 
and significance inscribed upon it like a bank-note or 
a share-certificate. The life of ideas is in systems 
of thought, and the same idea may take on a radically 
different weight said significance when transferred 
from one such system to smother. This is something 
which influence-tracing as sm activity undervalues: it 
is subject to an inevitable temptation to suppose that 
when we have assembled the influences bearing upon a 
writer we have understood his mind; whereas what we 
have done is often merely to assemble the materials 
upon which his mind worked to produce a structure yet 
to be comprehended. The temptation, in short, is al­
ways to regard the recipient of an older idea as a 
passive exponent of it, and to reserve originality for 
the original begetter, neglecting the truth that 
thought is not a matter of juxtaposing but of articu­
lating ideas, and that originality in thought consists 
as much in the articulation as in the materials artic­
ulated. (22)
These comments are appropriate to my study of Jane Austen's 
novels, particulary because of the ironic paradox between 
Harrison's “original begetter" and his universal masculine 
author. Both must, it would seem, bring forth new ideas in a 
sort of parthenogenesis. Would a woman author, then, be dis­
qualified as a “begetter" and limited to that of a “passive 
exponent" of the "originality" of a predecessor who “bear(s)" 
upon her? Austen would have fun with Harrison’s metaphor, and 
might play with it comically as she mocks the sententiousness
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
or conceit of Messrs. Collins and Darcy in Pride and 
Pre-iudice.
The vocabulary of eighteenth-century moralist texts of­
fers the same masculine universals as does Harrison, but I 
claim that Austen insists on gender equity in her dramas to 
challenge the inscribed masculinity of the discourse. Moral 
partnership for men and women is critical for the world fac­
ing her Regency characters and audience. Central to Austen’s 
reshaping of the discourse, as I argue, is the role of grati­
tude, traditionally an oppressive duty ■bearing" most heavily 
on women. In the novels, however, gratitude transcends gender 
and is revealed to be a virtue that graces and makes possible 
the future happiness which the novels implicitly promise.
Happiness, for Austen, seems to be the standard for 
evaluating decisions by their consequences, which is also the 
standard for Francis Hutcheson, whom Harrison would term the 
■original begetter" of the ideas that Austen's novels shape 
and transform. As I discuss, a number of scholars consider 
that Hutcheson's primary, if not exclusive, test of virtue by 
consequences classifies him as an early apostle of utilitari­
anism, and at least one of the readers of this dissertation 
expresses "shock" that Austen, then, might be identified as 
an early Benthamite. I am not a student of Bentham, and my 
impressions of his theories are conditioned by Foucault's 
presentation of prison design in. Discipline and Punish, which 
seems at first like a long stretch from Austen, although 
Austen does caution us not to rely on first impressions.
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Other scholars may wish to explore the possible connection of 
Austen with later utilitarianiin, and perhaps try to locate 
the architecture of happiness in the structure of the prison.
My reading of Austen is didactic, a critical approach 
that has not been particularly popular in recent years. I be­
lieve Austen is seriously concerned about the values her so­
ciety has espoused in the past and that she tries to show, 
through the workings of gratitude, how people might continue 
to join together in loving and virtuous bonds. My approach 
probably is close to that of Jan Fergus and of Maaja Stewart, 
whose recent work, Domestic Realities and Imperial Fictions:
Jans, Austen '.s. Novels ..in Eight eeathrCentmy. .Contexts 
(University of Georgia, 1993), pays more attention to the 
role of gratitude than it has attracted from most scholars. 
Although I disagree with many of Stewart's ideas, I think it 
is more significant that we may be participating in an impor­
tant new debate that recognizes Austen as a major voice in 
the history of philosophical and moral discourse.
People have asked me why I want to talk about Jane 
Austen. My answer is, simply, that she is at the same time 
the wisest and funniest writer I know. Her humor reveals her 
wisdom. This dissertation cannot possibly do justice to my 
continuing delight in the short shelf of books she composed 
in an equally short lifetime.
Durham, New Hampshire
July, 1995.
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ABSTRACT
THE DISCOURSE OF GRATITUDE IN THE NOVELS OF JANE AUSTEN
by
William G. Sayres 
University of New Hampshire, September, 1995
Jane Austen is preeminently the novelist of gratitude, 
and no substantive noun of similar moral content recurs in 
these texts with the frequency of “gratitude." Gratitude has 
enormous power in her novels. It is a necessary precursor of 
love in the formation of bonds between men and women, and no 
"good" mutual love is possible unless it evolves through the 
process of gratitude. For successful marriages, gratitude is 
even more necessary than love. Among the scholars who focus 
on significant terms in Austen novels, few give more them 
passing attention to gratitude or to the massive volume of 
eighteenth-century moralist texts that wrestle with 
gratitude's role in the discourse of virtue. Internal and 
external evidence confirm Austen's understanding of this 
discourse, particularly the texts of the "moral sense" 
philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) and of the Anglican 
bishop Thomas Sherlock (1678-1761).
Those scholars who do discuss gratitude in Austen tend 
to see it as the acceptance and approval of subordination to 
authority, necessary to correct humanity's essential 
depravity and selfishness, a long standing theosophical view 
in classical and Christianized philosophical discourse, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
which shadows the debate between Edmund Burke and William 
Godwin at the onset of the French Revolution. But Austen 
distances herself from older theosophical views, as well as 
from the Burke-Godwin debate itself, and instead uses 
Hutcheson, who believes in humanity's essential goodness, to 
transform gratitude into a virtue and guide for achieving 
happiness in this life, rather than to avoid punishment in 
the next.
Gratitude is closely linked with benevolence, 
traditionally an aristocratic virtue, but Hutcheson's 
biographer, William Robert Scott, argues that Hutcheson ■de­
mocratizes" the Third Earl of Shaftesbury's elitist 
philosophy of benevolence. Hutcheson’s theories, as well as 
the "practical Christianity" of Thomas Sherlock's Discourses 
seem to support the same goal of human happiness that 
Austen's novels also endorse as the standard of moral virtue 
Driving the moral thrust of her narrative seems to be 
confidence that, through gratitude, men and women can over­
come social and gender structures that stand in the way of 
happiness.
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CHAPTER I
THE VOCABULARY OF VIRTUE: GRATITUDE AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Gratitude energizes the moral world of all Jane Austen's 
novels, and no substantive noun of similar moral content re­
curs in these texts with the frequency of "gratitude.1,1 Austen 
grants enormous power to gratitude. It is a necessary precur­
sor of love in the formation of bonds between men and women, 
and no "good" mutual love is possible unless it evolves 
through the process of gratitude. For successful marriages, 
gratitude is even more necessary than love. A number of 
scholars have discussed what seem to them to be significant 
terms in Austen novels, yet none gives more than passing at­
tention to gratitude2 or to the massive volume of eighteenth- 
century moralist texts that wrestle with gratitude's role in 
the discourse of virtue. Internal and external evidence con­
firm Austen's understanding of this discourse, particularly 
the contributions of the “moral sense" philosopher Francis 
Hutcheson (1694-1746) and of the Anglican bishop Thomas 
Sherlock (1678-1761).3 Austen, however, goes beyond 
Hutcheson's theory that gratitude is a variety of benevo­
lence. Instead, she reshapes gratitude as the central contin­
uing and positive value for the moral life. Driving the moral 
thrust of her narrative seems to be confidence that, through 
gratitude, men and women can overcome social and gender 
structures that stand in the way of happiness.
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2The moral discourse in which Austen, Sherlock, and 
Hutcheson participate is grounded in religious belief, a sub­
ject in Austen studies that has been approached warily. Hie 
allusions in novels and letters to attendance at * divine ser­
vices , * as well as comments on sermons and discussions of 
clerical duties, cure all evidence that Austen observed at 
least the forms of religion and that the same could be ex­
pected of her characters. However, her religious commentary 
seems generally confined to character portrayals, often un­
flattering, of clerical figures, but which do not invite in­
ferences about the offices they represent. Scholars tend to 
respond to the absence of more overt religious discussion by 
shrugging it off as not germane to their studies. Gilbert 
Ryle, for exanple, observes that Austen "draws a curtain be­
tween her Sunday thoughts, whatever they were, and her cre­
ative imagination."4 Recently, however, there seems to be more 
interest in drawing aside Ryle's "curtain." Bruce Stovel 
writes about the usefulness of Jane Austen's published 
prayers for understanding her novels, and Irene Collins has 
published a sympathetic biographical work, Jane Austen and 
the Clerav. which connects the novels with her life-long 
close involvement with the church and clergy.5 As with 
Hutcheson and Sherlock, I believe that Austen's ideas about 
benevolence and gratitude must be understood in relation to 
their religious sources and foundation.
The few scholars who do discuss gratitude in Austen tend 
to see gratitude as the acceptance and approval of subordina-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3tion to authority, and misread Austen as they misunderstand
how she transforms gratitude. Gratitude, according to these
scholars, is repressive for the underclass, both women and
the working poor. The view of gratitude as subordination has
a long history in classical and Christianized philosophical
discourse as well as in fiction prior to Austen. In 1740 the
moralist George Turnbull saw social and economic inequalities
as desirable for the flowering of virtue.
. . . [W]hat can be happier than deficiencies and 
wants, which are the foundation of so many and so great 
goods [such as] generosity and kindness, gratitude and 
reliance?6
When Squire Allworthy in Tom Jones condemns the game­
keeper, Black George, not so much for stealing Tom's purse, 
but for "the black Ingratitude of this Fellow toward you, "7 he 
justifies punishment more for violating the relationship of 
servant and master than for a penal offence. Had the case 
been set in Swift's Lilliput, punishment would have been as­
sured, since the Lilliputians made ingratitude a capital of­
fence.8 Gratitude becomes a mechanism for controlling behavior 
of the lower classes and may be considered, in Foucault's 
terms, one of the "disciplines'' that constitutes an "infra­
law. "9 The justification of punishment for perceived ingrati­
tude reflects a skeptical view of human nature as inherently 
selfish and assumes that sanctions are necessary to enforce 
morality in a system of fixed class hierarchies. In philoso­
phy, Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville also base their 
systems on the selfish view of human nature.
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4Hutcheson intrudes into this discourse as the eigh­
teenth-century leader of "universal benevolence" moral phi­
losophy, opposed to that of Hobbes and Mandeville. He was 
born into a dissenting Ulster family, and in 1710 entered the 
University of Glasgow, where he spent six years, then re­
turned to head a private academy in Dublin. Leechman writes 
that he taught "for seven or eight years with great reputa­
tion and success,"10 then joined the faculty of the University 
of Glasgow in 1729 for the remainder of his life. In 1724, he 
published "Reflections on our Common Systems of Morality" in 
The London Journal, followed a year later by ftn -IIKtuirY. int-S 
the_Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. The lengthy 
title goes on to claim that "In Two Treatises . . . The 
Principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are explain'd and 
defended, against the Author of the Fable of the.Bees: . .
."11 Shaftesbury argues that humans have a natural propensity 
to virtue, for the same reason that we have a sense of 
beauty, which we approve, just as we recoil from vice as from 
ugliness. Mandeville, following Hobbes, argues the reverse, 
that people are naturally selfish.
Hutcheson avoids reliance on Shaftesbury's aesthetic 
analogy, and instead supports his claim that people are not 
naturally selfish but instinctively benevolent by an appeal 
to common experience. In the closest personal relations, 
benevolence is at its most intense and fuses with the recip­
rocal force of gratitude, a process important to Austen's 
dramas. Before Hutcheson's re-working of these ideas, grati-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5tude had been approved as an admirable and obligatory duty to 
benefactors. But unlike benevolence, gratitude had never been 
recognized as either an "official" cardinal or theological 
virtue. Hutcheson, however, elevates it to a level of equal 
virtue with benevolence. William Robert Scott claims that the 
Inquiry "begins to democratize Shaftesbury's philosophy," 
which is "aristocratically esoteric" and "addresses . . . 
•gentlemen of fashion.*"12 Ihe equalization of benevolence, 
usually an aristocratic virtue, with gratitude also seems to 
"democratize" the interaction of gentry and bourgeoisie in 
Austen's novels.
Hutcheson is also the principal developer and champion 
of the "moral sense" theory of ethics, a term first used ca­
sually by Shaftesbury, but which Hutcheson makes the princi­
pal motivator of behavior. Although Hutcheson states that he 
is an advocate for Shaftesbury and is not offering anything 
new, Adam Smith, Hutcheson's student at the University of 
Glasgow, gives him credit for originating the moral sense 
theory, which differs from Shaftesbury in substituting for 
the aesthetic link of virtue and beauty the idea that there 
is a separate, stand-alone "moral sense," which is as real as 
any of Locke's five senses. For Hutcheson, "divine grace" is 
the source of our "moral sense." He observes that people 
seem to have a "Sentiment" that approves "the Perception of 
moral Excellence, ..."
And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be
called a Moral Sense, since the Definition agrees to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6it, viz. a Determination of the Mind, to receive any 
Idea from the Presence of an Object, which occurs to 
us, independently on [sic] our Will.13
The moral sense reveals itself in virtuous feelings, foremost
of which are benevolence and gratitude. Virtue is quantified,
since the "Virtue" of an "Action . . .  is in proportion to
the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend."
This theorem leads to its corollary, "that Action is best,
which accomplishes the greatest Happiness for the greatest
Numbers."14 D. D. Raphael observes that "Hutcheson appears to
be the first to use this explicit formulation of the
Utilitarian doctrine."15
Hutcheson also distances himself from Shaftesbury by in­
sisting that the revealed truth of Christianity is fundamen­
tal to his philosophy. Although he commends Shaftesbury for 
giving "the best and most elegant account" of "the social na­
ture of man," the subject of Hutcheson's Inaugural Lecture at 
the University of Glasgow (1730), he acknowledges that "in 
other respects he [Shaftesbury] is liable to censure from the 
theologians." Hutcheson's theocentrism is also the principle 
difference between his ideas and those of his admirer, fol­
lower, and correspondent, David Hume, revealed in a 1739 ex­
change of letters. John Mullan points out that the decorum of 
the correspondence masks this basic conflict.
But for the fundamentally friendly nature of this 
exchange, Hume might have added that whereas 
Hutcheson's moralism could look to the final proofs of 
religion, his own 'experimental' philosophy recognized 
only the facts of a world without external sanctions or 
purposes.15
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7Nevertheless, Hutcheson’s philosophy, as well as his identi­
fication with Shaftesbury, exposed him to attacks from both 
the dissenting Presbyterian theocracy, of which he was a mem­
ber by birth and education, and also to attempted legal pros­
ecution by the Archbishop’s court of the Anglican Church of 
Ireland. Scott writes that ”[a]t this time it was a bold act 
to have placed Shaftesbury’s name on the title-page of the 
Inquiry— in fact, Shaftesbury was then the bgte noire of the 
combative theologian.”17 Hutcheson's religious ortho­
doxy was also challenged by other moralists, including con­
temporaries John Balguy and Bishop Joseph Butler (possibly 
the "combative theologian” cited by Scott) as well as by John 
Wesley in sermons as late as 1788. The main points of con­
tention are Hutcheson's measure of virtue by its contribution 
to human happiness, rather than by divine law, his belief 
that human nature is essentially good, not depraved, and that 
feelings are superior to reason as a guide to virtuous behav­
ior. Except for consistent rejection of Hobbes and Mandeville 
in his writings, Hutcheson's comments on other moralists mix 
approval and criticism of his immediate predecessors, 
Cumberland and Puffendorf, and of Cicero among the ancients. 
He also responds in later published works to John Balguy, and 
carries on a debate in letters published in The London 
Journal with Gilbert Burnet.
Thomas Mautner observes that Hutcheson's religious views 
were those of "the Moderate party," in contrast with "the or­
thodox-conservative Evangelical party in the Church of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8Scotland." Mautner associates such views with Anglican lati- 
tudinarians, and as they "slowly gained acceptance among the 
Scottish and Irish Presbyterians, . . . Hutcheson became 
their most significant early advocate."18 Despite scholarly 
disagreement over the definition of latitudinarianism and its 
influence, there clearly was an Anglican movement in the late 
seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries that was 
opposed to the Evangelical theology of man’s naturally de­
praved nature and innate sinfulness, which could only be re­
deemed through faith and repentance. By contrast, the so- 
called "latitudinarian" doctrine insisted that people gener­
ally were well-motivated, and by their own efforts could lead 
both a godly and happy life, pleasing to God and helpful to 
their fellow humans through charitable works and virtuous 
conduct.
Such views closely complement those of Francis Hutcheson 
and are also found in the writings and career of Thomas 
Sherlock whose sermons Austen praises in an 1814 letter to 
Anna Austen.19 Sherlock’s biographer Edward Carpenter, writing 
in 1936 for the "Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge," 
observes that "Sherlock is an able exponent of the claims of 
a practical religion" who is "opposed to ‘Enthusiasm’ in re­
ligion."20 While Sherlock endorses benevolent feelings and 
conduct, he is concerned to establish their authority in 
scripture. Against the deistic attack on revealed religion, 
Sherlock re-focused religious thought to search for the "his­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9torical Jesus*21 in such works as his Trial of the Witnesses 
to the Resurrection of Jesus (1729).
Anglican latitudinarian religious thought has its an­
tecedents in the late seventeenth-century "Cambridge 
Platonists," whose ideas Basil Willey recognizes as antici­
pating eighteenth-century ■•moral sense* philosophies,■ join­
ing philosophy and religion in a union, so that reason and 
faith mutually support each other. In their objective both of 
refuting Hobbes's "selfish* theory, as well as Calvinist pre­
destination doctrine, they sought to offer a pragmatic moral 
code with a humanitarian focus that emphasizes benevolence as 
charitable works. Doctrinally, they occupy a "middle" posi­
tion between the High Church and the Puritans, and share a 
common philosophical ground with the benevolence moralists, 
especially, I would emphasize, with Hutcheson.22
The scholarly debate about what constituted "latitudi- 
narianism" is incorporated in essays by R. S. Crane, Donald 
Greene, and Frans de Bruyn (1981),23 which address a larger 
controversy over the nature and importance of eighteenth-cen­
tury "sentiment" and "sensibility," which I discuss later in 
connection with the place of Henry Mackenzie in Austen's phi­
losophy. De Bruyn's review of latitudinarianism goes back to 
the origin of the term and the meaning recognized by early 
apologists, as well as critics, which strongly emphasizes 
charitable works and "the ecumenical spirit." Those caught up 
in this movement reflected "their self-conscious sense of 
novelty" in their writings.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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[E]ven the terminology used in their sermons conveys 
this sense of newness. Time and again the latitudinari- 
ans relied on the language of the new science— the lan­
guage of Newton and Locke— to explicate their doc­
trines . 24
"The language of Newton and Locke" is also aggresively em­
ployed by Hutcheson. He leans on Newtonian mechanics to ex­
plain how the moral sense promotes benevolence, which in­
creases in proportion to the degree of intimacy that people 
have with each other, and he employs a series of algebraic 
proofs to demonstrate this theory in the first three editions 
of the Incruirv.25
Locke also argued that it should be possible to prove
virtue mathematically.
They that are ignorant of algebra cannot imagine the 
wonders in this kind are to be done by it: . . . This 
at least I believe, that the ideas of quantity are not 
those alone that are capable of demonstration and 
knowledge; . . . and [the nature of God and "our­
selves " ], if duly considered and pursued, . . . might 
place morality amongst the sciences capable of demon­
stration: wherein I doubt not but from self-evident 
propositions, by necessary consequences, as incon­
testable as those in mathematics, the measures of right 
and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply 
himself with the same indifferency and attention to the 
one, as he does to the other of these sciences.26
Hutcheson' s attempt at moral mathematics exposed him to some
ridicule, such as the mockery Scott attributes to Laurence
Sterne.
Hutcheson, in his philosophic treatise on beauty, har­
mony and order, plus's and minus's you to heaven or 
hell, by algebraic equations— so that none but an ex­
pert mathematician can ever be able to settle his ac­
counts with S. Peter— and perhaps S. Matthew, who had 
been an officer in the customs, must be called in to 
audit them.27
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When Hutcheson abandons this apparent attempt to take up 
Locke’s challenge in the fourth edition, he explains that 
•same Mathematical Expressions are left out, which, upon sec­
ond Thoughts, appear'd useless, and were disagreeable to some 
Readers.”28 Even at this point (1738), it may be that the in­
fluence of 'sentiment* was making moral mathematics unappeal­
ing, even though Jane Axis ten later found Hutcheson's math 
useful to suggest Emma's moral transgression against Miss 
Bates.
De Bruyn backs Crane against Donald Greene on the theory 
that sentimental moral philosophy can trace its sources in 
latitudinarianism, but I think the debate gets into a quag­
mire on the shifting and overlapping interpretations of "sen­
timentalism" and "sensibility." I cannot draw a line that 
this massive scholarship has failed to inscribe, but Austen 
does use both terms, and "sensibility" quite clearly suggests 
understanding through the "senses, ■ or feeling guided by rea­
son. "Sentiment" and its derivatives imply feelings that have 
lost their moorings in reason, as personified by the incom­
plete and weakened figure of the sighing romantic, Captain 
Benwick, in Persuasion, a character whose prototype may be 
found in James and Henry Austen's periodical The Loiterer, 
which Jane Austen appears to have read, and to which she may 
have contributed while in her teens.
Hutcheson's A System of Moral Philosophy and Thomas 
Sherlock's Several Discourses preached at the Temple Church 
are both reviewed approvingly by Hugh Blair in the 1755 first
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edition of the original Edinburgh Review, joining in one vol­
ume three writers important to Austen.29 Blair's reviews 
clearly see no religious incompatability between fellow 
Presbyterian Hutcheson and the Anglican bishop, Sherlock, 
which tends to support Mautner's claim for Hutcheson's impor­
tance to the liberal Anglican movement dubbed "latitudinari- 
anism. *
Sherlock was bom into a politically visible church fam­
ily. His father had been Dean of St. Paul's and 'Master of 
the Temple," essentially the regular preacher and religious 
overseer of that institution of lawyers. Thomas succeeded his 
father in the post in 1705, and with such a congregation may 
have sharpened his own legal knowledge, demonstrated later in 
his theological courtroom drama, The Trial of the Witnesses 
to the Resurrection of Jesus (1729), which went through eigh­
teen editions during the next one hundred years. In a rapidly 
rising career, Sherlock became chaplain to Queen Anne and 
Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge.
Both Sherlocks were strong Tories, and Thomas's career 
was interrupted by the consequences of his pamphlet, 
Vindication of the Corporation and Test Acts, as well as his 
opposition to the essentially Evangelical doctrine of 
"Sincerity" advocated by King George I's appointee, Bishop 
Hoadley. This confrontation put him at odds with Robert 
Walpole's Whig administration and cost him his royal chap­
laincy. He managed to regain favor, however, and his upward 
mobility resumed with successive appointments as Bishop of
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Bangor, Salisbury, and London, although he declined the offer 
of “the primacy," i.e., Archbishop of Canterbury. This polit­
ical adaptability of the Sherlocks is celebrated in a contem­
porary jingle.
As Sherlock the elder, by his jure divine 
Did not comply till the Battle of Bpyne;
So Sherlock the younger still made it a question 
Which side he would take till the Battle of Preston.30
As did his father in 1690, Thomas apparently kept his options
open until the collapse of the ill-supported rising of 1715.
Sherlock's attack on Hoadley also brought him in con­
flict with John Balguy, who defended Hoadley' s doctrine of 
“Sincerity* with the same appeal to “reason" he used in at­
tacking Hutcheson's moral sense theory. “Reason," for Balguy, 
is deductive, leading to the knowledge of a priori truth re­
vealed in Scripture. Sherlock argues that, if “Sincerity* is 
the ultimate test of a Christian, there would be no way of 
“converting a Papist," whose erroneous belief is supported by 
"Sincerity." Balguy replies that a “Papist" is not “sincere* 
if he refuses to listen to "reason."31 Sherlock and Hutcheson, 
then, joined admiringly by Blair, also share in Balguay a mu­
tual opponent. Their common offense seems to be their shared 
belief that the workable usefulness of principles in the 
world testifies to their religious merit and moral worth, not 
their conformity with a priori divine authority, deduced by 
"reason."
Sherlock's sermons argue for the reconciling of fre­
quently opposing viewpoints, including the common basis of 
"natural religion" and the "gospel;” "sense" and "reason" as
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both gifts of God; and the need for good works to supplement 
faith in order to achieve salvation. He is vocal against "en­
thusiasm, ■ which he sees as divisive and one-sided in its 
negative view of human nature and rejection of good works. He 
strongly urges Christian charity, and advises his audience to 
agonize less over the purity of their motives, and to be more 
concerned with the positive effects of their benevolence on 
others. His focus on charity matches Hutcheson's elevation of 
benevolence, and his test of virtue by its effects seems 
close to the relativism of Hutcheson's proto-utilitarian ap­
proach.
Jane Austen's Tory family may well have approved 
Sherlock's record of early resistance to the Hanoverian 
Whigs, and discounted his later compliance as the practical 
recognition of political pressure to conform. Anglicans 
Overton and Relton in their 1906 history show that the Church 
hierarchy's accomodation with the Hanoverian succession cre­
ated a split between the clergy and church leaders.
The great mass of the inferior clergy were in their 
heart of hearts in favour of James the Pretender, while 
the dignitaries, as in duty bound, were in favour of 
George . . . and the result was a growing alienation 
between the higher and lower clergy.32
There are no strident pronouncements on record by the Austen 
family clergy on this issue, but Jane Austen's Stuart idola­
try at age fifteen is trumpeted in her "History of England" 
and it seems reasonable to assume that her views were not in­
consistent with those of her family.
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However, by the time of the third Hanoverian monarch, 
and the permanent end of Jacobite restoration efforts, the 
urgency of the issue had subsided, and the appeal to Austen 
of Sherlock's sermons, which say nothing about claims to the 
Crown, seems to have little to do with sympathetic Toryism. 
Austen's letter expressing her enjoyment of Sherlock's ser­
mons probably refers to the 1812 Clarendon edition of his 
works, which were collected and published thirteen times be­
tween 1754 and 1830, not counting the separate editions of 
Trial of the Witnesses mentioned above.
Jane Austen's "dear Dr. Johnson" also admires Sherlock. 
Boswell asks Johnson for his opinion on "the best English 
sermons for style," and Johnson's reaction to Sherlock is 
that "his style too is very elegant, though he has not made 
it his principal study." "Sherlock's Sermons" is also the 
only sermon collection included on a list of thirty books on 
various topics recommended by Johnson to a clergyman "for his 
studies."33 The "style* admired by Johnson apparently grated 
on John Balguy, who in attacking Sherlock criticizes his 
"Stile" as a "Satyrical Way of Writing by no means proper for 
Divines," who should "be content to imitate the Simplicity of 
the Gospel."34 It seems not unlikely, however, that Sherlock's 
"style" might have been a factor in Austen's professed admi­
ration.
Sherlock and Hutcheson together represent the full de­
velopment of the first of what Isabel Rivers sees as "two
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crucial shifts in ideas* that "took place* in the later sev­
enteenth century.
The first is an emphasis in Anglican thought on the ca­
pacity of human reason and free will to co-operate with 
divine grace in order to achieve the happy and holy 
life. This optimistic portrait of human nature repre­
sents a rejection of the orthodox Reformation tradi­
tion, which stresses the depravity of human nature. . .
. The second is the attempt to divorce ethics from re­
ligion, . . .35
Clearly, neither Sherlock nor Hutcheson participate in 
Rivers’s "second* category. Hutcheson, however, does seem to 
acknowledge reason as an ally and monitor for the judgment of 
feeling: "When the moral Sense is thus assisted by a sound 
Understanding and Application, our own Actions may be a con­
stant Source of solid Pleasure, . . .*36 Scott comments on 
this and other gestures to reason.
It will thus be seen that Hutcheson assigns an impor­
tant if somewhat vague position to reason in the pro­
cess attending moral decisions. In fact so far from 
reason being 'expressly excluded,* it has the function 
of 'assisting,* even of 'governing' the Moral Sense . .
.37
Austen, too, seems to recognize that reason and feelings 
should work in concert to guide conduct, but in case of con­
flict, she grants authority to the feelings. An early scene 
in Pride and Prejudice situates gratitude in relation to the 
conflict of feeling or sentiment versus a priori obligation, 
deduced by reason. Darcy's affirmation of love is received by 
an astonished Elizabeth Bennet with unexpected hostility.
In such cases as this, it is, I believe, the estab­
lished mode to express a sense of obligation for the 
sentiments avowed, however unequally they may be re­
turned. It is natural that obligation should be felt, 
and if I could feel gratitude, I would now thank you.
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But I cannot— I have never desired your good opinion, 
and you have certainly bestowed it most unwillingly.38
Elizabeth acknowledges that gratitude is an "obligation* but, 
rather paradoxically, also “natural* and based on feeling, a 
paradox which rests squarely on the same dichotony offered in 
Samuel Johnson's 1755 Dictionary definitions: "1. Duty to 
benefactors. . . .  2. Desire to return benefits."39 
■Obligation* points toward the pervasive and ancient moral 
discourse of rights and duties, but the primacy Elizabeth 
gives instead to her feelings ("feel* is underlined in the 
text) suggests the "moral sense* approach of Hutcheson's An 
Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil.4° This and other 
Hutcheson works may be read as a running moral commentary on 
Austen's dramatic narrative, which in turn seems to test and 
probe for the strengths and weaknesses in Hutcheson's philos­
ophy.
Except for conduct book literature, Mary Poovey appears 
to dismiss the moralist texts important to Austen as inacces­
sible to modem audiences.
The special resonances and impact that her contempo­
raries sensed in the statements and situations of 
Austen's novels are dim or absent altogether for twen­
tieth-century readers.41
The term "gratitude" today has an antiquarian ring, yet this
study claims that understanding its meaning for Jane Austen
is essential to understanding her novels. The challenge,
then, is to access a defunct and lost moral universe, and to
revivify it for the modern scholar.
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The term "moralist" has an even more antiquarian ring 
than "gratitude," and its connotation today might be somewhat 
disparaging, as suggesting hypocrisy or a "holier-than-thou 
attitude." The O.E.D.'s first definition, "One who practices 
morality," even quotes ironic usages in the eighteenth cen­
tury and earlier that reflect a similar attitude. But the 
first and only definition in Samuel Johnson's Dictionary is 
"One who teaches the duties of life, ■ which is echoed in the 
O.E.D. 's second definition, "A teacher or student of morals; 
a moral philosopher," and there were legions of them in addi­
tion to Hutcheson. Although debating among each other in 
books, letters, pamphlets, and journals, their shared project 
was opposition to the "selfish" theories which were also per­
ceived as irreligious, particularly those of Thomas Hobbes.
By melding classical philosophy with Christian doctrine, 
they sought to produce a workable theory of morals grounded 
in religion, and differed among each other primarily on the 
relative authority of feeling or reason. For David Norton, 
Hutcheson's argument with the advocates for reason "was a 
dispute among friends— the friends of virtue— concerning the 
foundations of morality."42 Hutcheson strives to formulate 
moral principles which have a general applicability, while 
Sherlock is more concerned with the practical applicability 
of moral principles than with motives, including benevolence 
as expressed through the paramount Christian virtue of char­
ity.
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Sherlock suggests that the "act of charity" itself is of 
more moral significance than introspective anxiety about 
■special motives" and that virtue can be, at least tenta­
tively, deduced from its effects- Since consequences in terms 
of personal happiness is also Hutcheson's "bottom line," he 
and Sherlock seem to agree in essentials. Particularly in 
Emma and Persuasion- the last two novels, Austen seems to 
move toward this pragmatic approach to virtue. The novels, 
then, engage in a dialogic triad of dramatic text with the 
works of Hutcheson and Sherlock, with gratitude the unifying 
focus.
Over forty years after the deaths of Hutcheson and 
Sherlock, and during Jane Austen's young adulthood, the role 
of gratitude becomes a point of contention between Edmund 
Burke and William Godwin in the larger debate about rights 
and duties in the contemporary context of the French 
Revolution. Godwin's Encruirv Concerning Political Justice 
(1793, rev. 1796, 1798) is a direct rebuttal to Burke's 
Reflections on the Revolution on France (1790). Godwin's con­
tention is that human rights, amply justified by reason, are 
denied by the irrationality of authority systems resting on 
nothing but tradition and “prejudice." Gratitude is among 
such irrational institutions, and Godwin argues, conse­
quently, it "is no part either of justice or virtue."43 Godwin 
completes the rejection of gratitude with its corollary: "It 
is therefore impossible for me to confer upon any man a 
favour; I can only do him right."44 That is, if I am in a po-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
sition to help a needy person, that person has a "right" to 
my resources.
Burke, on the other hand, appeals strongly to feelings 
which seem to revere traditional institutions of authority.
In "Letter to a Noble Lord" (1796), he charges that "ingrati­
tude is the first of revolutionary virtues" and 
"Revolutionaries are miscreant parricides, ■ for whom 
■Ingratitude is indeed their four cardinal virtues compacted 
and amalgamated into one. "45 As Squire Allworthy also insists 
in condemning Black George, ingratitude is an evil abberation 
from gratitude, which is the duty of allegiance, respect, and 
thankfulness for benefits and protection owed to those placed 
in authority over us.
For Austen, gratitude itself seems to be placed at risk 
in the conflict between rights and duties, which become the 
rallying cries of ideological enemies in the real war that 
casts its shadow over these debates. If gratitude is at risk, 
then so is benevolence and, by a kind of logical domino ef­
fect, the whole idea of the society founded on virtue that 
both Burke and Godwin, despite their mutual hostility, claim 
to endorse. Austen's novels, particularly the later ones, are 
profoundly involved with challenges raised by the French 
Revolution and Napoleonic wars, as many scholars have conclu­
sively established, but the Burke-Godwin debate seems more an 
ominous presence lurking at the margins of the novels, unlike 
Hutcheson and Sherlock, whose very texts are inscribed in 
Austen's.
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Austen's response to the debate's implied, if unspoken, 
challenge to gratitude addresses the complex relationship of 
“feeling" and “obligation" with which Elizabeth Bennet pref­
aces her rejection of “gratitude" for Darcy's avowal of love. 
Unlike Godwin, however, Austen does not subordinate feelings 
to reason, and reject gratitude as such, and unlike Burke, 
neither does she recognize that duty exercises controlling 
authority over her feelings or, for that matter, her reason. 
Each of the novels, with increasing stress, tests the 
strength and justification of Austen's vision of gratitude 
for the society emerging around her. In Mansfield Park and 
Emma, it barely survives the test, but in Persuasion grati­
tude seems to fully and conclusively claim its authority.
Austen's linkage of “obligation" and “gratitude* seems 
to agree with Hutcheson's pairing of these terms in his 
posthumous A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (1747), 
when he claims that “there's no obligation more sacred than 
that of gratitude, . . ..“ although he admits that “[t]he 
term obligation is both complex and ambiguous.*46 Nevertheless 
“obligation," whether or not we are influenced by self-inter­
est, always leads back to the inward motivation of the moral 
sense.
But if by Obligation we understand a Motive from 
Self-Interest sufficient to determine all those who 
duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage 
wisely, to a certain Course of Actions; we may have a 
Sense of such Obligation by reflecting on this 
Determination of our Nature to approve Virtue, to be 
pleas’d and happy when we reflect upon our having done 
virtuous Actions, . . . and also by considering how 
much superior we esteem the Happiness of Virtue to any 
ether Enjoyment.47
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When Hutcheson talks about "duty" rather them "obligation," 
it is in terms of duty to God48— he is not interested in duty 
as a prescribed standard of conduct abstracted from the moral 
sense and the guidance of reason.
"Obligation" and "duty" imply the assistance of reason 
for knowledge of virtue, and therefore Austen's attempt to 
join "obligation" with “feeling," brings together the “head" 
and the "heart" in shared allegiance. J. A. Kearney finds 
"that the ideal state of affairs for Jane Austen is when rea­
son and feeling possess equal strength."49 This reading has, 
in my opinion, much to recommend it, and also suggests why 
Austen might find the views of Thomas Sherlock compatible 
with her own.
Nor do we teach that nature and reason cannot lead to 
the speculative knowledge of divine truths; for the ev­
idence of all divine truth resolves itself ultimately 
into either sense or reason; which are the common gifts 
of God to mankind, by the principles of which the truth 
of all things, depending upon the deductions of sense 
and reason, may be proved and examined.50
Sherlock, however, argues that "sense" and "reason" are means 
to an end, the "knowledge of divine truth," as distinguished 
from Kearney's reading that the balance of the two by itself 
as a sort of golden mean is Austen's ideal. The flaw in 
Kearney's argument is that the ideal of balance implies a 
kind of stasis, of forces coming to rest in equilibrium. 
Reason in Austen serves as a moderator and guide for the pas­
sions; it serves the feelings but does not overrule them, and 
both are but means to the goal of happiness.
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Hugh Blair's review of Hutcheson's A System of Moral 
Philosophy in the original Edinburgh Review makes much the 
same favorable observation about Hutcheson's work as Kearney 
does concerning Austen.
His philosophy tends to inspire generous sentiments 
and amiable views of human nature. It is particularly 
calculated to promote the social and friendly affec­
tions; and . . .  it has the air of being dictated by 
the heart, no less than the head.51
In fact, Hutcheson's philosophy is “dictated'' primarily by 
the “heart," although he is far from slighting the usefulness 
of reason in A System, or any of his works, as he acknowl­
edges in his discussion of the moral sense.
And 'tis pretty plain that reason is only a subservient 
power to our ultimate determinations either of percep­
tion or will. The ultimate end is setled [sic] by some 
sense, and some determination of will: . . . Reason can 
only direct to the means; or compare two ends previ­
ously constituted by some other immediate powers.52
Reason guides the moral sense when decisions are unclear, and
in the earlier Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense (1728), he
acknowledges that "Our Reason does often correct the Report
of our Senses, about the natural Tendency of the external
Action, and corrects rash Conclusions about the Affections of
the Agent."53
The important and consistent focus for Hutcheson is 
moral decisions in a social environment. The "moral agent" 
must be a viable human being, combining both "head" and 
"heart." That Hugh Blair, who enjoys two approving references 
in Austen's novels, applauds Hutcheson's union of "heart" and 
"head" suggests, I believe, that Jane Austen might also find
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his philosophy compatible with her own. Gratitude as both a 
■feeling" and an "obligation" requires, in the latter sense, 
the exercise of reason and, thus, the use of the "head" as 
well. These novels, then, seem like playful enactments of the 
moralist project and perspective on human nature, and I agree 
with those scholars who have concluded that Austen may be 
read, therefore, as a moralist herself, with didactic inten­
tions.54 Understanding Austen requires engaging her moral 
point of view and recognizing that the playfulness is a seri­
ous game that tests and refines moral codes.
But how can Austen offer as new and empowering an idea 
of virtue with antecedents in moralist writings of the first 
part of the preceding century, whose authors had no idea of 
coming political upheavals, or the vast shifts in wealth and 
social class directly or indirectly linked to the French 
Wars? Despite the gap in years since Hutcheson published his 
ideas, Austen seems to recognize that the fluidity and rela­
tivism Hutcheson introduces into gratitude gives it an adapt­
ability to the violent changes of the period, which directly 
intrude in her personal life, and rumble at the edges of her 
dramas. Where Godwin would discard gratitude, Austen would 
dramatically revitalize it.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of grati­
tude's transformation by Hutcheson and Austen, but by making 
benevolence and gratitude interchangeable, benevolence is de­
throned as the latter is elevated. Austen, then, seems to em­
brace the "democratization" of these virtues that Scott con-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
siders Hutcheson's major departure from Shaftesbury. This 
leveling of the field, as it were, challenges the hierarchi­
cal class, economic, and gender structures associated with 
benevolence, and is as subversive, in a sense, as Godwin's 
political and atheistic anarchism.
Jane Austen was not alone in responding to Hutcheson 
years after his texts were first published. Isabel Rivers 
notes that Hutcheson was John Wesley's “ ‘bete noir' among 
moralists'1 and that Wesley was attacking Hutcheson in sermons 
in 1785 and 1788. Wesley's objections are that human nature 
is not essentially good, but evil, and that grace alone is 
the means to salvation.55 Hutcheson's confidence that people 
have essentially good instincts and his conviction that 
benevolence is the greatest virtue because it promotes human 
happiness are at the core of Sherlock's pragmatic 
Anglicanism, and of the moral perspective revealed in 
Austen's novels.
Since the shared responses of Austen's moral discourse 
community are, as Poovey observes, "dim or absent" today, 
scholars who have attempted to identify Austen's philosophi­
cal point of view often contradict each other.56 These dis­
agreements reflect, as I have suggested, the failure to rec­
ognize the central unifying role of gratitude, particularly 
as shaped by the moralist thought of Francis Hutcheson. But 
instead of stimulating further research and discussion, this 
failure to arrive at any sort of consensus has not encouraged 
continued investigation, and most studies I have cited are
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over ten years old. Why does scholarship seem to have turned 
away from inquiry into Austen's philosophical sources? One 
reason that suggests itself may be the sexist focus of these 
studies.
D. D. Devlin sees Samuel Johnson and Bishop Joseph 
Butler “looking over her [Austen's] shoulder as she writes," 
which calls up the cameo of the spinster novelist in her 
drawing room, hovered over by her shadowy mentors, and writ­
ing in tidy little journals, easily whisked under cover. Even 
though there seems to be admiration in C. S. Lewis's claim 
that Austen “unblushingly“ employs “the great abstract nouns 
of the classical English moralists,*57 he nevertheless implies 
that she takes a daring leap from feminine propriety to re­
peat the very words of masculine pundits.
Much Austen scholarship today, instead of investigating 
philosophical sources, tends to reflect feminist readings 
that posit, with much justification, a hostile relationship 
between women writers and repressive patriarchal ideology, 
and to examine how women accept, reject, or evade its domi­
nance.58 Finding that the texts of that ideology tend to be 
flawed by inscribed sexism, substantive study of their con­
tent seems unrewarding, and also perhaps irrelevant.
Instead, feminist scholarship tends to define the dis­
courses of gender, or of morality, or both as concerned pri­
marily with issues of power rather than of virtue; or rather 
that power defines virtue itself. Gilbert and Gubar note the 
weak position of women "[g]iven the financial, social, and
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political power of men."59 Claudia Johnson claims that Austen, 
as well as other women novelists, employs "the device of cen­
tering her novels in the consciousness of unempowered charac­
ters— that is, women."60 Wendy Moffat points out that 
Austen's apparently most autonomous character, Emma Woodhouse 
(Emma), is "not representative" of women of her class or 
time, and that to "treat Emma as if she had power in her fic­
tional world" is "to repress history."61
The eighteeth-century British legal system often is 
cited for its complicity in the cultural repression of women. 
Phoebe Smith analyzes English property and inheritance law 
that forces women into dependency on a system of "benevolent 
paternalism," and she shows that in Sense and Sensibility 
this system fails to benefit the Dashwood sisters and their 
mother, whom the laws of England have ground into poverty.62 
By employing the term "benevolent," Smith, although she seems 
unaware of it, opens up the ancient debate about the relative 
importance of virtue as benevolence, versus justice as codi­
fied in laws. Smith correctly sees that Sense and Sensibility 
exposes the law's profession of equal protection as a sham 
for women, but in focusing on the texts of the law and ne­
glecting those of moral philosophy, she fails to recognize 
that Austen offers a positive alternative in a code of virtue 
based on gratitude. Smith's only acknowledgment of the moral­
ists is perfunctory.
By the ease with which Fanny [Dashwood] undermines 
John's benevolent intentions, Austen appears to support 
the view held by philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and 
Bernard de Mandevilie that humans are naturally self-
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ish, rather them naturally benevolent as posited, for 
example, by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury.63
■Such as* and "for example* imply a comprehension of the 
moral philosophy discourse, but Smith's citation for such in­
clusive generalities is an Alistair Duckworth article in a 
collection of essays. Smith's view, of course, is quite dif­
ferent from mine, and perhaps reflects her reliance on 
Duckworh's scholarship for her understanding of the moral 
discourse of the time.
My discussion of the novels will show that, for Austen, 
gratitude is a virtue of far greater potential for happiness 
than reliance on the law, which always betrays people and 
sabotoges happiness. This is not to suggest that Austen of­
fers some kind of "money isn't everything* moral treacle, or 
that gratitude is financially rewarded. But gratitude does, 
however, seem to open purse strings, and to grace the deploy­
ment of resources, such as Darcy's funding of Wickham's mar­
riage to Lydia in Pride and Prejudice. For Austen, gratitude 
as * empowerment * reverses the subordination of virtue to 
power that Smith, Gilbert and Gubar, Susan Fraiman, and oth­
ers seem to argue. Instead, in the world of Austen's novels, 
virtue defines power. The “empowerment* of gratitude applies 
to both men and women in Austen's novels, but its effects are 
more manifest for "unempowered" women.
My reading also contrasts with that of the few scholars, 
such as Richard Handler and Daniel Segal, who recognize the 
role of gratitude in novels by Austen and her contemporaries,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
but who see its function as reinforcing repressive power
structures that deny women power of choice.
Like admiration, gratitude can be either a masculine or 
feminine sentiment, but, in contrast to admiration, it 
is more frequently a feminine response to male initia­
tive. Since it is men who have the advantage of choice, 
it is women who must be grateful to men for taking the 
initiative at the key moments of courtship.64
Marriage is only one institution where gratitude enforces 
ideology. Claudia Johnson seems to read Austen as writing 
against the constraints of gratitude in all kinds of rela­
tionships .
In contrast to conservative writers such as West, More, 
and Edgeworth, Austen explores the sinister aspects of 
benevolence and the burden of gratitude it places on a 
recipient.65
But Johnson reflects the older “traditional" view that grati­
tude defines the inferior position of a dependent to a supe­
rior’s “benevolence," and thus apparently makes virtue depen­
dent on class, economic, and even gender inequality.
According to the “traditional* view, economic inequality was 
not necessarily considered undesireable, as attested by the 
moralist George Turnbull quoted earlier, and in the marriage 
proposal the woman's gender inequality reflects those “defi­
ciencies and wants“ which the suitor supplies. For Handler 
and Segal, then, gratitude is gender-skewed and a character­
istic, if not unique, feminine response. Austen, however, 
makes gratitude equally applicable to men and women, in mari­
tal engagements as in all relationships.
This genderization of virtue creates a double standard, 
reflected in the popularized version of morality offered by
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Richard Steele in Tatler #172, which suggests that "there is 
a Sort of Sex in Souls" and "[t]he virtues have respectively 
a Masculine and a Feminine Cast."66 Addison ducks the question 
*n Spectator #128, while contrasting the "Nature" of men and 
women.
Women in their Nature are much more gay and joyous 
than Men; whether it be that their Blood is more re­
fined, their Fibres more delicate, and their animal 
Spirits more light and volatile; or whether, as some 
have imagined, there may not be a kind of Sex in the 
very Soul, I shall not pretend to determine.67
Addison advises that husbands and wives should strive to ben­
efit from each other's qualities, but much of the essay is 
devoted to showing how "irregular Vivacity of Temper leads 
astray the Hearts of ordinary Women, ■ with unfortunate domes­
tic consequences (10).
There is ample evidence of Austen's familiarity with 
Addison and Steele, and both Margaret Kirkham and Robert 
Uphaus insist that Austen not only rejects the double stan­
dard, but creates heroines who assert independent moral au­
thority. Kirkham argues that:
Jane Austen's heroines are not self-conscious femi­
nists, yet they are all exemplary of the first claim of 
Enlightenment feminism: that women share the same moral 
nature as men, ought to share the same moral status, 
and exercise the same responsibility for their own con­
duct.68
Much of Kirkham's book is concerned with establishing that 
Jane Austen shared the feminist ideas of Mary Wollstonecraft, 
which is also the thesis that Robert Uphaus develops. Uphaus 
notes "Austen's clear departure from the assumption that 
women lacked a full moral character," and finds that she "im-
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plements" Mary Wollstonecraft•s goal for "the consideration 
of women not as moral objects of decorum and propriety, but 
as 'moral beings'.1,69
Paula Cohen also claims that Austen's position "can be 
seen to mark a convergence with Wollstonecraft, ■ and she 
places Austen in opposition to Rousseau's belief that gender 
differences in character and moral capacity are grounded in 
•natural law.“70 The connection suggested by Cohen between 
Austen and Rousseau is tenuous, but her exploration is impor­
tant because it represents one of the few recent serious ef­
forts to connect Austen with the texts of moral philosophy. 
However, her observations on Rousseau apply equally well to 
the "double standard* of popular philosophy and moral behav­
ior as reflected in Addison, Steele, and conduct literature. 
Cohen claims that Austen’s story-telling is a "self-conscious 
declaration that she must depend on other texts for the cre­
ation of her own," which "implies a potential plasticity in 
the code of behavior which governs her novels; ..." The 
authority Austen exercises over her own texts and their moral 
code "testifies to her increased self-confidence as a woman 
and a writer capable of shaping a model for male-female in­
teraction in which both sexes are at last governed by the 
same principles."71
Although I question the Rousseau connection, I agree 
completely with Cohen that Austen is building her own text of 
moral philosophy, within which women characters have or gain 
power, and successfully assert their claims to gender equity
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and moral parity with men. What is important is that scholars 
like Cohen, Uphaus, and Kirkham, who da try to place Austen 
in a moral discourse, and who study the texts of that dis­
course, seem to find her women characters not powerless, but 
strong. Scholars who overlook, exclude or belittle the influ­
ence of moral philosophy, and who concentrate instead on con­
duct literature, legal codes, and perceived ideological re­
pression, see Austen's women as victimized and oppressed. TO 
the extent that an Emma does not seem to fit the pattern, she 
is “not representative" (Moffat) and to the extent that 
Austen does not seem to speak out against female oppression, 
she is engaging in deep irony. This seems to be Susan 
Fraiman's position.
I am arguing . . . that the female protagonist's hu­
miliation, as much as it advances the marriage plot, 
also comments ironically on this plot and on marriage 
as a girl's developmental goal.72
My study, by contrast, follows the approach of those who look 
at Austen in the context of the moralist discourse, but ar­
gues further that the centrality of gratitude to the novels, 
based upon Hutcheson's ideas as mediated by Thomas Sherlock's 
pragmatic Christianity, suggests a unity and coherence lack­
ing in the earlier studies I have noted.
Margaret Kirkham claims that the feminist ideas of 
Austen were buried "in the aftermath of the anti-feminist re­
action which followed Mary Wollstonecraft ’ s death, a time 
when open discussion of feminist ideas, however unexception­
able they might appear to modem readers, was almost impossi­
ble."73 Since Hutcheson's ideas represent, in my opinion, the
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philosophical basis of Austen's feminism/ he may have been 
caught in the same reaction which re-imaged Austen as the 
“gentle Jane“ who wrote “comedies of manners. “ Therefore, his 
importance to Austen's view of gratitude, and its empowerment 
for her women characters, has been lost to modern scholars. 
This is not to argue that Hutcheson is a “feminist" philoso­
pher. His texts reflect the usual masculine universal nouns 
and pronouns, and his examples draw on male historical mod­
els. But, as I have suggested, his radical idea of the ex­
changeability of benevolence and gratitude erases and even 
reverses culturally recognized gender roles.
William Blackstone believes that “Hutcheson became lost, 
historically, between Shaftesbury and Hume, “74 but Blackstone 
clearly is talking about his disappearance in our times. For 
over fifty years after his death in 1746, his texts partici­
pate in philosophical discourse, and the 1771 first edition 
of the Encyclopedia Brittanica, in its article on “Moral 
Philosophy, or Morals," specifically cites Hutcheson, along 
with Shaftesbury, Butler, and “the Stoics.*75 Hobbes, Hume, 
and Mandeville differ from Hutcheson, as well as from most of 
the other sixty-five moralists identified by Selty-Bigge, in 
excluding from their theories a unifying and authoritative 
religious basis. John Mullan appears to see the severance of 
this link as progress.
Famously, he [Hume] abandoned the theocentrism of writ­
ers like Locke and Hutcheson, both of them in different 
ways willing to submit philosophy to the final verdict 
of religious belief.76
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Mullan, of course, does no more than implicitly claim that 
philosophy should be secular study. Because most "theocen- 
tric" moralists believed in human nature as essentially 
benevolent, Mullan also disparages eighteenth-century novels 
which "show benevolence as an operative, reforming influ­
ence," since "it is typically like the benevolence of Pamela 
to the poor of the neighborhood; rewarding the obedience of 
the socially inferior, affirming hierarchy, . .. " (144). 
Mullan, however, fails to do justice to Hutcheson's concept 
of benevolence and gratitude as interchangable, which under­
mines the structure of oppressive hierarchy. As I have ar­
gued, it is this idea, with its profound implications, that 
drives Austen's novels.
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CHAPTER II
THE TEXTS OF VIRTUE: JANE AUSTEN AND MORAL DISCOURSE
Two worlds uneasily coexist in Jane Austen’s novels, as 
well as in the society they mirror. One is a world of laws, 
which administers justice unjustly, and serves the avarice of 
the mean, contemptible, and the simply unworthy. This is the 
world which disinherits mothers and daughters through 
primogentiture reinforced by custom in Sense and Sensibility, 
or through the entailed estate in Pride and Prejudice, the 
world that through fraud, greed, and relentless creditor 
pressure both creates and impoverishes the widowhood of Mrs. 
Smith in Persuasion.
The other world is the world of virtue, which for 
Hutcheson is virtually synonymous with benevolence. For 
Austen, a world driven by virtue represents the only real 
hope for happiness and protection from laws, which invariably 
are perverted by the venial to serve their selfish objec­
tives. Virtue requires self-motivated giving of help or re­
sources; justice relies on laws for protection against harm 
or loss. For Hutcheson, there is no question which is the 
more important, as he reveals in the concluding section of 
Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil.
To conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been 
said, see the true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This 
moral Sense of Excellence in every Appearance, or
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Evidence of Benevolence; and that we have Ideas of 
Virtue and Vice, abstractly from any Law, Human or 
Divine. . . .
But that our first Ideas of moral Good depend not 
on Laws, may plainly appear from our constant 
Inquirys into the Justice of Laws themselves, and 
that not only of human Laws, but of the divine.1
Hutcheson proves his claim by a logical exercise that demon­
strates the futility of seeking the “laws of a Superior* when 
it comes to divine Justice and concludes that the only abso­
lute is divine benevolence as the guide for human virtue.
Austen even shows in Sense and Sensibility that the 
force of legal guarantees of benevolent intent can be twisted 
into a threat used to thwart that benevolence, when Fanny 
Dashwood talks her husband out of a moral commitment to pro­
vide an annuity for his widowed stepmother and her daughters. 
Since an annuity is a legally enforcable fiduciary 
obligation, Fanny frightens John with the possibility that 
his stepmother’s life span might exceed actuarial assump­
tions, and then she adds the clinching argument: •. . . and 
after all you have no thanks for it. They think themselves 
secure, you do no more than what is expected, and it raises 
no gratitude at all."2 Fanny argues that, since the money may 
be seen by the mother as a legal right rather than benevo­
lence, "it raises no gratitude."
Fanny, however, expresses a hard-nosed concept of 
gratitude that has classical support. Cicero encourages 
carefully calculated generosity, both public and private, in 
order to "win us greater gratitude" that will enhance 
personal power and prestige.3 Cicero argues that generosity
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(beneficentia) and gratitude are subject to the overriding 
principle of justice, in which he includes the laws of the 
state. Cicero's De Officiis claims the authority of Socrates 
and Plato in presenting the cardinal virtues of prudence 
(wisdom), justice, fortitude (courage), and ■moderation" or 
■self-control."4 Of these categories, "justice . . .  is the 
crowning glory of the virtues . . . and, close akin to 
justice, charity ['beneficentia'], which may also be called 
kindness or generosity. ■
In the next twenty-four pages of the Loeb Classical 
Library edition, Cicero amplifies on justice, "the crowning 
glory of the virtues," before taking up "kindness and gen­
erosity, " which "calls for the exercise of caution," so that 
generosity will not "be beyond our means" or hurt instead of 
help, "and finally, that it shall be proportioned to the wor­
thiness of the recipient; for this is the corner-stone of 
justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of kindness 
must be measured* (47). It is clear that the scope of gen­
erosity is circumscribed, not only by justice, but also by a 
rather narrowly construed virtue of prudence.
How did Cicero's "beneficentia" become elevated to "benevo­
lence, * the most important virtue for Hutcheson and "the Name of 
Perfection" itself? The answer is that "benevolence" represents 
the linkage of the classical cardinal virtues with the central 
"theological" or Christian virtue of "charity." The scriptural 
foundation of Christian benevolence rests principally on Matthew
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22: 37-40, which records Jesus's response to a loaded question
put to him in the teirple by “one of them, which was a lawyer.*
Master, which is the great commandment in the law?
Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God 
with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with 
all thy mind. This is the first and great command­
ment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love 
thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments 
hang all the law and the prophets.5
This is a sweeping mandate indeed, and Thomas Sherlock af­
firms in his Discourse on this text that "the whole reason of 
religion lies in these two general commandments; that in 
these all particular duties and precepts are founded; . . . “6 
“Benevolence" is among the examples Sherlock uses to illus­
trate the love which Jesus commands, and in a later Discourse 
he amplifies on this topic, using as his text 1 Peter 4:8,
“And above all things have fervent charity among yourselves: 
for charity shall cover the multitude of sins.“
[This epistle] plainly shows how highly the Apostle 
[Peter] esteemed this great virtue of charity; and 
that it is the perfection of a Christian, the very 
life and soul of all other duties. . . . [T]he char­
ity spoken of in the text [has reference to no par­
ticular acts]. It is therefore the principle of char­
ity, or a general benevolence of mind towards one an­
other, which the Apostle recommends.7
The term "charity" as used by Sherlock to mean the "love“ of 
one’s neighbor commanded by Jesus and manifested by “benevo­
lence" reflects, originally, the King James translation of 
caritas from the Latin Vulgate, in turn a translation of the 
Greek aaape. For Sherlock and the earlier translators, love 
and benevolence are indistinguishable, and all three words 
have the same meaning. But the alternative translations have 
evolved into different meanings, so that "charity" is one of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
those terms whose special "resonance" for the eighteenth cen­
tury is, as Mary Poovey suggests, "dim or absent" for modern 
readers.8 But for Sherlock and Austen, love, charity and 
benevolence converge into the same, central Christian virtue, 
and their common quality is giving, not allocating resources 
with due consideration to the circumstances, as Cicero ad­
vises. Maaja Stewart, who has written on gratitude in Tom 
Jones as well as in Austen, observes that the gratitude of 
Miss Bates in Emma expresses this coalescence of meaning.
Her gratitude is not an expression of social humility 
to social superiors that demeans both the giver and 
the receiver, but an expression of trust in "such 
good neighbors and Friends" that is part of her trust 
in life itself as a gift of God. The community called 
forth by Miss Bates is thus the premarket Christian 
community of caritas and reciprocity that coexists 
uneasily with' the dominant market society in the 
novel.9
Stewart's focus is the subjugation of women by the emergent 
British imperialism and capitalism, which debases gratitude 
into a form of enslavement for the powerless, contrasted with 
Miss Bates's Christian gratitude as a vestigial cultural rem­
nant. Stewart fails to recognize, however, that Emma learns 
from Miss Bates, and that Austen tries to show that the "pre­
market" gratitude is not moribund, but survives as the hope 
for virtue in the modem world.
Hutcheson always starts with and leads back to benevo­
lence as "absolutely good" and not justified by useful re­
turns of gratitude, or subject to justice codified in law, as 
Cicero argues. Hutcheson first reverses, then conflates, 
Cicero's justice-benevolence relationship. Neither Hutcheson
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nor Austen attempts to argue for the triumph of virtue over 
vice, but all contend that a system of virtue represents a 
viable alternative, perhaps the only alternative, to selfish 
human nature shielded by law. Hutcheson's near-contemporaries 
and successors, Hobbes, Mandeville, Hume, and Adam Smith, 
however, continue to argue the importance of justice over 
benevolence, but at the same time abandon (with the possible 
exception of Smith) Hutcheson's theocentrism for a secular 
and skeptical view of human nature. Fanny Dashwood's argument 
that charity must be avoided where it does not "earn grati­
tude" is exposed, then, as un-Christian, and this religious 
subtext underscores the venial selfishness of her hypocriti­
cal hiding behind the law.
Sense and Sensibility suggests Austen's disapproval of 
Fanny's idea of gratitude and benevolence. More concrete evi­
dence of Hutcheson’s informing presence has been persuasively 
argued by Mark Loveridge, who identifies Mr. Weston's alpha­
betical conundrum in the later Emma as an algebraic equation 
employed by Hutcheson to express the highest value possible 
for benevolence.10 Mr. Weston poses his riddle to the assem­
bled party at the Box Hill outing.
"— What two letters of the alphabet are there, that 
express perfection?"
"What two letters!— express perfection! I am sure 
I do not know."
"Ah! you will never guess. You (to Emma), I am 
certain, will never guess.— I will tell you.— M. and 
A.—  Em— ma.--Do you understand?"
The reaction to this sally, intended to compliment Emma, is
mixed, but Mr. Knightley has the last word: "Perfection
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should not have come quite so soon" (371), a veiled rebuke 
that he soon makes explicit in chastising Emma for earlier 
humiliating Miss Bates.
The equation Mr. Weston borrows for his conundrum is 
Hutcheson's ■proof" of benevolence as the "Perfection of 
Virtue," presented after four pages of intermediate steps.
Since then Benevolence, or Virtue in any Agent, is 
as M+A, or as Mfcl+A, and no Being can act above his 
natural Ability, that must be the Perfection of 
Virtue where M=A, or when the Being acts to the ut­
most of its Power for the publick Good; and hence the 
Perfection of Virtue in this case, or M*-A is as 
Unity.11
In the process of proof, benevolence is symbolized by “B," 
while "M=Moment of Good, ■ and A represents "Abilitys, ■ so 
that "M=BxA." Austen's adaptation of Hutcheson's unique, if 
not bizarre, mathematics for an alphabet game in Emma is an 
astonishing feat, and could not be accomplished without inti­
mate knowledge and understanding of the philosopher's method 
and objectives. Loveridge suggests that Austen's comic re­
working of Hutcheson might represent "oblique criticism of a 
Moral Sense writer."12 This reading rests on the questionable 
assumption that values cannot be “serious" if they are used 
in "comic" situations. Further, Mr. Knightley's criticism 
that "Perfection should not have come quite so soon" is 
loaded with moral meaning, emphasized by the italics in the 
text that set off the word, which joins Austen and Hutcheson 
in a larger moral discourse. Mark Loveridge's article creates 
a rare opportunity to link specific texts of Austen and 
Hutcheson, and the algebraic "demonstration" of virtue has a
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cameo appearance in Emma to underscore ironically just how 
far Bnma is from "the name of perfection" in her cruel 
ridicule of Miss Bates, whose superior virtue is pointed out 
by Maaja Stewart.
Where did Jane Austen acquire both her specific knowl­
edge of Hutcheson's arcane benevolence formulae, as well as 
the larger understanding of his philosophy which shapes 
gratitude's driving role in the novels? I will discuss three 
possible sources: her father George Austen's library at 
Steventon, sermons heard and read, and periodical literature, 
probably in the form of bound volumes of older journals.
The formulae themselves only appear to have been pub­
lished in "Treatise II" of the first three editions of 
Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.13 
It is probable that more than sixty years must have passed 
since publication before this work seems to have attracted 
Austen's interest, and its domicile for the latter part of 
that period, I suggest, would likely be her father's five 
hundred volume library, sold upon the family’s move to Bath 
in 1801.14 It is an exasperating mystery that no catalog of 
its contents seems to have survived, yet it is scarcely con­
ceivable that this collection was never inventoried. David 
Gilson appears to have done the most exhaustive research, ex­
cept possibly for Deirdre Le Faye, but his investigation 
comes up empty-handed: “Her [Austen's] first recourse would 
have been to her father's library; virtually nothing is known 
of the fate of the books which this comprised, . . ,"15
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The response to xry own personal inquiries also has been that 
no inventory of the library's contents seems to exist.
Nevertheless, moral philosophy and sermon literature 
must have been represented in George Austen's library, and 
Hutcheson's credentials to be among the moralists are 
stronger than most. Republication of Hutcheson's original 
writings ended in the late eighteenth century, except for 
subsequent anthologies of representative moralists, such as 
L. A. Selby-Bigge's 1897 compilation, updated by D. D.
Raphael in 1969. His complete works only became generally 
available to scholars through the seven volume 1971 Georg 
Olms facsimile edition. My count shows twenty-one printings 
or editions of his various writings between 1725 and 1788, of 
which twelve were posthumous (Hutcheson died in 1746), and L. 
A. Selby-Bigge' s 1897 compilation adds translations and edi­
tions of letters under pseudonyms to this total.16 In Selby- 
Bigge' s bibliography, Hutcheson's publications easily exceed 
in number of printings those of the sixty-five other moral­
ists represented, whose writings spanned the late seventeenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, including such canonical fig­
ures as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, and 
David Hume, which testifies both to the large market for 
moral philosophy, as well as to the significant share of that 
market represented by Hutcheson.
Although the comprehensive study of the history of books 
published in the eighteenth century has yet to be completed, 
there cleariy was a lively market for moral and religious
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literature, as indicated by the extensive publication histo­
ries of just the texts discussed in this study. Thomas 
Preston’s research reveals that “an average of 230 books on 
religion was published annually’ over most of the eighteenth 
century,“17 while John Vladamir Price, in “The reading of 
philosophical literature, “ observes that “[i]t would be te­
dious to enumerate the philosophical books that were pub­
lished in just one decade, the 1750's. “18 However, Ian 
Maxted's study of gross publication data makes it possible to 
estimate the religious book market. Maxted tabulates an aver­
age number of titles for most of the second half of the eigh­
teenth century at 600 per annum, rising to 700 in the last 
decade.19 Preston's figures, then, suggest that religious 
books alone represented perhaps more than one-third of the 
market. James Raven concludes that published sermons “were 
such a staple of the eighteenth-century book trade that there 
survive numerous announcements by booksellers pleading that 
the market was saturated and that no new collections could be 
accepted for publication.'20
At what point the market might be "saturated" is hard to 
say, but there certainly must have been a substantial demand 
for sermon literature. The data seems to contradict J. Paul 
Hunter's claim that "they [sermons] seldom caught on with the 
public," although he does argue that "[d]idactic writings in 
the early eighteenth-century were everywhere." These included 
"theological treatises which, . . . often argued points of 
practical divinity and moral obligation as well as creed."21
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I suspect that Hunter is defining ■ sermon" narrowly, 
since many of Sherlock's "Discourses" follow the sermon pat­
tern of explicating a biblical passage referenced or quoted 
at the beginning of the text and relating its significance to 
practical concerns of an audience. Hie length of these 
Discourses is about that of other acknowledged Anglican ser­
mon literature, and when Jane Austen says she is "very fond 
of Sherlock ’ s sermons, * I have no doubt she includes those 
nominally published as Discourses. Whether to stimulate de­
mand for more publishable sermons, or to unload excessive in­
ventories, Thomas Mautner notes that Shaftesbury accused the 
booksellers of fomenting the trade in moral and religious 
texts.
The publishing of books and pamphlets on religion and 
morality had become a very profitable business, so 
profitable indeed that booksellers in their unscrupu­
lous quest for material gain could be suspected, at 
least in jest, of fomenting theological controversy. 
Shaftesbury likened them to a glazier who, in order 
to insure a thriving business, tosses a football to a 
bunch of street urchins on a frosty morning.22
Mautner's conclusion seems somewhat better supported than 
Hunter's, and Jane Austen's observations as both a reader and 
hearer of sermons tends to verify it. Unfortunately, there 
appear to be no surviving sermons of her father, George, or 
of her brother, James,23 and Henry's published sermons proba­
bly were not written or delivered before his ordination in 
1816, a year before Jane Austen died. Nevertheless, her com­
ment in the Letters on Sherlock’s sermons is comparative— she 
"preferfs] them to almost any, "2i— which strongly suggests
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that she could draw on a wide knowledge of sennon literature 
for such comparisons.
In contrast to her admiration of Sherlock, Austen ex­
presses dislike for her cousin, Edward Cooper’s, "new 
Sermons■ as "fuller of Regeneration and Conversion than ever- 
-with the addition of his zeal in the cause of the Bible 
Society."25 The "British and Foreign Bible Society" was 
founded by the Evangelical Anglicans who had formed what came 
to be known in 1812 as the "Church Missionary Society, "2S and 
this object of Edward Cooper's "zeal" reflects the 
Evangelical focus of his Practical and Familiar Sermons. 
Designed for Parochial and Domestic Instruction (1809), which 
went through eight or more British and an 1817 American edi­
tion, testifying at least to the existence of a more recep­
tive audience than Jane Austen. The titles tend to confirm 
the Evangelical approach to piety: "The Unfruitfulness and 
Misery of Sin, * "Mortification of Sin a Reasonable Duty," and 
"The Day of Account." Austen's distaste for the subject of 
"Conversion" may have been stimulated by a sermon entitled 
"Description and Danger of Conviction When not Followed by 
Conversion.”27
Volume one is dedicated to "The Reverend Thomas 
Gisborne," whom Overton identifies as a leading Evangelical, 
and whose sermons his "contemporaries" regarded as "models .
. . of that much neglected art."28 In an 1805 letter, Austen 
thanks Cassandra for having "recommended 'Gisborne'," and 
"having begun," expresses pleasant surprise that she is en­
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joying it.29 Chapman guesses that she refers to An Enquiry 
■into the Duties of the Female Sex, which as conduct litera­
ture avoids the religious exhortation of Evangelical sermons. 
Although Cooper's dedication to Gisborne suggests his own 
self-identification with the Evangelicals, Austen's enjoyment 
of Gisborne's conduct book does not, it seems to me, undercut 
her later professed dislike for the Evangelical sermons pub­
lished by her cousin.
In the absence of surviving sermons by James or her fa­
ther, sermons collected in the nine volumes of The English 
Preacher (1773) suggest that Austen might have heard a pre­
vailing concern with doctrine as reflected in conduct, repre­
senting the growing taste for •practical'' preaching identi­
fied by the compiler, William Enfield.30 The index to this 
work groups sermons by six "Subjects':
I Virtue and Vice in General
II Religion and the Duties of Piety
III Social Virtues and the Opposite Vices
IV Personal Virtue and the Opposite Faults
V Christianity
VI Historical Subjects [from the BibleJ31
Within these subject headings, at least four sermons address 
•charity* as the single most important Christian virtue, re­
inforcing the principle of benevolence and good works.
These categories contrast with what Reverend Overton, a 
mainsteam Anglican and admittedly negative toward the 
Evangelicals within the Church of England, gives as his sum­
mary of the content of Evangelical preaching.
They insisted upon the total depravity of human na­
ture. The image of God was not only defaced but ef­
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faced by the Fall. Restoration to Divine favour was 
effected by Christ not only on behalf of man, but in­
stead of man, who of his own will had no power to 
turn himself Godward.32
This summary of human powerlessness for self-help is clearly 
the doctrine against which Sherlock inveighs. What makes 
Overton useful in his combined capacity both as an historian 
of the established church, as well as a committed cleric, is 
the struggle against his evident bias as he attempts to ac­
knowledge the positive influence of Evangelicalism, not much 
more than a century after the events and writings he dis­
cusses. In some ways, I feel his prejudice may be an indica­
tor of likely attitudes for and against the Evangelicals in 
Jane Austen’s clergy-dominated family.
The dialogue between Hutcheson's theories and Sherlock’s 
advice also suggests the interplay of motive and conduct in 
the novels, which reflects the importance Austen evidently 
attaches to sermons in the spiritual and temporal life of the 
parish. In Pride and Prejudice, when Wickham recalls a desire 
for a clerical life, Elizabeth's immediate question is, "How 
should you have liked making sermons?" Wickham is equally 
quick to respond "Exceedingly well," but Elizabeth reminds 
him that "there was a time when sermon-making was not so 
palatable to you as it seems to be at present; ..." (328- 
29) .
In Mansfield Park. Edmund and Fanny include sermons in a 
wider view of clerical duties, but the Crawford siblings re­
veal indeed that they see little more than sermon-making 
among the clergyman's functions (92-93, 341). Echoing his
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son's feelings, Sir Thomas rebukes them with observations on 
Edmund's duties that seem modelled on Sherlock's Charge to 
the Clerov of the Diocese of London (1759), reportedly the 
only one of these annual pastoral charges that Sherlock al­
lowed to be printed. Henry Crawford tries to advance a scheme 
for his renting the parsonage at Thornton Lacey, on the as­
sumption that Edmund can discharge his clerical offices while 
he continues to live at Mansfield Park. Sir Thomas, however, 
informs him in no uncertain terms that Edmund will reside on 
his living.
It is perfectly natural that you should not have 
thought much on the subject, Mr. Crawford. But a 
parish has wants and claims which can be known only 
by a clergyman constantly resident, and which no 
proxy can be capable of satisfying to the same ex­
tent. . . . [Edmund] knows that human nature needs 
more lessons them a weekly sermon can convey, and 
that if he does not live among his parishioners and 
prove himself by constant attention their well-wisher 
and friend, he does very little either for their good 
or his own. (247-48) .
Sherlock considered residence as "the Foundation of all other
Duties and it would be absurd to speak of any other without
presupposing this."
Can you deliver the Message of Christ, as his 
Ambassador, to Persons to whom you have no access?
Can you oversee the Flock, or Feed the Church, which 
you have forsaken? Can you dispense the Mysteries of 
God to those whom you neither see nor speak to? Can 
you watch for their Souls, to whose Persons, as well 
as to their spiritual Wants, you are a Stranger?33
Austen comes close here to putting Sherlock's words in Sir 
Thomas's mouth to denounce, as Sir Thomas cannot do in the 
confines of polite social discourse, the principles and con­
duct of the Crawfords, as Fanny Price also speaks the Ian-
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guage of Sherlock's sermon text to condemn the erring Henry 
and Maria Bertram in the wilderness at Sotherton.
The terms "wants and claims" of Sir Thomas, and 
Sherlock's rhetorical insistence that the health of "their 
Souls" requires attention to the "Persons" as well as the 
■spiritual Wants" of parishioners in order for the priest to 
"Feed the Church" are the vocabulary of "good works," which 
latitudinarian Anglicans endorse as fundamental to the 
Christian life. Sherlock and Sir Thomas condemn as pastoral 
negligence the focus on spirituality as an excuse for neglect 
of human needs. Even worse for Sherlock is transforming the 
vice of such neglect into a virtue, which Sherlock accuses 
"the enthusiasts" of doing in arguing that faith alone is re­
quired for salvation.
There is, in the language made use of to explain 
the doctrine of grace, something liable to be abused 
by ignorant or crafty men. We say, that of ourselves 
we can do nothing; whence they conclude, that we have 
nothing to do. We say, that it is the grace of God 
which enables us to do every thing; from whence they 
conclude, that every thing must be left to the grace 
of God, and that we need only work ourselves into a 
strong persuasion that God is at work for us, and may 
still ourselves. And this persuasion, which is gener­
ally mere enthusiasm, they dignify with the name of 
Christian faith.
To convince his reader of the need to join faith and works,
Sherlock offers an allegorical parable of a person who
. . . wanted to move a weight, that required double his 
strength to move. If a friend came to his assistance, 
would it not be properly said, that his friend enabled 
him to do what he did? but would it follow that his 
friend did all, and he nothing?
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Should there remain any doubt as to his meaning, Sherlock 
drops the rhetorical questioning and states an unambiguous 
conclusion.
Now then works are necessary to salvation; and it 
matters little in what degree they are necessary, or 
how they are to be named: if they are necessary, you 
must do them; and that is enough to secure the prac­
tice of virtue and holiness in the world.34
Sherlock's position on faith and works stands in sharp con­
trast with the Reverend Cooper's list of topics, and 
Overton's summary of the content of Evangelical preaching.
Benevolence and gratitude link the faith versus works 
debate, whose concern is "salvation,1 with the concerns of 
Hutcheson's moral philosophy. Both benevolence and gratitude 
are feelings that originate in the moral sense, but are fo­
cused on tangible benefits leading to the happiness and well­
being of others. This pragmatism suggests the cooperation of 
head and heart that Blair commends in his comments on 
Hutcheson's last published work, which appeared in the 1755 
Edinburgh Review, where he also praises Sherlock's 
Discourses. Earlier, Hutcheson himself had contributed to 
philosophical discussions in the London Journal and The 
Dublin Weekly Journal.
In his biography of Henry Mackenzie, Harold Thoirpson ar­
gues that the posthumous Hutcheson philosophical discourse 
continues in Henry Mackenzie's The Mirror (1779-80), which 
Catherine Morland's mother in Northanaer Abbev prescribes for 
her despondent daughter (241),35 and in its successor, The 
Lounger (1785-87). Thompson also notes that both Walter Scott
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and later Leigh Hunt recognized Mackenzie's debt to 
Hutcheson.36 Further, The Loiterer (1789-90), a journal of 
Oxford vignettes and collegiate satire edited and largely 
written by Jane's brothers, James and Henry Austen (and to 
which Jane Austen may have contributed at age 15) claims lit­
erary kinship with "The Mirrour" in its first edition. Thus 
it seems that Austen may have encountered Hutchesonian phi­
losophy directly in an early edition of his Inquiry, and also 
through the sentimentalism of Mackenzie's journals, as well 
as through the playful satires on sentiment in The Loiterer. 
But the philosophy reflected in Mackenzie's stories seems to 
have degenerated, from the union of head and heart that Hugh 
Blair approves, into pure feeling and emotionalism. The 
figure of the "sentimentalist'' who substitutes words for ac­
tions recurs, both in Lounger stories and in James and Henry 
Austen's, The Loiterer, where the division of head and heart 
becomes apparently irreversible, and which seems to end the 
Hutchesonian conversation as philosophical discourse. Jane 
Austen's novels, however, reclaim this discourse, and re-con­
nect the "head and heart" that the earlier Edinburgh Review 
applauds.
According to Brian Vickers, Austen "mocked the figure of 
The Man of Feeling in Sand it on. "37 the novel left unfinished 
at her death. Austen also reveals a kind of exasperated ad­
miration of Walter Scott, who both dedicates Waverlv (1814) 
to Mackenzie as "Our Scottish Addison," and who later praises 
Emma highly in an important review.33 However, what Austen im­
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plicitly criticizes in The Mirror is not Hutcheson or 
Mackenzie, but a patronizing essay about proper educational 
influences on young women, attributed to ‘Mr. Alex. 
Abercraniby," later a judge "of the Court of Session in 
Scotland.*39 It seems more likely that Austen “mocks* the sen­
timental figure of the abused Harley in The Man of Feeling, 
who is victimized by his emotional sensitivity, rather than 
the work itself. Comically, Austen seems to affirm both 
Hutcheson and Mackenzie against "sentiment."
Mackenzie uses the genre of sentimental fiction to dis­
close its menace to happiness and, indeed, to survival, but 
his essay "On Novel Writing" in The Lounger is didactic crit­
icism, in the style of Samuel Johnson's Rambler #4, of that 
very genre.
In the enthusiasm of sentiment there is much the 
same danger as in the enthusiasm of religion, of sub­
stituting certain impulses and feelings of what may 
be called a visionary kind, in the place of real 
practical duties, which, in morals, as in theology, 
we might not improperly denominate good works. In 
morals, as in religion, there are not wanting in­
stances of refined sentimentalists, who are contented 
with talking of virtues which they never practice, 
who pay in words what they owe in actions; or per­
haps, what is fully as dangerous, who open their 
minds to impressions which never have any effect upon 
their conduct, but are considered as something for­
eign to and distinct from it.40
Robert D. Mayo observes that "ultimately Mackenzie the novel­
ist says nothing about prose fiction of which Johnson the 
moralist could possibly have disapproved,"41 and joining reli­
gious belief with good works is a consistent theme of 
Sherlock's Discourses.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
In The Mirror, the shift toward sentiment in the 
discourse of Hutcheson's philosophy after his death seems 
particularly relevant to the "Story of LaRoche," a fable of 
the conversion to Christianity of a nortorious skeptic, 
identified subsequently by Mackenzie himself as David Hume, 
who had been Hutcheson's student in Edinburgh. When shown the 
story by Mackenzie, Adam Smith, who had been an Edinburgh 
Review contributor, "immediately recognized its subject (or 
target) as David Hume,*42 and he must also have recognized 
that this story continues posthumously the earlier 
correspondence between Hume and Hutcheson, which records the 
widening gulf between their philosophies.43 "The Story of La 
Roche" appeared three years after Hume's death, and for John 
Mullan, "It is a fiction which, though it cannot quite make 
Hume into a Christian, is an attempt to exorcise the spirit 
of his philosophical reputation."44 The Hume threat to reli­
gious belief cannot have gone unnoticed by Austen, although 
he is only acknowledged, again in Northanaer Abbev (109), as 
the author of The History of England.
By degrees the mind of the philosopher surrenders to the 
fervent and emotional piety of La Roche. "His parishoners 
catched the ardour of the good old man; even the philosopher 
felt himself moved, and forgot for a moment, to think why he 
should not."
La Roche’s religion was that of sentiment, not 
theory, . . .  A philosopher might have called him an 
enthusiast; but if he possessed the fervour of the 
enthusiasts, he was guiltless of their bigotry. "Our
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Father, which art in heaven!" might the good man say- 
-for he felt it— and all mankind were his brethren.45
This careful distinction of LaRoche's version of "sentiment" 
from "enthusiasm* is echoed in Lounger 20 (above), and re­
flects distrust at the individualism of the "enthusiasts" 
claim for a direct relationship with God, versus the social 
nature of religion in benevolent feelings toward "all 
mankind," manifested by good works.
But the sentiment which pulls the erring philosopher 
back to religion in the "Story of La Roche," seems to be 
quite different from the Hutchesonian philosophy "dictated by 
the heart, no less than the head" that the Edinburgh Review 
editor found so commendable. The conclusion of Mackenzie's 
fable notes that the sentiment triggered by "remembrance 
overcame him [the philosopher] even to weakness," which cer­
tainly is not characteristic of Hutcheson's socially involved 
moral agent. It is not even a quality of the good La Roche, 
who through all his trials is a faithful shepherd to his 
flock of parishioners. Sentiment seems to drive out reason, 
at least during moments of "remembrance, ■ and the result is a 
loss of vitality, to which indeed the man who "excelled all" 
others in "the development of abstract subjects"46 may, be­
cause of living in the world of thought, be constitutionally 
vulnerable. This is hinted at by the narrator's comment, 
"[t]he truth was, that indolence was the habit most natural 
to him. "47
I suggest that this "indolent" and "weak" figure is a 
product of the separation of "head" and "heart," and that he
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is recognized as a sort of “species" in the first number of 
The Lounger. "Introduction— Character of the Author, indolent 
with Feeling, and Vacant with Observation."48 Hie piece is not 
self-mocking, contrary to what one might expect, nor does it 
invite an ironic reading. Rather, it privileges "the lounger" 
as an observer and commentator. Nevertheless, "the lounger" 
warns of the "passive feelings of sensibility," after he lis­
tens to a mutual friend tell about a certain Mr. Woodfort who 
is moved to tearful sympathy with distress "in a tender 
novel" or "the representation of a tragedy," but "in real 
life" his "feeling and generosity unaccountably forsake him."
Scarcely ever has he been known to relieve the dis­
tresses he is so willing to pity, or to exercise the 
generosity he is so ready to applaud. The tenants on 
his estate are squeezed for rents higher than their 
farms can afford; his debtors are harassed for pay­
ments, in circumstances which might often plead for 
mitigation or delay. Nay, I know some of his pretty 
near relations, for relief of whose necessities I 
have applied with success to others, after having in 
vain solicited Woodfort's assistance to relieve 
them.49
Not only is Woodfort incapacited by feelings of sentiment, he 
also has lost touch with the morality of his own life. In 
many ways, he suggests a prototype for John Dashwood in Sense 
and Sensibility, who seems moved by the idea of fulfilling 
his father's dying request to provide for his mother and sis­
ters, but whose generous feeling quickly evaporates when 
faced with the impact on his own situation.
The "lounger" adds his own observations to his friend's 
story:
To this it may be proper to add, that the very in­
dulgence in the passive feelings of sensibility has a
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tendency to produce indolence, langour, and fee­
bleness, and to unfit the mind for anything which re­
quires active and firm exertion.50
This observation is appropriate to the speaker in “Characters
of Dr. Villars, and Mr. Sensitive," created for The Loiterer
by W. B. Portal, family friend and school mate of James and
Henry. This tale seems almost an elegy for Hutcheson in the
figure of the venerable Dr. Villars and his somewhat sickly
nephew, Mr. Sensitive.
In all their views of things, the Doctor is sanguine, 
the other inclines to Despondence, and while both 
wish to find things better than perhaps their Nature 
will admit, the one fancies he sees in the world less 
Defect, the other less Excellence than realy exist. .
. . [wjhile the Doctor's Heart expands with a thou­
sand Projects for fostering Virtue, nothing enters 
Mr. Sensitive's Brain but how more effectually to re­
press Vice.51
This comparison captures the degeneration from the elderly 
Villars* benevolent sensibility to the morose romanticism of 
his alienated nephew's sentimentality, who perhaps reappears 
in Persuasion as the forlorn widower and sentimental Byron 
worshipper, Captain Benwick. The Loiterer also associates the 
benevolent Villars with the position represented by Sherlock 
and the latitudinarians on the importance of good works, 
while Mr. Sensitive clearly is identified with the “enthusi­
asts,* whom Mackenzie accuses of “bigotry" in "The Story of 
La Roche.“
By personal example, the Oxford student who narrates 
this tale in The Loiterer seems to show that one may ratio­
nalize inaction, as John Dashwood rationalizes moral inaction 
in Sense and Sensibility when confronted with the desperate
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needs of mother and sisters. The thought processes of both
are alike in justifing their non-involvement, whether moral
action or the pursuit of knowledge.
I account myself, therefore, singularly fortunate, 
who have fallen upon such valuable Friends; . . . 
from whom I may acquire Information without the te­
diousness of Research, and arrive at Truth without 
the Exertion of Reflection. . . . And thus I imbibe 
more real and efficient Knowledge extended at ny Ease 
on the Doctor's Sofa, than toiling through the close 
stowed Learning in the Library of ny College, bewil­
dered among Titles and Indexes, and enveloped in 
Dust. (10)
Hutcheson's steady focus on moral behavior has been converted 
to little more than the idle furniture of the academic mind, 
and "the lounger's" warning has become a fulfilled prophecy. 
Drained of energy and desire, the academic is all mind, but a 
mind passive and inert.
In The Loiterer's story, the "head" and the "heart" have 
become permanently divided, which defines the barely viable 
organism represented by the narrator passively absorbing aca­
demic knowledge on Dr. Villar's sofa. The elderly doctor, 
however, looks back to the philosophy applauded by The 
Edinburgh Review in Hutcheson that combines head and heart, 
and whose goal is human happiness. But The Loiterer's mock 
fin de la ohilosoohie is the challenge Austen picks up, and 
she shows in her novels that benevolence and gratitude belong 
to the world of the present and future, not to miscellaneous 
intellectual acquisitions of the acadeny, or to the decayed 
sentiment of Mr. Sensitive. The supine figure of split and 
de-energized values in The Loiterer symbolizes the spiritual
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sickness caused by the failure of heart and head to work to­
gether.
Before concluding my discussion of "the texts of 
virtue," I would like to address the argument that Austen re­
veals the influence of Bishop Joseph Butler, Hutcheson's near 
contemporary, more than that of any other moralist. J. A. 
Kearney concludes that "[c]losest to her position is that of 
Bishop Butler . . . *52, a relationship also suggested earlier 
by D. D. Devlin, Philip Drew, and Park Honan. Honan dismisses 
Hutcheson as “the eighteenth-century philosopher of happi­
ness,*53 and Devlin merely acknowledges him as the apostle and 
echo of Shaftesbury.54 Drew, like Kearney, ignores Hutcheson, 
and instead argues for Butler against Gilbert Ryle's attempt 
“to establish her affinity" with Shaftesbury.55
My argument for Hutcheson and Sherlock as more important 
does not necessarily exclude ideas attributable to other 
moral philosophers, including Butler. However, I feel that 
these three studies have, collectively, two serious flaws.
The first is that slight consideration is given to 
Hutcheson's texts, when in fact their publication dovetailed 
with the appearance of Butler's major works, and each ac­
knowledged the other, approvingly by Hutcheson, critically by 
Butler.56 Further, Loveridge's brief essay is strongly persua­
sive of Austen's knowledge of Hutcheson, although his article 
in Notes and Queries was published after Devlin's and Drew's 
studies. The case built by Loveridge would seem to require 
some modification of earlier studies, particularly since no
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comparable textual link between Austen and Butler has yet 
been offered.
In the preface to An Essav. Hutcheson actually claims 
for his moral sense theory the support of Butler.
I hope it is a good Omen of something still better 
on this Subject to be expected in the learned World, 
that Mr. Butler, in his Sermons at the Rolls Chapel, 
has done so much Justice to the wise and good Order 
of our Nature.57
Butler, however, does not return the compliment. Although he 
never cites Hutcheson by name, he does seem to attack the 
idea that all virtue is summed up in benevolence. In 
Dissertation: Of the Nature of Virtue, he conflates 
Hutcheson's “moral sense" with his own idea on "conscience" 
under the general category of a "moral faculty,"58 which is 
more responsive to the intrinsic morality of decisions as de­
termined by Christian revelation and influenced by tradi­
tional Christian sanctions of reward and punishment. Such 
considerations make morality more a matter of the individu­
al's relation to God's commands and gives less weight to 
Hutcheson’s standard of the promotion of people’s happiness. 
Therefore, for Butler, "benevolence and the want of it, 
singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and 
vice."59 The significance of Butler's devaluation of benevo­
lence is that it also devalues gratitude by breaking 
Hutcheson's dynamic union of the two, and, in fact, Butler 
has little to say about gratitude. The distance between 
Austen and Butler is proportional to his neglect of grati­
tude. For Butler, gratitude would be considered a "duty," the
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first definition in Johnson's Dictionary cited earlier in 
this study, and "duty" needs little discussion, only compli­
ance with external authority. Since the exchange of benevo­
lence and gratitude in relationships is basic to the growth 
of love in Austen's novels, Butler's different concerns seem 
almost irrelevant.
Butler, on the other hand, does not reject happiness,
but insists that it is more a spiritual satisfaction from
following conscience as our duty. Those who shirk this duty
shall at last find, that he who has given up all the 
advantages of the present world, rather than violate 
his conscience and the relations of life, has in­
finitely better provided for himself, and secured his 
own interest and happiness.60
Nothing could be farther from Austen than this invitation to 
take up the Cross and find happiness in sacrifice. Anne 
Elliot in Persuasion endorses "a strong sense of duty" (246), 
but her referent is the child-parent relationship, and by im­
plication the spousal relationship in marriage, and neither 
Austen nor Hutcheson challenges the mandates of these social 
institutions. In Austen, however, the authority of gratitude 
is always the authority of one's feelings, Johnson's second 
definition of gratitude as "desire.''
Hutcheson's focus is benevolence and gratitude as the 
two faces of virtue's coinage, whose value is stated in the 
quantity of human happiness they bring, and this also seems 
to be Austen's standard of value, not Butler's advice to look 
beyond privation in "the present world" for an ultimate "hap­
piness." But neither is Hutcheson's emphasis on feelings and
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happiness an excuse for hedonism, since the moral sense may 
give wrong readings, and "reason often corrects the report of 
our senses." In my discussion of Mansfield Park. I argue that 
Sherlock's sermon that Kearney quotes, offers a commentary on 
the sexual frolic of Henry Crawford and Maria Bertram in the 
"wilderness" of Sotherton, where reason is lost in the indul­
gence of passion. Sherlock addresses conduct and its conse­
quences, whereas Hutcheson's concern is the instinctive mo­
tive to virtue or vice, leading to the threshold of action, 
where the sermon takes over.
Although in some ways, Sherlock's ideas are not unlike 
Butler's, particularly in their concern with conduct, he 
differs importantly from Butler in lamenting the acrimonious 
divisions among Anglicans, freethinkers, and deists.
You see how nearly natural religion and the Gospel 
are allied in the foundation of their hopes and ex­
pectations. It is a pity such near friends, who have 
but one common interest, should have any disputes.
But disputes there are.61
By contrast, Overton points out that Butler wrote The Analogy
of. Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and
Course of Nature (1736) "to counteract the practical mischief
which he thought the Freethinkers . . . were doing. ■62 As I
have suggested, there is a rigidity and other-worldliness to
Butler that devalues the goal of human happiness for falli-
able beings in Austen, but with which Sherlock seems much
more in tune. Both Butler and Sherlock were products of
Cambridge, but Butler scholar Ernest Mossner sees him as a
minority view against the dominant "selfish or utilitarian
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school, basing itself on Locke and Newton," and he identifies 
Sherlock with this “school."63 MOssner's choice of the term 
"selfish" is unfortunate and suggests a misleading connection 
with the diametrically opposed ideas of Hobbes, Mandeville, 
and Hume. However, "utilitarian" does seem to apply to 
Sherlock's concern with the practical benefits of Christian 
principle, such as charity, as well as to Hutcheson's 
standard that virtue is measured by its contribution to human 
happiness.
"Happiness" for Austen is, indeed, "salvation" for her
characters, and her dramas seem to work like Sherlock's
parables, whose homely examples illuminate larger truths.
Even an apparently trivial incident in Austen's incomplete
1804 work, The Watsons, contrives to make a larger statement
about benevolence, gratitude, and happiness. A fine, ten-year
old boy, "uncommonly fond of dancing," is allowed by an
indulgent mother to join the adults at a ball. Emma, the
heroine, observes that his delight at securing a young,
pretty partner is quickly dashed when the partner seizes a
better opportunity.
If the poor little boy's face had in it’s [sic] hap­
piness been interesting to Emma, it was infinitely 
more so under this sudden reverse;— he stood the pic­
ture of disappointment, with crimson'd cheeks, quiv­
ering lips, & eyes bent on the floor. His mother, 
stifling her own mortification, tried to sooth his, 
with the prospect of Miss Osborne's second promise; —  
but tho' he contrived to utter with an effort of 
Boyish Bravery "Oh! I do not mind it"— it was very 
evident by the unceasing agitation of his features 
that he minded it as much as ever.— Emma did not 
think, or reflect;— she felt and acted— . "I shall be 
very happy to dance with you Sir, if you like it." 
said she, holding out her hand with the most unaf­
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fected good humour.— The Bey in one moment restored 
to all his first delight— looked joyfully at his 
Mother . . . The Thankfulness of Mrs. Blake was more 
diffuse;— with a look, most expressive of unexpected 
pleasure, & lively Gratitude, she turned to her 
neighbour with repeated & fervent acknowledgements of 
so great & condescending a kindness to her boy.64
A great deal is packed into this little story to make it a 
crystalline parable of virtue that exemplifies unimpeachable 
benevolence and gratitude. Emma's action is utterly sponta­
neous feeling— "she felt and acted"— unlike Cicero's and 
Fanny Dashwood's careful weighing of benevolence against cal­
culations of reciprocal gratitude. Her action is pure benevo­
lence, free of any taint of self-interest or (presumably) 
sexual attraction, since the lad is too young for banter such 
as Henry Tilney's flirtatious comment to Catherine Morland in 
Northancter Abbev that "I consider a country-dance as an em­
blem of marriage" (76) . Finally, gratitude is felt both by 
the beneficiary and his mother, the observer of Emma's in­
stinctive compassion, which testifies to the propagation of 
virtue by example.
Austen's parable draws on the commonplace to reveal 
virtue in action. Sherlock provides the moral commentary, 
based on his reading of the biblical commandment to "love thy 
neighbour as thyself" (Matthew 22:39). For Sherlock, "love, 
with respect to our equals, is friendship and benevolence: 
towards inferiors it is courtesy and condescension:, . . .6S 
Austen erases the distinction between "equal" and "inferior" 
in her story. Emma’s gesture in addressing her young partner 
as "Sir" may only be gallantry, but it bridges any inequality
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of status due to age, and offering herself as the bey's dance 
partner qualifies as the ■benevolence" that Sherlock consid­
ers an act of Christian love, and reflects that "democratiza­
tion" of virtue that Scott finds in Hutcheson.
Austen's opposition to the genderization of virtue is 
demonstrated when she re-writes this parable in Emma, in 
which virtually the identical scenario is repeated in a more 
complex version with gender roles reversed. Mr. Knightley 
steps to the rescue of this later Emma's proteg£, Harriet, 
who has been cruelly snubbed at the Crown Inn ball, and 
dances with her, for which Emma is "all pleasure and grati­
tude" (328). Further, Mr. Knightley's benevolent act encour­
ages Harriet to consider their inequality of station not so 
formidable as to preclude thoughts of marriage— a backfire of 
benevolence that, of course, creates comic problems of hor­
rendous proportions. Hutcheson does acknowledge that reason 
may be needed to correct the false report of our senses, 
butit deserts Harriet to give an ironic twist to the rather 
"pat" version of the benevolent dance partner tale unfolded 
in the earlier work.
Dancing, however, stops short of being a metonymy for
married life in Austen, although Henry Tilney seems to argue
that it is, with the exception that the duties of dance
partners to each other are reversed in marriage.
I consider a country-dance as an emblem of marriage. .
. . In marriage, the man is supposed to provide for 
the support of the woman; the woman to make the home 
agreeable to the man; he is to purvey, and she is 
tosmile. 3ut in dancing, their duties are exactly 
changed; the acreeableness, the compliance are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
expected from him, while she furnishes the fan and the 
lavender water. (76-77)
By accepting him as a dance partner, Henry claims that the
woman exercises the power to make the dance happen, whereas
in marriage the husband provides for the needs of the union.
Tilney‘s theory implies, then, that the reciprocal response
of gratitude is owed by the man in the dance and by the woman
in marriage, but the literal-minded Catherine seems
instinctively to reject, not Henry's logic, but the
fundamental premise that any connection exists between
dancing and marriage.
People that marry can never part, but must go and keep 
house together. People that dance, only stand opposite 
each other in a long room for half an hour. . . .  I 
cannot look upon them at all in the same light, nor 
think the same duties belong to them. (77)
Paradoxically, Henry later finds himself bound by gratitude
even more strongly in proposing marriage than in offering his
hand in the dance, as Austen turns his own simile against
him.
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CHAPTER III
DISCOVERING GRATITUDE: THE SEARCH FOR MORAL GUIDANCE 
IN NORTHANGER ABBEY AND SENSE AND. SENSIBILITY
Northanaer Abbev reveals that growing up as a young 
woman in Regency England is to experience brutality and de­
ception, and that the lessons learned are one's own power­
lessness in the face of hostile force end violence, expressed 
as restraint, constraint, assault, and intrigue. Claudia 
Johnson observes that "bullying of various sorts is rampant" 
in Northanaer Abbev and that characters "resort even to phys­
ical compulsion."1 Gratitude is also shown to be moral compul­
sion which, however, may be a peaceful alternative to the at­
tainment of objectives by physical force, although at first 
it seems to serve the ends of oppression. Gratitude is liber­
ated from serving tyranny by the claim on Henry Tilney that 
Catherine Morland successfully opposes to the demands of his 
father, General Tilney, who can claim the authority of filial 
gratitude.
I must confess that his [Henry's] affection origi­
nated in nothing better than gratitude, or, in other 
words, that a persuasion of her partiality for him 
had been the only cause of giving her a serious 
thought. (243)
Nevertheless, Austen's narrative explanation that grati­
tude is Henry's motive for proposing marriage seems gratu­
itous. What purpose is served by this reader enlightenment? I 
suggest that behind the story of Henry as the center of a 
gratitude conflict between Catherine and his father, and be-
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neath his veneer of a civilized, worldly, mentor, Austen sees 
Henry as sexually abusive and violent toward Catherine. His 
■gratitude* may or may not be read as remorse, but does seem 
to represent sort of a quid pro quo acknowledged toward his 
victim. The narrative assurance of "perfect felicity* await­
ing them (250) is heavy irony, since Austen has already in­
terposed the obligation of gratitude for a scoundrel whose 
offense reveals him incapable of love.
Austen, then, is telling two stories at the same time, 
and she superimposes the lighthearted story of Catherine's 
awakening from a gothic dreamworld on the nightmare of a 
young woman's sexual victimization by adapting the genre and 
traditions of the fable. Gratitude can be seen as the link 
between the stories and genres.
In Northanaer Abbev. gratitude seems drained of emo­
tional content. Instead, it means obligation, conduct, and 
behavior, and seems to have little to do with the feelings. 
The concept is that of a manifest "duty," Samuel Johnson's 
first definition in his 1755 Dictionary, and not that of a 
powerful "feeling," Johnson's second definition. In all other 
Austen novels except for Northanoer Abbey and Sense and 
Sensibility, gratitude is feeling, and a necessary ingredient 
in love. Gratitude is also feeling in Samuel Hutcheson's phi­
losophy, and the absence of any suggestion of Hutcheson's 
philosophy suggests that Northanaer Abbev (originally Susan) 
was composed before First Impressions (later published as 
Pride and Prejudice), possibly even earlier than Elinor and
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Marianne, the epistolary version of Sense and Sensibility, 
written in Jane Austen's twenty-first year.2 Jan Fergus seems 
to accept the chronology that places Susan as a later canpo- 
sition than the original versions of the other two novels, 
but contends that "in it Austen reverts to the inodes of bur­
lesque and parody that she had enjoyed in the juvenilia."3 
Although Susan clearly was revised, both before its sale to 
Crosby in 1803 as well as prior to its contemplated publica­
tion as Northanaer Abbev in 1813, I believe the role of grat­
itude places it, not as a "reversion," but as a composition 
much closer to Austen's Juvenilia, where there is a continu­
ing challenge to the authority of gratitude, which is bur­
lesqued and spoofed, as a kind of youthful rebellion against 
an imposed and burdensome duty.
The germ of Austen's plot seems to be found in the epis­
tolary Ladv Susan, dated by Chapman as probably composed in 
1793 or the following year. The ogre in the earlier work cor­
responding to the widower General Tilney is the widowed Lady 
Susan, who holds her terrified daughter, Frederica, in fear­
ful and abusive bondage, a bondage implied in the iron grip 
of the General on his children in Northanaer Abbev. Lady 
Susan's sister-in-law schemes to free Frederica from her 
mother by attaching her to Reginald, a young man whom the 
mother happens to have set her sights on as well. The sister- 
in-law describes her observations of the pair, and the quali­
ties of the intended husband which she counts on for the plan 
to work.
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I cannot help fancying that she is growing partial to 
[Reginald], I so often see her eyes fixed on his face 
with a remarkable expression of pensive admiration! .
. . I am much mistaken if a syllable of his uttering, 
escape her.
I want to make him sensible of all this, for we 
know the power of gratitude on a heart such as his; & 
could Frederica's artless affection detach him from 
her Mother, we might bless the day which brought her 
to Churchill.4
Although there is gender reversal of characters, the plot 
still relies on the power of gratitude to encourage a mar­
riage proposal, and to free Frederica from her mother's 
clutches, as it also releases Henry from his father's 
tyranny. The erotic symbolism of Frederica's “eyes fixed on 
his face’ also recurs in Catherine Morland's gaze of surren­
der on Henry Tilney before his attack.
As I have suggested, claims to gratitude may empower the 
powerless, but this power is costly. In Northanaer Abbev. the 
quid pro quo of gratitude can also be seen as, perhaps, even 
more like a pay-off to Catherine. Gratitude is probed and 
satirized in other works from the Juvenilia, and the chal­
lenge always seems to be that the price, whether in moral 
values or personal integrity, is too high.’ In “A Letter from 
a Young Lady" in the miscellany collected as "Scraps,"5 the 
writer willingly gives perjured testimony to support a fraud­
ulent plaintiff, who "in gratitude waited on me the next day 
with an offer of his hand" (MW 175). "Evelyn" (1792) is an 
extended burlesque of excessive gratitude, which is pushed to 
reductio ad absurdum. and In "Jack and Alice" (1787-90),
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Lucy declines an offered life of comfort and security because
of the burden of gratitude.
Your Ladyship’s kind wish of my always remaining with 
you, is noble and generous but I cannot think of be­
coming so great a burden on one I so much love & es­
teem. That one should receive obligations only from 
those we despise, is a sentiment instilled into my 
mind by my worthy aunt, in my early years, & cannot 
in ny opinion be too strictly adhered to. (MW 27)
These youthful challenges to gratitude suggest an effort to 
degrade its sacrosanct status, or at least to convert it from 
a childhood burden to a resource for rebellion. The authori­
tarian targets may be the law, as in "A Letter, • or parents, 
as in Ladv Susan and Northanoer.
The burden in Northancrer Abbev that bears on the Tilney 
children, as well as on Catherine, is General Tilney. Why 
should Catherine’s claim to gratitude be superior to that of 
Henry’s father? The General can also marshall gratitude’s 
heavy artillery on his own behalf to demand that Henry obey 
his directive to drop Catherine. The difference seems to be 
that gratitude may create a constructive engagement to marry, 
and therefore prior claims are subordinate to the performance 
of this covenant. The child’s duty of gratitude to a parent 
as inherent in the relationship itself is affirmed by a long 
line of literary and philosophical texts. After humiliation 
by Goneril, King Lear turns in pathetic desperation to her 
sister, Regan.
Thou better know'st 
The offices of nature, bond of childhood,
Effects of courtesy, dues of gratitude.
(Act 2, Scene 4, 169-71)
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What are the "dues of gratitude" owed under the "bond of 
childhood?" Sir William Blackstone gives filial obligation 
the force of law for the eighteenth century, based on "a
principle of natural justice and retribution.........For to
those who gave us existence we naturally owe subjection and 
obedience during our minority, and honour and reverence ever 
after.“6
Conversely, violation of the "bond of childhood" with a
parent is ingratitude, which David Hume denounces as a crime
that aggravates offenses against parents.
Of all crimes that human creatures are capable of 
committing, the most horrid and unnatural is ingrati­
tude, especially when it is committed against par­
ents, . . .7
The paradigm for filial gratitude is found in an eighteenth- 
century Anglican sermon to be the Christian's relationship 
with God.
Our blessed Lord . . . represented his Father as al­
together good, and kind, and lovely, and enjoined 
obedience to him as a free tribute of gratitude and 
love; as the homage of affection, not of fear; as the 
duty of a son, not the work of a servant.8
Although fear does seem present in the Tilney children's
“homage* to their father, the General nevertheless has a
strong practical claim, in addition to cultural support, to
Henry's gratitude, since he owns the parsonage property and
controls the living at Woodston, where Henry now serves as
parish priest.
The house stands among fine meadows facing the south­
east, with an excellent kitchen-garden in the same 
aspect; the walls surrounding which I built and 
stocked myself about ten years ago, for the benefit 
of my son. It is a family living, Miss Morland; and
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the property in the place being chiefly my own, you 
may believe I take care that it shall not be a bad 
one. Did Henry’s income depend solely on this living, 
he would not be ill provided for. (176)
Thus Henry's recognition of a ■superior" gratitude owed to
Catherine must overcome the formidable opposing claims of his
father. Further, the gratitude that motivates Henry, as well
as that invoked by Shakespeare and Blackstone, is recognized
as obligation or "duty, * unrelated to the "feelings." At
most, Henry's gratitude is a reasoned response to Catherine's
feelings, and a reversal of Dr. John Gregory's analysis of a
woman's response to a man's love.
— What is commonly called love among you, is rather 
gratitude, and a partiality to the nan who prefers 
you to the rest of your sex: and such a nan you often 
marry, with little of either personal esteem or af­
fection. Indeed, without any unusual share of natural 
sensibility, and very peculiar good fortune, a woman 
in this country has very little probability of marry­
ing for love.9
Gregory's theory is based on the widely shared assumption 
among his contemporaries that men are more passionate and ca­
pable of love than women, and Austen seems determined to con­
test this premise. After Catherine's first meeting and dance 
with Henry, the narrator speculates on whether Catherine will 
dream of him that night.
Whether she thought of him so much, while she drank 
her warm wine and water, and prepared herself for 
bed, as to dream of him when there, cannot be ascer­
tained; but I hope it was no more than in a slight 
slumber, or a morning doze at most; for if it be 
true, as a celebrated writer has maintained, that no 
young lady can be justified in falling in love before 
the gentleman's love is declared, it must be very im­
proper that a young lady should dream of a gentleman 
before the gentleman is known to have dreamt of her.
(30)
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Hie “celebrated writer* is revealed in a footnote to be “Mr. 
Richardson," writing in “Rambler“ #97, but the relationship 
of initiative and response attributed to him shares the same 
assumptions as Gregory's essay. Hie unvoiced comment in 
Austen's humorous sally, of course, is how little these male 
"authorities" know about women's feelings, and the absurd 
logic which subjects the unconscious to a rule of behavior 
mocks their assumptions, despite Austen's admiration for both 
Richardson and Johnson.
Austen frequently presents gratitude as a sort of obli­
gation incurred in response to the love of another, but she 
seems to argue that it may equally well define man's response 
to woman's affection, as it does for Henry Tilney, or indeed 
be the precursor of love for both. In Persuasion, her last 
novel, Frederick Wentworth speculates to Anne Elliot on the 
possible explanation for the unlikely engagement of Captain 
Benwick to Louisa Musgrove.
Had it been the effect of gratitude, had he learnt to 
love her, because he believed her to be preferring 
him, it would have been another thing. But I have no 
reason to suppose it so. (182-3)
Gratitude here is seen as sufficiently powerful to overcome 
the contrasts in temperament and character that would seem to 
make their union improbable, but it does not necessarily 
speak well for future happiness, or for the concordance of 
feeling that eventually joins the hearts of Anne and 
Frederick, and which readers are encouraged to believe will 
also unite Henry and Catherine. Indeed, as obligation, grati­
tude may be a potent threat to future happiness, as Wentworth
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himself realizes with dismay that, because of his own earlier 
attentiveness to Louisa, he “was hers in honour if she wished 
it."
He found too late, in short, that he had entangled 
himself; and that precisely as he became fully satis­
fied of his not caring for Louisa at all, he must re­
gard himself as bound to her, if her sentiments for 
him were what the Harvilles supposed. (242)
He is, fortunately, rescued by “the astonishing and felici­
tous intelligence of her engagement with Benwick* (243). 
Narrative explanation of Henry Tilney's gratitude discloses 
that he, too, recognizes the same constraints that Wentworth 
acknowledges.
He felt himself bound as much in honour as in affec­
tion to Miss Morland, and believing that heart to be 
his own which he had been directed to gain, no unwor­
thy reaction of a tacit consent, no reversing decree 
of unjustifiable anger, could shake his fidelity, or 
influence the resolutions it prompted. (247)
Since filial obedience to his father's directive turns out to 
have been the basis of Henry's courtship, the argument seems 
to be that the General must live with the consequences of 
Henry’s success. Legal terms such as "bound,“ “tacit con­
sent," and "decree" invest the argument with the judgment of 
the moral court that General Tilney has waived his rights to 
gratitude and assigned them to Catherine.
Austen, however, leaves final judgment of competing
claims to the reader, to whom she presents the moral question
that the novel is supposed to address, and which readers may
answer as they interpret the facts.
I leave it to be settled by whomsoever it may con­
cern, whether the tendency of this work be altogether
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to recommend parental tyranny, or reward filial dis­
obedience. (252)
But implied in the subtext is an equally sweeping moral ques­
tion, "what price gratitude?" Catherines claim to Henry's 
gratitude is power for the powerless, but she has gained it 
at substantial personal cost. The form of the didactic moral 
question that ends the novel also is characteristic of fables 
and biblical parables, such as those enployed for moral or 
religious instruction, texts with which Austen, who may have 
been still in her teens, would be better acquainted than with 
the works of moral philosophy that seem to inform her later 
novels.
Another "fable" in Catherine's schooling is John Gay's 
■The Hare and Many Friends," which "she learnt . . .  as 
quickly as any girl in England* (14). Gay's fable teaches a 
lesson about human nature through bestial allegory just the 
reverse of the biblical Good Samaritan parable.10 A hare, be­
set by hounds, exhausts herself in evasive action, and begs 
to be carried out of danger by, successively, a horse, bull, 
goat, sheep, and calf. Each claims some kind of incapacity to 
help, but says that the next animal to follow will surely 
give the hare a ride. The calf, however, although the hare's 
last hope, pleads that he would offend the others by helping 
her after they had declined.
Should I presume to bear you hence,
Those friends of mine may take offence.
Excuse me, then. You know my heart,
But dearest friends, alas! must part.
How shall we all lament! Adieu.
For see the hounds are just in view.11
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The reader turns with the hare to see violent death at hand, 
more terrifying in anticipation than the event itself. And 
this fable is what Catherine "learnt as quickly as any girl 
in England"? Although Austen may be seen as making some kind 
of joke about moral instruction, I think the significance 
lies in the meaning of "learnt." The mock drama of the novel 
is that the adolescent Catherine is "training for a heroine" 
(15), and "learnt" may mean that she learns the truth of this 
fable in her own experience, not necessarily that she memo­
rizes Gay's verse. Catherine, although not threatened by 
hounds, finds herself regularly betrayed, forced, dropped, or 
neglected by those in whom she places her trust. All of these 
parables and fables inform Catherine's story, and their vio­
lence represents a subtext commentary on what usually passes 
for innocuous horseplay in Austen's comedy.
Catherine herself is the hare, but Austen's comic drama 
masks forces that threaten her happiness quite as deadly as 
the hounds and reveals the defenselessness of a young woman 
against the brutality of the ethical system she encounters 
growing up. This system also unites the animals in their com­
mon refusal to help the hare, who clearly cannot escape her 
"space" that she shares with oppressors and presumed friends. 
Gay's hare is female, but except for the generic labels of 
"sheep* and "goat," all the other animals who might help her 
are identified as male. The significance of this gender dif­
ferentiation seems to be not that men are evil or ruthless, 
but that their moral inertia, which sacrifices an innocent
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victim, is supported by a common system of values. There 
seems to be almost an invisible fence that encloses the 
hare's world, and she can only double back and zig-zag to 
throw off the hounds and the ethical system that conspires 
against her.
Like the hare, Catherine, too, must share the same space 
with friend and foe. A seventeen-year old of Catherine's so­
cial class does not expect freedom of movement, nor does she 
hunger for it. Her social class is surrounded by an invisible 
fence, quite as impenetrable as that which confines the hare. 
In such confinement, where can Catherine look for guidance 
and help in the personal choices that open up to her? At home 
her father, the clergyman, says not a word throughout the 
novel, nor are any thoughts attributed to him independent of 
his wife, whose concerns are more with the health and school­
ing of the six younger children. Both parents are only too 
happy to have their family friends, the Allens, take their 
eldest daughter off their hands. From Fullerton, Catherine is 
conducted to Bath, chaperoned by the the Allens. Catherine 
seeks direction from others, but Mrs. Allen, however, turns 
out to be totally laissez faire, and Mr. Allen is too preoc­
cupied with allieviating his gout and pursuing his own inter­
ests to intervene, except with retrospective comments. Mrs. 
Allen declines to advise Catherine on the propriety of ac­
cepting invitations from the Thorpes for excursions from 
Bath, leaving Catherine with no excuse to follow her con­
flicting inclination to join the less insistent Tilneys, who
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nevertheless turn out to be manipulating her through polite 
manners as she is overtly bullied and lied to by the Thorpes. 
Her brother, James, might be expected to be an authoritative 
source of guidance, but he is befuddled by love of Isabella 
Thorpe, and reinforces their demands against the wishes of 
his sister.
Catherine’s education at home is delegated to books, and 
allowed wide latitude in her reading, she avoids "books of 
information" (15), but gobbles up an eclectic diet of poetry, 
gothic romance, Shakespeare, and Gay’s Fables. Ironically, 
this mix seems to offer a more faithful foreshadowing of the 
near future them morally instructive "books of information." 
Catherine brings heme with her the mental cruelty she suffers 
at the abbey, but finds no solace in her family's bosQm for 
the rental anguish she betrays, which her mother attributes 
to a let-down after enjoying the elegant life with the 
Tilney's. In yet another parental abdication to textual in­
struction, her mother runs off to fetch volume one of The 
Mirror, which contains, she states, "a very clever Essay . .
. about young girls that have been spoilt for home by great 
acquaintance,"12 which she expects will cure Catherine's 
malaise (241). The real cure, of course, is presented as 
Henry’s unexpected arrival and marriage proposal.
As is obvious to any reader, the novel both praises and 
spoofs the popular gothic romance, in particular Ann 
Radcliffe's The Mysteries of Udoloho (1774), whose heroine is 
pulled and pushed violently through a labyrinth of medieval
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geography, before emerging intact and happy. Claudia Johnson 
argues that the “physical compulsion" in Northanaer Abbev 
“emphasizes the political subtext of gothic conventions: her 
[Radcliffe's] villain, General Tilney, is not only a repres­
sive father, but also a self-professed defender of national 
security.*13 Johnson seems to see the novel more as a politi­
cal and cultural critique of Regency England, but I suggest 
its principal concern is with the psychological anxieties of 
a young woman, dependent on others for both security and hap­
piness. Uncertain of her authority to make her own decisions, 
as well as lacking the power to do so, she writes herself 
into the scripts of the gothic novels she devours.
Both readings, however, are commonplace, and there is no 
doubt that Catherine's predicaments reflect a political and 
cultural context. Claudia Johnson also argues against inter­
pretations that find that “Austen's parody in Northanaer 
Abbev debunks gothic conventions out of an allegiance to the 
commonsense world of the ordinary, where life is sane and de­
pendable, if not always pleasant."
But by showing that the gothic is in fact the inside 
out of the ordinary, that the abbey does indeed pre­
sent a disconcerting double image, particularly for­
bidding and arrogant to one who, like Catherine, does 
not have an entree. Northanaer Abbev does not refute, 
but rather clarifies and reclaims, gothic conventions 
in distinctly political ways.14
As I have suggested, I think Johnson veers off hastily toward 
a political interpretation, but I do agree that the novel re­
veals "the gothic" to be more reality than fiction in 
Catherine's experience. Nevertheless, I would argue that
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Catherine’s life is an overlapping of many texts, including 
both ancient fables and biblical parables as well as Gay's 
modem satiric versions, and their biblical parable counter­
parts.
Marilyn Butler sees "[a] 11 of Jane Austen's novels" as 
■fables which act out traditional concepts of the qualities 
and the role of the gentry, ■ specifically "a pointed adapta­
tion of the Cinderella nyth."15 Butler's sweeping theory needs 
more support than she provides, but certainly a number of fa­
bles are combined in Northanaer Abbev. Like Radcliffe, Austen 
eventually offers explanations that explain the apparently 
marvelous in terms of the commonplace and probable, such as 
Henry Tilney's debunking of Catherine's gothic fantasy about 
the fate of his mother. For Mark Loveridge, the reader also 
is expected to learn from the debunking of the marvellous.
The reading mind must be led to make an inference from 
the narrative— the "fable"— to the moral that the fa­
ble is designed to reveal (Austen reminds her readers 
that novels and fables share interests, in her dis­
creet reference in the first chapter to John Gay's fa­
ble of "The Hare and Many Friends). "16
As I have suggested Catherine learns from experience that
there is no escape from the vicious "hounds" of life, unlike
gothic novels that find a safe haven for heroines.
Certainly if any safe haven were to beckon Catherine, 
she should find security among the powerful and close-knit 
Tilneys in the shelter of their "abbey." Yet Austen uses the 
verb "seemed" to describe Catherine's impressions of the 
Tilneys on the first two occasions of seeing them en famille, 
which lends mysteriousness and a sense of illusion to her ex-
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periences, heightened by her feeling of "awe" in the 
General's presence, whose progressive "metamorphosis* for 
Loveridge includes transformation into a "repressive and ra­
pacious ogre."17 "Awe" is the eighteeth-century response to 
"the sublime" that suggests the immanence of supreme and per­
haps occult power, dangerous even if not an immediate threat 
to one’s personal safety, and Catherine's awe foreshadows the 
evidence of that power, later to be directed at her. When the 
mystery of the General's inexplicable volte-face is unrav­
elled, Catherine is revealed to have been identified as a 
suitably wealthy prospective bride for Henry, and maneuvered 
into visiting Northanger Abbey under a strategy masterminded 
by the General and executed by his children. Leaving Bath, 
the caravan of coach and four, followed by Henry's curricle, 
is like a troop movement. The trip is referred to as "their 
journey into Gloucestershire," and the preposition "into" 
seems to emphasize that Catherine is leaving one enclosed 
space, only to enter another as captive, albeit a willing 
one, of her hosts. Her path leads into increasing confinement 
and restricted movement, until she is face-to-face with the 
agent of her undoing, at the point of her least ability to 
resist.
Her approach to the abbey grounds penetrates deeper into 
a series of further enclosures, as she "found herself passing 
through the great gates of the lodge into the very grounds of 
Northanger," thence "actually under the Abbey walls," "be­
neath the shelter of the old porch," and "passed on to the
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hall, . . " (161). Her survey of the grounds, conducted the 
morning after her arrival, confirms that indeed she is cap­
tive in a beautiful prison.
The whole building enclosed a large court; and two 
sides of the quadrangle, rich in Gothic ornaments, 
stood forward for admiration. The remainder was shut 
off by knolls of old trees, or luxuriant plantations, 
and the steep woody hills rising behind to give it 
shelter, were beautiful even in the leafless month of 
March. (177)
The setting is remarkably like another luxurious prison, the 
Happy Valley in Samuel Johnson's fable, Rasselas. with which 
Northanaer Abbev shares other similarities, as noted by Mark 
Loveridge18 and Frederick Keener.19
The place . . . was a spacious valley . . . sur­
rounded on every side by mountains, [from which] 
rivulets descended that filled all the valley with 
verdure and fertility, . . .
The sides of the mountains were covered with trees, 
the banks of the brooks were diversified with flowers;
. . .All the diversities of the world were brought 
together, the blessings of nature were collected, and 
its evils extracted and excluded.20
Northanger Abbey is really a self-contained kingdom, and the
General impresses on Catherine the scope of his reign, which
extends to Henry's living and vicarage at Woodston, twenty
miles from Northanger. Enlarging on his philosophy that "ev-
ery young man" should have "some employment," he notes that
"[e]ven Frederick, my eldest son, you see, who will perhaps
inherit as considerable a landed property as any private man
in the county, has his profession" (176).
Having drawn this vaguely defined but impressive map of 
the kingdom, the General conducts Catherine on an inspection 
of its attractions, particularly the "kitchen-garden."
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The walls seemed countless in number, endless in 
length; a village of hot-houses seemed to arise among 
them, and a whole parish to be at work within the in­
closure. (178).
The whole domain, however, is a vast, comfortable, prison, as 
the "countless walls" suggest, presided over by a master ar­
tificer who creates botanical wonders such as pineapples 
(178) in the hot-houses and kitchen-garden.
But only the wizard of fable could transform himself 
once more into the ogre who inexplicably evicts Catherine, 
even though a plausible explanation is later offered of the 
General as the dupe of John Thorpe, who misled him about 
Catherine’s wealth. Catherine is jolted into new proof of her 
powerlessness, and even Eleanor again seems enchanted into 
powerlessness as well, when she pleads with Catherine to for­
give her for bearing the message of her expulsion.
. . . yet, I trust you will acquit me, for you must 
have been long enough in this house to see that I am 
but a nominal mistress of it, that iry real power is 
nothing. (225)
Throughout the novel, Catherine’s powerlessness is re­
vealed. Henry reminds her that in both "matrimony and dancing 
. . . man has the advantage of choice, woman only the power 
of refusal;" (77), but the sententious gravity of the state­
ment is masked as flirtatious banter and dismissed by the 
literal-minded Catherine, who is not disposed to look beyond 
her enjoyment of the dance. John Thorpe lacks Henry’s grace 
and sense of scene, but physically demonstrates Catherine's 
powerlessness when he contrives to get her into his car­
riage. Catherine, however, finds that Thorpe has misled her
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that the Tilneys had called off a prior engagement with her
when she sees them from the carriage.
"Stop, stop, Mr. Thorpe, . . . How could you tell me 
they were gone?— Stop, stop, I will get out this mo­
ment and go to them.* But to what purpose did she 
speak?— Thorpe only lashed his horse into a brisker 
trot; . . . Catherine, angry and vexed as she was, 
having no power of getting away, was obliged to give 
up the point and submit. (87)
If Catherine is indirectly restrained from leaping by fear of
injury, on the next occasion she is physically held back from
keeping her postponed date with the Tilneys. Further, her
brother, James, backs up the Thorpes by an appeal to sisterly
loyalty.
Isabella, however, caught hold of one hand; Thorpe of 
the other; and remonstrances poured in from all three. 
Even James was quite angry. (100)
But Catherine insists she will not be "tricked" into violat­
ing her promise to the Tilneys, "[a]nd with these words she 
broke away and hurried off" (101). Catherine must use her own 
physicality to free herself from the combined holds of the 
Thorpes.
Claudia Johnson argues that Henry Tilney is no better 
than the other bullies, only "more polished" (37), and I also 
think that Henry's toying with Catherine's unsophisticated 
openness, under orders from the General to woo her, amounts 
to manipulation little different from the use of force. But 
his most severe assault is the reproof he administers to 
Catherine's gothic novel reconstruction of the fate she con­
cocts for General Tilney's deceased wife, whom she imagines
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either murdered, or possibly even alive but hidden away in 
captivity.
Catherine finally penetrates to the innermost recesses 
of the abbey in her clandestine investigation of the room 
Mrs. Tilney had occupied. Her wide-ranging earlier surveys of 
the premises obscured the reality that these chambers offered 
only greater confinement, but this final compartment proves a 
cul-de-sac when she is surprised by Henry’s unexpected re­
turn. Using the same back stairs that gave Catherine access 
to his mother's apartment as a shortcut to his own quarters, 
he catches her red-handed at her most powerless moment, with 
no way out.
For the reader of their ensuing conversation,
Catherine's efforts to change the subject from the true rea­
sons for their unanticipated encounter are hilarious, but 
Henry sees through the awkward efforts of an unskilled pre­
varicator and fills her in on the sad but commonplace circum­
stances of his mother's illness and death nine years earlier. 
After dispelling her illusions, he turns to Catherine’s lurid 
imaginative version.
"And from these circumstances," he replied, (his 
quick eye fixed on her's,) "you infer perhaps the 
probability of some negligence— some— (involuntarily 
she shook her head) — or it may be— of something less 
pardonable." She raised her eyes towards him more 
fully than she had ever done before. (196)
What is this meeting of "his quick eye" with hers, "raised .
. . towards him more fully than she had ever done before?"
Why should this be the occasion for Catherine to deliver her­
self, body and soul, with the symbolic sexuality of direct
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gaze? At this point, Catherine still clings to her psycholog­
ical investment in the idea of General Tilney having aided or 
abetted his wife's death in some way. Her illusions are her 
clothes but, unlike the nythical deluded Emperor, she senses 
the imminent threat of nakedness. By “rais[ing] her eyes to­
wards him more fully than she had ever done before, ■ she 
pleads with Henry, he of the "quick eye," who has the power 
to cover or expose her shame. His response is to disrobe her 
ruthlessly.
"If I understand you rightly, you had formed a sur­
mise of such horror as I have hardly words to— Dear 
Miss Mbrland, consider the dreadful nature of the sus­
picions you have entertained. What have you been judg­
ing from? Remember the country and the age in which we 
live. Remember that we are English, that we are 
Christians. Consult your own understanding, your own 
sense of the probable, your own observation of what is 
passing around you— Does our education prepare us for 
such atrocities? Do our laws connive at them? Could 
they be perpetuated without being known, in a country 
like this, where social and literary intercourse is on 
such a footing; where every man is surrounded by a 
neighborhood of voluntary spies, and where roads and 
newspapers lay every thing open? Dearest Miss Morland, 
what ideas have you been admitting?" (197-8)
Mark Loveridge sees this verbal "assault* as "closer to bul­
lying," echoing Claudia Johnson's view of the whole novel, 
but he seems to minimize the damage to Catherine.
She may be an object of burlesque and ironical humor, 
and she may be the abused and distressed good-hearted 
heroine; at the end of the previous chapter, abused 
and distressed by Henry himself.21
However, Catherine’s purgation of gothic fantasies seems to
disguise a text of sexual violence, whose vocabulary intrudes
into the civilized discourse. Henry begins his attack with
"Dear Miss Morland," a familiarity that degrades her from the
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respectful salutation of “Miss Morland, “ and closes with her 
further degradation to “Dearest Miss Morland, “ accused of 
“admitting," a term with overtones of unchastity, “ideas" 
which Henry replaces as he assumes possession and authority. 
Catherine's roam is at hand by the end of this assault, to 
which she flees “with tears of shame, “ exposed and wounded.
Next to Henry's violation of Catherine, her eviction by 
the General is minor punishment that leaves her person un­
scathed. Gratitude succeeds in securing her abuser as her 
husband, but at the same time seems to validate abuse. 
Austen's didactic “either-or“ question at the novel's end 
plays on the authority of the morally instructive fable or 
parable, but it may also reveal that Austen herself is unsure 
of the true worth of gratitude. Her questioning of gratitude 
continues in Sense and Sensibility, before she grants it in 
Pride and Prejudice the positive role for human happiness ar­
gued by Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Sherlock. Although grat­
itude also leads to love and marriage in later novels, it 
never again serves the ends of sexual oppression.
In Sense and Sensibility22. Jane Austen directly con­
fronts the question of whether firm adherence to the stoical 
virtues can lead to personal happiness, and her answer to 
that question is "no.“ She seems to present a “what if" 
world— "what if" our lives were ruled by the stoic values, 
which among eighteenth-century moralists are encoded in the 
moral philosophy of John Balguy and the so-called “intellec- 
tualists." These values seem to offer philosophical support
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for the contemporary views of woman’s passion and sexuality 
offered in Dr. John Gregory's 1774 A Father's Legacy to his 
Daughters.23 The consequences of Austen's exploration of a 
stoic world are so grim that she seems to waiver, unable to 
leave Marianne Dashwood a sacrifice to their logic, and the 
hurried patching together of relationships at the end of the 
novel suggest a distancing from the world she has created.
Why, then, do scholars such as Park Honan claim that 
Jane Austen “absorbed a strict Christian and stoic morality, “ 
and that “a stoical Christian faith underlies all of Jane 
Austen' s comedies. “24 The reason may be that such readings 
confuse Austen's moral philosophy with that of Sense and 
Sensibility's heroine, Elinor Dashwood, who does espouse 
stoic principles, and who even seems to reach back to early 
classic stoic ideals that underlie their Christianized adap­
tation. The well-known model for texts of classical philoso­
phy is that of the master who guides his students in the 
search for wisdom. This model is particularly apparent in 
Stoic philosophy, such as Epictetus, and it also character­
izes the role and comments of Elinor.
Elinor . . . possessed a strength of understanding, 
and coolness of judgment, which qualified her, though 
only nineteen, to be the counsellor of her mother, . .
. [H]er feelings were strong; but she knew how to gov­
ern them: it was a knowledge which her mother had yet 
to learn, and which one of her sisters [Marianne] had 
resolved never to be taught." (6)
Elinor's role as "counsellor," supported by the verbs "learn"
and "taught," reinforce the narrative stoic model of mentor
and students, and anticipate the classroom tone of much of
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Elinor's direct commentary.25 Elinor's views closely reflect
those implicit in the writings of John Balguy/ who in turn is
representative of the eighteenth-century "rationalist" or
■intellectual" school, which incorporates Stoic absolutism.
For the intellectuals, deductive reasoning leads to the proof
of absolute moral truth and virtue. 26
What the intellectualists want to assert is . . . that 
there are certain acts, or classes of acts, which are 
virtuous or vicious in all relations and circum­
stances. They instance 'keeping faith and performing 
equitable covenants and equity' [Samuel Clarke],
'making a virtuous agent happy' [Richard Price], and 
gratitude.27
Elinor demonstrates her wholehearted commitment to all these 
principles, even when they seem to dash her own hopes of per­
sonal happiness.
Selby-Bigge's example of "gratitude" as always "virtu­
ous" for the "intellectualists" is found in John Balguy's The 
Foundation of Moral Goodness (1728), which is an extended re­
sponse to Hutcheson's An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good or 
Evil (1725) . Gratitude is a point of controversy between the 
■intellectualists" and the "moral sense* or "sentimentalist" 
philosophy championed by Hutcheson. If gratitude is always 
virtuous, then it must command our responses, even where 
obeying the dictates of gratitude seems to conflict with per­
sonal happiness. This issue is dramatized in Elinor's 
predicament, and places Austen in the thick of this philo­
sophical controversy.
The opposition implied in the novel's title is mislead­
ing. Austen does not personify in Elinor and Marianne "head"
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and “heart" alternatives. Rather, “sense* seems to mean “un­
derstanding through the senses, “ and “sensibility" the judg­
ment of emotions that guides understanding. Events of the 
novel contradict and challenge Elinor's espoused principles, 
creating a series of paradoxes so incredible that her ideas 
and principles, however well motivated, ultimately are dis­
credited. I see this conflict of events with Elinor's princi­
ples as Austen's dialogue with her heroine, which implicitly 
affirms that principles must be tested by their contribution 
to happiness, a central tenet of Francis Hutcheson's “moral 
sense- philosophy. The verdict of events, then, seems to deny 
that Elinor's stoic values can heal the troubled soul of her 
sister Marianne.
Since the dialogue between Austen and her "heroine" 
picks up a continuing philosophical debate, Honan correctly 
places Austen in that same Christian-based moral discourse, 
but he fails to see that the authorial presence distances it­
self from classic principles which clash with the Christian 
ethic, even though the debt to classical philosophy is ac­
knowledged. The marriage of Marianne and Colonel Brandon may 
be seen as Elinor's victory in this debate, but I believe 
that Austen wishes to show the reader that the victory is a 
Pyrrhic one, and that Marianne pays a terrible price for 
Elinor's triumph.
This conflict between Austen and Elinor requires that 
the reader infer the moral or philosophic authorial point of 
view from the clash of events -with Elinor's principles, un­
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like Pride and Pre-iudice. where I argue that reader, author, 
and heroine seem to move together, not always in the right 
direction, but ultimately guided to moral knowledge and a 
happy ending by the informing presence of Francis Hutcheson 
and Thomas Sherlock. However, not until Persuasion, the last 
published novel, is there an explicit statement that suggests 
consequences may render the final moral verdict on decisions. 
When Anne Elliot reflects that following the advice to break 
her youthful engagement may have been "one of those cases in 
which advice is good or bad only as the event decides" (246), 
Austen seems to confirm her commitment to the test of ulti­
mate happiness that Hutcheson urges as the standard of moral 
evaluation. Hutcheson's philosophy in Sense and Sensibility 
is less convincing, because the stoic-rationalist school, 
through Elinor, attacks his “moral sense" and theory of 
•Affections" where he is most confused and vulnerable.
Instead of the reconciliation of events with principle 
in Pride and Pre-iudice through the testimony of disinterested 
witnesses, Sense and Sensibility relies on complex plots and 
subplots, as well as the use of "surrogates," to establish 
the emotional distance necessary for sound judgments of char­
acter. Consequently, characters destined for future union are 
forbidden most direct contact with each other. Elinor 
Dashwood and Edward Ferrars barely brush each other on their 
way to the altar, unlike Elizabeth Bennet and Fitzwilliam 
Darcy who, although separated for an important interval, nev­
ertheless are joined in a personal history of direct negotia-
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tions. The pre-marital relationship of Marianne and Colonel 
Brandon is even more remote than that of Elinor and Edward, 
who at least share an unsaid mutual affection throughout. 
Colonel Brandon's love for Marianne, however, is both unde­
clared as well as unreciprocated, and ultimately relies on 
encouraging the latter's "esteem" to bridge the gap.
Marianne's "sensibility," driven only by her emotions, 
does not represent a philosophical alternative to stoicism. 
Her headlong plunge toward disaster, however, raises the 
question of passion's role in love, a question avoided by 
moralists. Here Austen seems both to acknowledge and chal­
lenge the observations of Dr. John Gregory, who argues that 
passion is both a quality as well as a burden generally af­
flicting men rather than women. By setting Marianne's tumul­
tuous passion against Elinor's cool, if flawed, philosophy, 
Austen seems to demand that moral philosophy address, not 
dodge, woman's passion. The term that links the moral philos­
ophy issues and the gender views of Gregory with the novel is 
•esteem.•
"Esteem" appears to be the product of gratitude and a 
moral response which may or may not lead to "romantic" love, 
but if not is offered as an acceptable surrogate. Without es­
teem, however, no enduring love is possible. Elinor's consis­
tently authoritative and pedagogical voice supports this the­
sis, which is contested by her pupils, her mother and 
Marianne, in their discussion of the budding relationship be­
tween Elinor and Edward Ferrars. In a conversation organized
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
like schoolroom instruction, Mrs. Dashwood contrasts him fa­
vorably with his miserly sister, Fanny.
■It is enough," said she; "to say that he is unlike 
Fanny is enough. It implies everything amiable. I love 
him already. ■
■I think you will like him,* said Elinor, "when you 
know more of him. ■
■Like him! * replied her mother with a smile. "I can 
feel no sentiment of approbation inferior to love."
■You may esteem him."
"I have never yet known what it was to separate esteem 
and love." (16)
"Love" clearly is the higher valued term and swallows esteem
in Mrs. Dashwood's conflation. But the even more impulsively
romantic Marianne rejects esteem altogether in condemning
Elinor for the inadequacy of her affection for Edward.
"I do not attempt to deny," said she [Elinor],
"that I think very highly of him— that I greatly es­
teem, that I like him. *
Marianne here burst forth with indignation—
"Esteem him! Like him! Cold-hearted Elinor! Oh! 
worse than cold-hearted!" (21)
This issue is played out in the pages of the novel and appar­
ently resolved when Marianne finally is offered as a sacri­
fice to those principles which Elinor affirms as moral men­
tor. By word and exaitple, Elinor attempts to rescue Marianne 
from the nearly fatal enslavement to her passions, but 
Elinor's instruction proves helpless to convert Marianne and 
finally irrelevant as well to her own happiness. Instead of 
learning from Elinor, Marianne gets deathly sick, and Elinor, 
committed to the mind's transcendence of the body's passions, 
also fails to recognize the gravity of Marianne's physical 
afflictions. Her "care" for her sister is really blindness to
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the language of the body, which almost causes Marianne’s 
death.28
Elinor’s consistent supression and denial of romantic 
love seems to reflect the discomfort of the moral philosopher 
who attempts to deal with the relationship of passion and 
virtue. Francis Hutcheson finds it necessary to exclude 
erotic attraction in distinguishing the forms of virtuous 
love and assigning a place for "esteem."
The Affections which are of most Importance in 
Morals, are Love and Hatred: All the rest seem but 
different Modifications of these two original 
Affections. Now in discoursing of Love toward rational 
Agents, we need not be caution’d not to include that 
Love between the Sexes, which, when no other 
Affections accompany it, is only Desire of Pleasure, 
and is never counted a Virtue. Love toward rational 
Agents, is subdivided into Love of Complacence or 
Esteem, and Love of Benevolence.29
Hutcheson's classifications do little to clarify the ambigui­
ties in this passage. Is “Esteem" an alternative to 
“Complacence" as the object of the preposition "of," or is it 
an alternative to "Love?" Further, Hutcheson’s introduction 
of "Complacence" complicates the already murky discussion.
The confusion seems to arise from Hutcheson's insistence that 
all forms of love are broadly included among the 
"Affections," even though he tries to exclude "that Love be­
tween the Sexes."
The "rationalist" John Balguy seizes on Hutcheson's con­
fusion to attack his "moral sense" philosophy in The 
Foundation of Moral Goodness. Starting from the primacy of 
reason and the mind, rather than "affections" produced by 
“instinct," Balguy claims that
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we esteem Virtue or moral Rectitude upon its own 
Account; that our Affection for it [virtue], is not an 
instinctive Determination, but raised and produced in 
the Mind by the intrinsick Worth and Goodness of the 
Ob j ect.30
Having made "Affection* a product of, and subject to, reason, 
he has no trouble locating "Esteem" as an identifiable and 
separate "Affection" in its own right and not as part of 
Hutcheson's messy continuum of "instinct," at one end of 
which is the troublesome "Love between the sexes." Balguy 
asks rhetorically "whether that Esteem, Admiration, 
Complacency which Virtue produces, be no Affection?", and 
concludes that "[a]n Object that is and appears Self-good, or 
intrinsically excellent, must necessarily produce Esteem and 
Admiration in all minds capable of perceiving it. "31 Although 
he disclaims their influence on his thought, Balguy*s eleva­
tion of reason as the highest faculty for ascertaining moral 
truth closely resembles the classical stoic principle of 
virtue as an end in itself, a guiding principle for Elinor 
without regard to the conflict of compelling personal self- 
interest .
Austen, however, widens this debate among moralists into 
the very nature of love as passion, from which Hutcheson dis­
tances himself, but on which Marianne insists, at the great­
est peril to her health, virtue, and chastity. But her pas­
sion fails to find a philosophical "home," and Marianne's 
claim for the legitimacy of passion seems denied in the con­
trived marriage tw Brandon. In later novels, Austen salvages 
and stengthens Hutcheson's philosophy as a modus vivendi, but
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here her objective primarily seems to be to expose Elinor's 
rationalist system as lethal to personal happiness.
Austen must contend, not only with the texts of moral 
philosophy, but with received wisdom about woman's passion, 
and its relationship to marital choice, as authoritatively 
presented by the Edinburgh physician and moralist, Dr. John 
Gregory, in A Father's Legacy. Gregory bases his observations 
and advice on perceived emotional differences between men and 
women.
The natural hardness of our hearts, and strength of 
our passions, . . . make us less susceptible of the 
finer feelings of the heart. Your superior delicacy, 
your modesty, and the usual severity of your educa­
tion, preserve vou. in a good measure from any tempta­
tion to those vices to which &£ are most subjected.32
Austen seems to offer Marianne as a flat contradiction of 
Gregory, and even Elinor's outward composure disguises that 
"her feelings were strong," although "she knew how to govern 
them." Uncontrolled passions lead to folly and dangerous in­
discretions for all principal characters of both sexes, with 
the exceptions of Elinor and her invidious rival, Lucy 
Steele.
Given his assumed emotional dichotomy between men and
women, Gregory goes on to trace the process of courtship.
Some agreeable qualities recommend a gentleman to your 
common good liking and friendship. In the course of 
his acquaintance, he contracts an attachment to you.
When you perceive it, it excites your gratitude; this 
gratitude rises into preference; and this preference, 
perhaps, at last advances to some degree of attach­
ment, . . .33
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This process by which "gratitude" is the initial "exciting" 
affection is exactly mirrored in all Austen's works, but 
where it leads is less clear. Gregory, too, waffles on the 
results of gratitude and acknowledges only that it leads to 
"preference," and then to "some degree of attachment."
Esteem, however, is recognized as a product of the process 
for women.
A man of taste and delicacy marries a woman because 
he loves her more than any other, a woman of equal 
taste and delicacy marries him, because she esteems 
him, and because he gives her that preference: . . *34
Gregory, then, recognizes a clear distinction between "love" 
and "esteem," which is consistent with the difference im­
plicit in the connotation of these terms as deployed by moral 
philosophy, whether “moral sense" or "rationalist."
Elinor has no problem with the role of esteem that 
Marianne violently rejects, and for Elinor it is a source of 
emotional support, while Marianne is drowning in passion. In 
contrast with her appraisal of Marianne’s despair at 
Willoughby's faithlessness, Elinor's "own situation gained in 
the comparison; for while she could esteem Edward as much as 
ever, however they might be divided in future, her mind might 
always be supported" (179). italics in the text emphasize 
that Elinor's esteem succeeds in overcoming her repugnance at 
the approaching marriage of Edward and Lucy Steele, because 
it is based on the greater moral value she recognizes in his 
doing his "duty" by respecting an engagement to a woman 
Elinor is confident he no longer loves.
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It would seem that the novel's task, through its moral 
mentor, Elinor, is to redirect Marianne's affection to a 
stronger support through the development of esteem for the 
worthy Colonel Brandon, a formidable challenge with 
Marianne's expressed contempt for that affection. The oppor­
tunity is what I call the "surrogate" seduction, as Colonel 
Brandon unveils it in an extended narration (205-10) to 
Elinor. The story told by Brandon reveals that Willoughby has 
a prior history as a seducer of Brandon' s former ward and 
daughter of Brandon's once-loved and wayward cousin. In con­
trast to this convoluted plot and the bathos of Brandon's 
narration, the "real" seduction of Lydia by Wickham in Pride 
and Prejudice directly involves the principal players and 
throws Elizabeth and Darcy together.
Why does Austen choose this roundabout off-stage drama 
involving Willoughby and two characters who figure only in 
this subplot? First, it clearly will not do for Marianne ac­
tually to be seduced by Willoughby. The experience might be 
instructive, but her future would be destroyed. The lesson is 
not lost on Marianne, although she acknowledges to Elinor the 
danger only in the somewhat tangled syntax of her post-ill- 
ness discussion: "'— What in a situation like mine, but a 
most shamefully unguarded affection could expose me to'— " 
(345). But more important than the lesson in life, learned 
without personal cost, is that the knowledge not only in­
volves a victim unknown to Marianne, but is inparted to her 
via Elinor, to whom it is already second-hand information.
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Marianne thus is called upon to judge virtue and vice from as 
disinterested a perspective as Austen can contrive.
Since this knowledge comes to Marianne after she already 
has learned of Willoughby' s marriage, her mental attitude is 
affected only to the extent of becoming "settled in a gloomy 
dejection" (212) . The plus side of the experience, however, 
is that Elinor "saw with satisfaction the effect of it, in 
her no longer avoiding Colonel Brandon when he called, in her 
speaking to him, even voluntarily speaking, with a kind of 
compassionate respect, ..." (212). Marianne is edging 
closer to "esteem, “ although she must undergo a symbolic 
death and resurrection to cast aside her old repugnance, and 
accept esteem as the basis of a relationship, and the path 
leads through gratitude.
When Mrs. Dashwood observes the convalescent Marianne as 
she expresses gratitude to Colonel Brandon for his "fetching 
her mother" during her illness, the mother "persuaded herself 
to think that something more than gratitude already dawned" 
(340). Mrs. Dashwood's ready romanticism, which she shares 
with Marianne, leads her to impetuous and usually wrong con­
clusions. Elinor, who also is present, seems only to be ana­
lyzing Brandon's motives, and we are not given her thoughts 
about Marianne, who seems to be emerging from illness with a 
revised outlook. Filtering an ambiguous observation about the 
changed Marianne through the unreliable, and scarcely disin­
terested Mrs. Dashwood, makes any conjectures about meaning 
almost hopelessly problematic. All can agree on Marianne's
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gratitude, since she acknowledges what the circumstances call 
for. But has "somthing more than gratitude already dawned?" 
And if so, what is it? We can be fairly sure that the "some­
thing more" for Mrs. Dashwood is her version of love, but it 
later becomes clear that the "something more" indeed is es­
teem.
There seems to be no disagreement among Hutcheson, 
Balguy, and Austen that esteem is highly prized. All would 
support the idea that gratitude leads to esteem, which Austen 
sees as a step in the growth of love that must not be by­
passed, unlike Mrs. Dashwood, who seems to look on gratitude 
as more of a hurdle than a stage in a process. But where 
Austen parts company with moral philosophy, and with Elinor, 
is on the acceptability of esteem as a "surrogate" for that 
love on which future happiness depends in marriage. Dr. 
Gregory, on the other hand, offers physiological support to 
moral philosophy in suggesting that passionate love such as 
Marianne's is uncharacteristic for women, and instead claims 
that *[w]hat is commonly called love among you, is rather 
gratitude," leading to marriages "with little of either per­
sonal esteem or affection."35 Gregory suggests that the rela­
tionship may stop at the level of gratitude, and if so the 
marriage offers little in the way of permanent happiness or 
satisfaction to the partners. However, if gratitude leads to 
"personal esteem" gr "affection," the physician's prognosis 
is more favorable, and thus it is not surprising that Mrs.
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Dashwood is encouraged to see the growth of ‘something more 
than gratitude" in Marianne’s feeling toward Colonel Brandon.
As I suggest in ny discussion of Northanaer Abbey. 
Gregory’s Legacy seems even more overt in Henry Tilney's mar­
riage proposal to Catherine Morland (243). In both novels, 
Austen reverses the emotions Gregory assigns to men and 
women. She leaves open, of course, the possibility that 
■something more" may ‘dawn" for Henry, as Mrs. Dashwood hopes 
for Marianne. But to the extent that "passions" and "affec­
tion" are linked by Gregory with men, the options for 
Marianne’s response appear limited to "esteem." However, de­
spite Marianne’s revulsion at "esteem," there seems to be no 
philosophical or psychological "space" for woman's passion in 
love. Cultural attitudes, moral philosophy, and Gregory’s 
medical authority join in a powerful phalanx that eventually 
crushes Marianne, a conclusion toward which Austen appears 
reluctantly driven.
She was bom to overcome an affection formed so late 
in life as at seventeen, and with no sentiment supe­
rior to strong esteem and lively friendship, voluntar­
ily to give her hand to another! (378)
The encoded message seems to be “she was bom to be hanged," 
and the term "voluntarily" is subverted and undermined by the 
determinism of "was bom to. ■
But Austen again seems to be dissatisfied with the way 
her own story keeps denying Marianne a vital role in her fu­
ture, and she ends her concluding remarks on the marriage 
with Brandon by giving us, once again, the old Marianne.
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Marianne could never love by halves; and her whole 
heart became, in time, as much devoted to her husband, 
as it had once been to Willoughby. (379)
These internal contradictions, which follow each other in 
closely connected paragraphs, leave the moral meaning ambigu­
ous. The didactic narrator seems to be saying on the one 
hand, "believe this," and on the other offering contradictory 
evidence. "Show" fails to confirm "tell," "head" to rule 
"heart." As I have suggested earlier, this conflict of events 
with stoic philosophy is Austen's dialogue with Elinor, and 
the severest commentary on Elinor's stoic moral view is 
Marianne's victimization. Indeed, she is reduced to the sta­
tus of a commodity “by general consent, to be the reward of 
all" in the settling of "obligations" to Brandon (378).
Janet Todd argues that Marianne's fate in marrying
Colonel Brandon is itself a kind of death.
Sense and Sensibility, which, in the stories of 
Marianne and the shadowy Elizas, comes close to invok­
ing the Clarissa plot, mocks and stifles the agony of 
the female victim: ultimately it socializes the near 
scream of Marianne into sensible rational discourse.36
Todd seems to read Austen's approval of this ending. Instead,
I believe that Austen pleads for Marianne's rescue from the
disaster which is facilitated rather than prevented by the
faulty principles of Elinor's stoic philosophy, and the rapid
narrative reversals on Marianne's later history reflect, if
anything, authorial unhappiness at Marianne's victimization.
In a sense, Elinor "wins" the contest of values with 
Marianne, by seeing her married (after her own, ironically, 
"romantic" marriage) "with no sentiment superior to strong
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esteem and lively friendship." Power, therefore, is on 
Elinor’s side, allowing her and others virtually to ■sell’ 
Marianne to satisfy "obligations." However, the body's de­
nial, which the stoic system endorses, not only is reflected 
in Elinor's blindness to Marianne's near-mortal illness be­
fore she is sacrificed in marriage, but also mandates that 
Elinor sacrifice her own and Edward’s happiness to its prin­
ciples. As in the gratitude that secures Henry Tilney for 
Caterine Morland in Northancrer Abbev. Austen shows that the 
triumph of virtue can exact a terrible price.
Elinor's self-identification with stoic values is nearly
overt in her reflections on Mr. Palmer's snide, affected, and
contemptuous manner, who otherwise displayed "no traits at
all unusual in his sex and time of life."
He was nice in his eating, uncertain in his hours; 
fond of his child, though affecting to slight it; and 
idled away the mornings at billiards, which ought to 
have been devoted to business. She liked him, however, 
upon the whole much better than she had expected, and 
in her heart was not sorry that she could like him no 
more;— not sorry to be driven by the observation of 
his Epicurism, his selfishness, and his conceit, to 
rest with complacency on the remembrance of Edward's 
generous temper, simple taste, and diffident feelings. 
(305).
“Epicurism" sums up this catalogue of Mr. Palmer's qualities, 
and Elinor's "complacency" in noting Edward's opposite quali­
ties, of course, is a refracted endorsement of her own 
"Stoic" values.
The first instance of Elinor's commitment at all costs 
to such values is her incredible respect for a "vow* of se­
crecy, which Lucy Steele deviously extracts from her. Selby-
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Bigge calls attention, in the comments at the beginning of
this discussion, to "keeping faith" as among "acts which are
virtuous . . .  in all relations and circumstances" for "in-
tellectualists" such as Balguy. This is also a central stoic
virtue, and among those admired by Cicero, who models his Ds.
Officiis on the principles and practices of the Stoics.
But in taking an oath it is our duty to consider not 
what one may have to fear in case of violation but 
wherein its obligation lies: an oath is an assurance 
backed by religious sanctity; . . . For the question 
no longer concerns the wrath of the gods (for there is 
no such thing) but the obligations of justice and good 
faith.37
“Religious sanctity" as Cicero uses it is quite different 
from vows sanctioned by their concurrence with Christian be­
lief, where the nature and subject matter of the vow are sub­
ject to their conformity with doctrine. An extreme but famil­
iar example would be the "pact with the devil," but even a 
vow that conflicts merely with future happiness would have 
questionable religious authority, so long as the "happiness" 
pursued was virtuous. For Cicero and the Stoics, no qualifi­
cations can mitigate the absolute sanctity of vows, and their 
model is the story of Regulus, which has an exact parallel in 
Elinor's promise of secrecy to Lucy.
Cicero offers the story of Regulus as a praiseworthy ex­
ample of the high value placed by stoicism on fidelity to the 
absolute virtue of abiding by vows, despite the appeal of 
"utilitas." translated in the Loeb edition of De Officiis as 
"expediency" or "best interests." Regulus, whose name echoes 
the Latin term "regula" or "a rule, pattern, model,"38 as a
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prisoner of war is sent by his captors, the Carthaginians,
■on parole, sworn to return to Carthage himself, if certain 
noble prisoners of war were not restored to the 
Carthaginians, ■ who he knew would punish his failure by death 
from torture. "His apparent interest was to remain in his own 
country, to stay at home with his wife and children, ■ either 
ignoring the vow, or at least using his influence to have the 
prisoners released. Nevertheless, he refused to do either, 
holding that "he was not a member of the senate so long as he 
was bound by the oath to his enemies, ■ and he returned empty- 
handed to his promised execution at Carthage where he was 
■slowly put to death by enforced wakefulness.*39
Not only does this tale sanctify vows destructive of 
family ties, it also appears that one can be put under oath 
to an enemy merely by seeming to permit, through silence, an 
assumption of compliance. Regulus goes through the motions of 
his mission, performing the letter if not the spirit of the 
tacit compliance assumed by the Cathaginians, and he knows 
that the consequence will be death. Elinor also finds herself 
drawn into Lucy's confidence almost by default, although she 
does not as yet know where it will lead. Lucy prefaces her as 
yet unrevealed disclosures with “I am sure I should not have 
the smallest fear of trusting vou" (128), followed by the 
revelation of her four-year engagement to Edward, and closes 
the trap on Elinor by concluding "I never should have men­
tioned it to you, if I had not felt the greatest dependance 
in the world upon your secrecy" (129) . Lucy recognizes a
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stoic character when she sees one, and understands how to ma­
nipulate it to the detriment of everyone's best interests and 
happiness except her own.
Elinor knows that revealing this secret of an engagement 
repellent to the Ferrars family might well wreck the marriage 
plans and thus serve her own hopes, as well as rescue Edward 
from his own unwise and youthful "vow" which engaged him to 
Lucy. But Elinor seems unmoved by considerations of utilitas 
in her single-minded commitment to confidentiality. When the 
secret comes out anyhow because of the indiscretion of Lucy's 
own sister, Elinor is free to reveal it to Marianne, who has 
assumed all along the de facto engagement of Elinor and 
Edward, and who thus finds incomprehensible Elinor's with­
holding of such information for four months. When Marianne 
asks wonderingly, "how have you been supported?", Elinor re- 
ples:
By feeling that I was doing my duty.— *ty promise to 
Lucy, obliged me to be secret. I owed it to her, 
therefore, to avoid giving any hint of the truth; . .
I have very often wished to undeceive yourself and my 
mother, . . . but without betraying my trust, I never 
could have convinced you. (262)
The reader is more likely to share Marianne's incredulity
than accept Elinor's extraordinary self-denial on behalf of
Lucy, who is quite as deadly an enemy as the Carthaginians.
Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) offers a view of stoic princi­
ples which seems generally in accord with Marianne's mystifi­
cation, as well as representative of eighteenth-century 
moralist opinion, including Francis Hutcheson, who otherwise 
more often differed with Clarke.
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For though virtue is unquestionably worthy to be cho­
sen for its own sake, even without any expectation of 
reward; yet it does not follow that it is entirely 
self-sufficient. and able to support a man under all 
kinds of sufferings, . . . Here therefore began the 
error of the Stoics; who taught that the bare practice 
of virtue, was itself the chief good, . . . And the 
suitable practice of some few of them, as of Regulus 
for instance, who chose to die the cruellest death 
that could be invented, rather than break his faith 
with an enemy; is indeed very wonderful and to be ad­
mired. But yet, after all this, it is plain that the 
general practice of virtue in the world, can never be 
supported on this foot.41
Clarke, also a Christian moralist, even if opposed to "moral 
sense" philosophy, cannot accept virtue as "entirely self- 
sufficient," or an end in itself, because it must emanate 
from God and therefore mirror the Deity. Further, the example 
of Regulus virtually justifies self-destruction in order to 
respect the obligation of vows, which is anathema to 
Christian doctrine, regardless of the sanctity of vows. 
Elinor's sacrifice of her and Edward's mutual love and future 
happiness to this same principle, in order to keep Lucy's se­
cret, amounts to self-destruction of the spirit. 
Interestingly, it is the recovered Marianne who recoils with 
horror at what she sees as her own flirtation with suicide.
My illness, I well knew, had been entirely brought on 
by myself, by such negligence of my own health, as I 
had felt even at the time to be wrong. Had I died,— it 
would have been self-destruction. (345)
Marianne's confession is laced with religious contrition, re­
morse, and resolve to lead a more regulated, as well as a 
Christian, life.
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Elinor, on the other hand, appears to look back at pre- 
Christian values. Indeed, in adhering to her promise to Lucy, 
she seems to distance herself even from Balguy, who acknowl­
edges that the "Stoicks . . . had noble Ideas of Virtue, . .
. but unaccountably forgot, or overlooked the Constitution of 
Human Nature.":
And hence they fell into great Extravagance, and a 
kind of Enthusiasm. Wrapt up in Admiration of moral 
Good, they seemed not to regard any other. Had they 
considered that they were sensible Beings as well as 
moral, they could not easily have imagined that Virtue 
alone was self-sufficient. Their Scheme therefore must 
be unnatural and indefensible; I mean exclusively of a 
future State, the only Support of Virtue in Adversity 
and extreme Cases.42
Considerations of a "future State," of course, are expressly 
rejected by Cicero when he says, in the passage quoted ear­
lier on the sanctity of vows, that "the question no longer 
concerns the wrath of the Gods (for there is no such thing) 
but the obligations of justice and good faith."
Concern with a "future state," however, is central to 
Judeo Christian belief. Milton presents the conflict between 
"pagan" philosophy and Christianity in Christ's temptation in 
the wilderness by the devil, who tries to persuade Jesus to 
accept into his doctrine the received wisdom of the ancients. 
Jesus rejects the authority of all these philosophical sys­
tems as "Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm," and 
saves his most explicit rebuttal for stoicism.
The Stoic last in Philosophic pride,
By him call'd vertue; and his vertuous man,
Wise, perfect in himself, and all possessing 
Equal to God, oft shames not to prefer.
As fearing God nor man, contemning all
Wealth, pleasure, pain or torment, death and life,
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Which, when he lists, he leaves, or boasts he can,
For all his tedious talk is but vain boast.
Or subtle shifts conviction to evade.
Alas what can they teach, and not mislead;
Ignorant of themselves, of God much more,43
Elinor's stoic values appear even before she is made privy to 
Lucy's and Edward's engagement, when she is disturbed by 
Edward's "desponding turn of mind" manifested at the unex­
plained termination of his visit with the Dashwoods, and 
which
left an uncomfortable impression on Elinor's feelings 
especially, which required some trouble and time to 
subdue. But as it was her determination to subdue it, 
and to prevent herself from appearing to suffer more 
than what all her family suffered on his going away, 
she did not attempt the method so judiciously employed 
by Marianne, on a similar occasion, . . . (104)
This total reliance on her own personal resources suggests
the self-referential stoic virtue criticized by Balguy and
decried by Milton as "Ignorant of themselves, of God much
more." The reference to Marianne's histrionics on
Willoughby’s departure as “method so judiciously employed"
is, of course, ironic, and contrasts with Elinor's successful
efforts to surmount her emotion by her combined denial of the
passions and fidelity to absolute virtue.
Samuel Johnson offers in his Dictionary an apparently 
non-committal definition of "Stoick" as “[a] philosopher who 
followed the sect of Zeno: holding the neutrality of external 
things," but his example suggests that he too shares a nega­
tive view.
While we admire 
This virtue, and this moral discipline,
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Let's be no stoicks. nor no stocks. I pray.
Johnson's fourth definition for "Stock" is "[a]man prover­
bially stupid," and he uses the same Shakesperian quotation 
to illustrate his meaning.44
But it could also be argued that Elinor's fidelity to a 
vow made to her enemy becomes an empty gesture, since events 
work in her favor with Anne Steele's indiscretion in disclos­
ing the secret, unlike the fated consequences for Regulus. 
Therefore, Austen devises a second exercise that puts her 
stoic principles to a more severe test. Elinor is called 
upon, by the dictates of gratitude to Colonel Brandon, to 
play a key role in salvaging Edward's and Lucy's marriage, 
apparently wrecked only a few pages earlier without involving 
any breach of Elinor's obligation of secrecy. Elinor has just 
received Colonel Brandon's commission to offer the living of 
Delaford to Edward Ferrars, which she immediately recognizes 
will remove the financial impediment to his marriage, due to 
his mother's earlier threat to disinherit him when she learns 
of his engagement with Lucy, and so must snuff the remnants 
of hope for Elinor from postponement of the nuptials. Mrs. 
Jennings, from another part of the room, observes but does 
not hear the conversation with Brandon and assumes that 
Elinor's emotional response is to a proposal of marriage.
Her [Elinor's] emotion was such as Mrs. Jennings had 
attributed to a very different cause;— but whatever 
minor feelings less pure, less pleasing, might have a 
share in that emotion, her esteem for the general 
benevolence, and her gratitude for the particular 
friendship, which together prompted Colonel Brandon to
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this act, were strongly felt, and warmly expressed.
(283)
This lengthy narrative sentence encapsulates the key princi­
ples of eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Brandon's benev­
olence is "general" because not tainted by "particular" re­
gard or self-interest, since he scarcely knows Ferrars. His 
friendship for Elinor, however, is allowably "particular," 
since presumably she is involved only as a messenger of his 
"benevolence." Further, Elinor's "esteem" reflects the prin­
ciples of the propagation of virtue in the response of a 
“witness" to an act of benevolence, even though Brandon's 
benevolence is at cross-purposes with her own desires. 
Nevertheless, nothing in this scenario seems to explain why 
Elinor's "emotion" compells her to be the messenger, whose 
tidings pass the sentence of death on the messenger's hopes, 
except the key responses of "esteem" and "gratitude," which 
overwhelm "whatever minor feelings less pure, less pleas­
ing. "45
How can gratitude alone propel Elinor to this distaste­
ful mission? Elinor's response here puts her in the camp of 
the "intellectualists," in particular Hutcheson's critic, 
Balguy, whose credo is laid down in Part I of his work.
To be determined to the doing a good Action merely by 
the Reason and Right of the Thing, is genuine 
Goodness; this is the purest and most perfect Virtue 
of which any Agent is capable.46
Elinor respects this principle in accepting her commission 
from Brandon, answering in the affirmative Balguy's rhetori­
cal question, "might we not possibly be induced to attempt
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the Relief of a Person in Distress, merely from the Reason of 
the Thing, and the Rectitude of the Action?*47 The “induce­
ment," or more properly the “command,* is Balguy*s key “al­
ways right" virtue of gratitude: “Thus a Person obliged acts 
rightly and reasonably, when his Actions are answerable to 
the Relation of Gratitude between him and his Benefactor."48
Hutcheson finds a complex web of “exciting* or “justify­
ing* “reasons* for actions,49 which would tend to interpose 
the objections of Elinor's and Edward's undoubted love for 
each other to Elinor's acceptance of Brandon's mission.
Balguy takes specfic objection in The Foundation of Moral 
Goodness to Hutcheson's categories of “exciting reasons* by 
asking “whether that esteem, admiration, complacency which 
virtue produces, be no affection? and, whatever they may be 
called, whether they may not excite to election?*
However pleasure may be the consequence or appendage 
of virtue, yet, strictly speaking, it is not the end 
of a moral agent, nor the object of a moral affection, 
but virtue alone, antecedent to all considerations, 
and abstracted from every natural good.50
Elinor's mission is totally alien to her self-interest and
can only be explained by an equally total commitment to the
imperative virtue of gratitude, as well as to her idea that
she is serving the cause of virtue by facilitating Edward's
unhappy duty to fulfill his misguided vows to Lucy Steele,
despite the endorsement of this ancient stoic virtue by
Balguy and other eighteenth-century rationalists.
Thus, Elinor's decisions mirror those “acts, which are 
virtuous . . .  in all relations and circumstances," as Selby-
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Bigge describes "intellectualist" principles in the passage 
quoted at the beginning of this discussion. Since the vow to 
Lucy Steele, however, goes well beyond "keeping faith and 
performing equitable covenants and equity, ■ it must be based 
on pre-Christian stoicism, which Austen seems to argue is at 
the root of Elinor's philosophy. A slavish obedience to the 
■always right" virtue of gratitude, and to "making a virtuous 
agent happy," are the only possible explanations for Elinor's 
performance as messenger for Brandon (the "virtuous agent") 
in conveying to Edward the news of the living which seems 
guaranteed to push him into the marriage with Lucy so painful 
to both him and Elinor. Austen's * exposure" of Elinor's moral 
system also incriminates Balguy's absolutism, but Elinor is 
unchanged at the end of the novel, even if Austen seeks to 
discredit her stoic values. The conversion of her character, 
and values, remains unfinished business for the novelist.
Elinor’s philosophy reappears in Fitzwilliam Darcy of 
Pride and Pre-iudice. whose repellent personality sets him up 
for the transformation he eventually undergoes, unlike the 
invulnerable shield of goodwill that preserves Elinor, de­
spite the flaws of her values. But between the acceptance for 
publication of Sense and Sensibility in 1810, and the revi­
sion of First Impressions into Pride and Prejudice which oc­
cupied Austen during the following year, it seems that Austen 
must have made, or greatly improved, her acquaintance with 
the Hutcheson and Sherlock texts that inform the later nov­
els. These texts offer the philosophical basis for the au­
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thority of feelings against Elinor’s and Darcy’s stoic ratio­
nalism. Feelings energize both the resentment that places 
Elizabeth Bennet and Darcy in hostile opposition, as well as 
the growth of their mutual gratitude which prepares the way 
for the novel’s happy ending.
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CHAPTER IV
GRATITUDE TRIUMPHANT IN PRIDE AND PREJUDICE
Early in Pride and Prejudice. Elizabeth Bennet's disdain
for Darcy escalates into resentment, when she learns that he
has successfully blocked Jane's budding romance with Bingley,
and thus is responsible for her sister's unhappiness.
Elizabeth's refusal of Darcy's astonishing marriage proposal
triggers resentment in him as well, but by the end of the
novel, resentment has been converted into gratitude toward
each other. This shared "conversion'' is a measure of the
moral journey both must take to find love, since resentment
is the polar opposite of gratitude, although both "arise from
the same constitution of the passions," as Samuel Johnson
points out in Rambler #4.
Thus men are observed by Swift to be 'grateful in the 
same degree as they are resentful.' . . . [Yet] it 
follows not that they [resentment and gratitude] will 
be equally indulged when reason is consulted; yet un­
less that consequence be admitted, this sagacious 
maxim becomes an empty sound, without any relation to 
practice or to life.
Nor is it evident, that even the first motions to 
these effects are always in the same proportion. For 
pride, which produces quickness of resentment, will 
obstruct gratitude, by unwillingness to admit that in­
feriority which obligation implies; and it is very un­
likely that he who cannot think he receives a favor 
will acknowledge or repay it.1
Johnson incisively diagnoses the kind of "pride" that charac­
terizes Darcy/ although Elizabeth’s resentment is more in
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sympathy with the injury to Jane, who herself is a moral 
paragon, exemplifying the highest standards of benevolence, 
itself the summit of virtue for Hutcheson as well as most 
eighteenth-century sentimental moral philosophy-2
Further, Jane's benevolent disposition should make her 
happy, and Francis Hutcheson contends that it should also be 
recognized by others with responses of gratitude and approba­
tion.
That disposition therefore which is most excel­
lent, and naturally gains the highest moral approba­
tion, is the calm, stable, universal good-will to 
all, or the most extensive benevolence. And this 
seems the most distinct notion we can form of the 
moral excellency of the Deity.
Another disposition inseparable from this in men, 
and probably in all beings who are capable of such 
extensive affection, is the relish or approbation of 
this affection, and a naturally consequent desire of 
this moral excellence, and an esteem and good-will 
of an higher kind to all in whom it is found. This 
love of moral excellence is also an high object of 
approbation, when we find it in ourselves by reflec­
tion, or observe it in another. . . . This desire of 
moral excellence, and love to the mind where it re­
sides, with the consequent acts of esteem, venera­
tion, truth, and resignation, are the essence of 
true piety toward God.3
Yet Jane's demeanor hides heartbreak at the probable end of 
her growing relationship with Bingley, although she struggles 
to make her benevolence triumph over personal disappointment. 
Instead of the "approbation,“ "esteem," and returns of grati­
tude such behavior is supposed to encourage, Jane is dis­
carded by the Bingley entourage, with the encouragement of 
their moral custodian, Fitzwilliam Darcy.
Jane's behavior is analyzed by three close observers, 
her sister Elizabeth, Darcy, and Charlotte Lucas. A compari­
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son of their points of view tends to confirm Francis 
Hutcheson's sentimental approach to benevolence and gratitude 
as the novel's moral voice, particularly his 1725 An Inquiry 
Concerning Moral Good and Evil.
For Hutcheson, virtue should manifest itself to an im­
partial observer through a direct appeal to the "moral 
sense." The obvious failure of observation as a reliable 
guide to character assessment of Jane and others in Pride and 
Pre-iudice seriously undermines this fundamental principle, by 
the operation of which virtue is supposed to be propagated 
and socialized through observation of its workings in others, 
to the gratitude and happiness of all concerned.4 Austen sug­
gests that a principle reason for the failure of observation 
to give correct readings is that women are not seen as capa­
ble of the highest benevolence and thus are denied full par­
ticipation in the discourse of virtue.
But judgment based on observation is flawed, regardless 
of gender. The sifting of evidence, particularly as offered 
by reliable witnesses, must correct the false readings of the 
senses. The truth of Darcy's benevolence is determined by 
Elizabeth through a discovery process which simulates a 
courtroom inquiry into the credibility of witnesses, followed 
by an evaluation of testimony. Since the testimony of the 
housekeeper at Pemberley, Mrs. Reynolds, is crucial, the in­
quiry into credibility also suggests that Austen insists on 
women's full participation in the discourse of virtue.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
142
Subject to the intrusion of key women, the moral philos­
ophy apparently endorsed in these dramas concurs with the 
•moral sense* theories of Francis Hutcheson. The exception to 
this claim is Austen's implied questioning of the reliability 
of human observations, which must be evaluated by the exer­
cise of reason on the testimony of witnesses. Here the influ­
ence of Austen's favorite sermon writer, Thomas Sherlock, is 
evident, although Hutcheson also acknowledges that reason may 
have a role, subject to the primacy of the ■moral sense," 
which should otherwise unerringly sniff out the presence of 
benevolence.5 Nevertheless, the role of reason does not un­
dercut the authority of feeling, and does not convert Austen 
into the "rationalist* found by some scholars.6
Both Hutcheson and Sherlock ground their arguments and 
examples in religious paradigms, which suggests the high se­
riousness of the moral issues at stake in the novels.
However, the idea of benevolence advanced by Hutcheson, un­
like that offered later by Bishop Butler and others, requires 
no overt acts or “capacity,“ but only a state of mind or 
■disposition" toward mankind, like God's love for His cre­
ation. Nevertheless, this disposition should shine through 
and be recognized by observers with “approbation.* Certainly 
Jane has minimal opportunity to make a tangible impact with 
her benevolent disposition. Her virtue, however, goes unrec­
ognized and unrewarded, except by her sister Elizabeth.
"My dear Jane!“ exclaimed Elizabeth, “you are too 
good. Your sweetness and disinterestedness are re­
ally angelic; I do not know what to say to you. I
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feel as if I had never done you justice, or loved 
you as you deserve. . . .
You wish to think all the world respectable, and 
are hurt if I speak ill of any body. X only want to 
think vou perfect, and you set your mind against it.
Do not be afraid of my running into any excess, of 
my encroaching on your privilege of universal good 
will. You need not. There are few people wham I re­
ally love, and still fewer of whom I think well. The 
more I see of the world, the more am I dissatisfied 
with it; and every day confirms my belief of the in­
consistency of all human characters, and of the lit­
tle dependence that can be placed on the appearance 
of either merit or sense. (135)
Some allowance must be made for Elizabeth's agitated emotions 
at Bingley's sister's frigid letter, which announces their 
departure from the neighborhood and dashes Jane's hopes of a 
growing relationship with the brother, before we identify 
Elizabeth as a bitter skeptic of human nature. Nevertheless 
she does, like Hutcheson, see Jane's benevolence as other­
worldly ("angelic") and uses Hutcheson's phraseology 
("universal good will") to differentiate Jane's character 
from her own.7
If Elizabeth understands Jane's benevolence, Darcy 
misses it altogether. In his apologia letter to Elizabeth, 
after she forcefully rejects his avowal of love and implicit 
marriage proposal, he notes Jane's behavior, but attributes 
it only to a well-mannered girl disinclined to encourage a 
prospective suitor.
Your sister I also watched.— Her look and manners 
were open, cheerful and engaging as ever, but with­
out any symptom of particular regard, and I remained 
convinced from the evening's scrutiny, that though 
she received his attentions with pleasure, she did 
not invite them by any participation of sentiment.—  
. . .  I shall not scruple to assert, that the seren­
ity of your sister's countenance and air was such,
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as might have given the most acute observer, a con­
viction that, however amiable her temper, her heart 
was not likely to be easily touched.—  (197)
Although Darcy claims that “the most acute observer" would 
back him up in concluding that his observations of Jane 
demonstrated her lack of “particular regard" for his friend 
Bingley, his claim may testify as much to his own blindness 
and insensitivity as it does to Jane's effacement of her emo­
tions. Darcy is a stoic, even more than Elinor Dashwood of 
Sense and Sensibility, and both his self-justification for 
shielding Bingley from Jane, as well as his recantation at 
the novel's end, give Austen smother opportunity to expose 
stoic values as destqyers of human happiness.
Darcy does not deny Elizabeth's accusation of his inter­
ference between Jane and Bingley, but instead prides himself 
on his role in obstructing the progress of their relation­
ship.
I have no wish of denying that I did everything in 
my power to separate ny friend from your sister, or 
that I rejoice in my success. Towards him I have 
been kinder than towards myself. (191)
The stoic puts aside all merely sensual gratification to pur­
sue what is seen as the course of virtue. Darcy is guided by 
the central Stoic principle that virtue is its own reward, as 
expressed by Epictetus.
“Is there no reward then?“
“Reward! do you seek any greater reward for a good 
man than doing what is right and just?“
The Harvard Classics editor notes that "Epictetus is a main
authority on Stoic morals, [and emphasizes] the importance of
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cultivating complete independence of external circumstances.'8 
Darcy, of course, cares little for the feelings of those in­
jured by his pursuit of what he sees as the greater good, as 
he makes clear in his explanatory letter, which he delivers 
to Elizabeth the next day.
If I have wounded your sister's feelings, it was un­
knowingly done; and though the motives which gov­
erned me may to you very naturally appear insuffi­
cient, I have not yet learned to condemn them.
(199).
A 1675 collector of Stoic teaching writes approvingly that 
■these generous Philosophers' insist that "their wise man' 
should be 'as little concerned for his Neighbors afflictions 
as for his own disasters," and ask 'Can we not be charitable 
without being afflicted?'9 But Darcy's confidence that he can 
both determine and act for the greater good is, for Milton's 
Jesus, only “Philosophic pride / By him ['the Stoic*] call'd 
vertue.■
Alas what can they teach, and not mislead;
Ignorant of themselves, of God much more,10
Milton focuses on the preeminence given by the Stoics to
teaching virtue, which Jesus condemns as worthless due to
their ignorance "of themselves" and "of God." Epictetus
states the Stoic position.
He that hath no musical instruction is a child in 
Music; he that hath no letters is a child in 
Learning; he that is untaught is a child in Life.11
Austen directs the Stoic reverence for teaching against Darcy 
himself at the novel's end and thus educates him in the defi­
ciencies of his own Stoic values. She seems to anticipate the 
lessons he must learn in Elizabeth's early conversation with
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him at the piano, where Elizabeth responds to his claim to 
lack "the talent" for sociability.
"My fingers," said Elizabeth, "do not move over 
this instrument in the masterly manner which I see 
so many women's do. . . . But then I have always 
supposed it to be my own fault— because I would not 
take the trouble of practising." (175)
Elizabeth seems to adapt Epictetus's mode of argument by 
analogy, and she even plays with the connection of musical 
and moral instruction, as she also simultaneously "plays" on 
the piano and on Darcy.
As yet Elizabeth does not know of Darcy's agency in sti­
fling the budding romance of Bingley and Jane, whose suffer­
ing is unseen, even as it is unimportant, to the Stoic Darcy. 
However, not only Darcy, but a modem critic also sees Jane's 
be' wior as no more than “a struggle to suppress her love for 
Bingley through many weeks when she believes that it is not 
returned," ignoring the earlier clear explanation by 
Elizabeth of Jane's benevolent disposition.12 But why must 
Jane signal her partiality so flagrantly to Bingley himself? 
Elizabeth argues with Charlotte Lucas that "[i]f X can per­
ceive her regard for him, he must be a simpleton indeed not 
to discover it too." Charlotte counters "that he does not 
know Jane's disposition as you do" (22) . Charlotte has no il­
lusions about the necessity of making one's preference known, 
regardless of the virtuousness of "universal good will," or 
the self-protection of emotional privacy.
If a woman conceals her affection with the same 
skill [as she uses in public concealment] from the 
object of it, then she may lose the opportunity of 
fixing him; . . . There is so much of gratitude or
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vanity in almost every attachment, that it is not 
safe to leave any to itself. . . .  In nine cases out 
of ten, a woman had better shew more affection than 
she feels. Bingley likes your sister undoubtedly; 
but he may never do more than like her, if she does 
not help him on. (22)
Charlotte's wisdom seems like a follow-up to Austen's comment 
at the end of Northanaer Abbev that Henry Tilney's "affec­
tion" for Catherine Morland "originated in nothing better 
than gratitude" (243), and the bottom line in Charlotte's ut­
ter realism is that self-interest is the only sensible guide 
for a marriageable woman. Bingley, like Darcy, appears to 
find it impossible to discern affectionate partiality in a 
woman who tries to practice the virtue so praised by 
Hutcheson. Thus Charlotte advocates not hypocrisy but practi­
cal wisdom in advising "a woman to shew more affection than 
she feels."
What Austen seems to be suggesting is that a benevolent 
disposition in a woman appears only as disinterest, where the 
range of her allowable responses is acceptance or rejection 
of an eligible suitor. In the passage quoted earlier from A 
System of Moral Philosophy. Hutcheson conventionally employs 
what appears to be the universal "in men" diction, but fol­
lows this phrase with the clause "and probably in all beings 
who are capable of such extensive affection, ■ that is, a 
■disposition" toward benevolence. Hutcheson does not reveal 
what "beings" he has in mind, but the addition of this quali­
fying clause appears to make "in men" no longer a universal, 
but gender specific. Darcy and Bingley, then, may be excused
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by the standards of moral philosophy if they fail to recog­
nize and respond to Jane’s benevolence, since a woman may not 
qualify as a 'being" who is 'capable' of such qualities.
Jane's stillborn benevolence, then, demonstrates that 
the xnoralism which informs this world is gender skewed and 
excludes women as participants in the process of observation 
and the judgment central to moralist claims for the propaga­
tion of virtue and happiness. For Hutcheson, this process 
does not work unless benevolence calls forth gratitude, which 
in Austen's novels requires that men and women participate as 
full partners in the discourse of morality and virtue. Thus 
Austen seems to showcase the moral blindness of Darcy and 
Bingley in order to emphasize that Hutcheson’s theories earn 
their validity only through full gender equity. This gender 
equity is seen by Claudia Johnson as defiant.
In endowing attractive female characters with rich 
and unapologetic senses of self-consequence, Austen 
defies every dictum about female propriety and def­
erence propounded in the sermons and conduct books 
which have been thought to shape her opinions on all 
important matters.
But shortly after this claim, Johnson comments on Austen’s 
'device of centering her novels in the consciousness of unem­
powered characters--that is, women."13 Johnson's reading of 
Austen leads her into contradictions, since it is difficult 
to polarize Austen in some sort of oppositional role in a 
presumed "debate" (a term featured in Johnson). Johnson is 
right, however, that the serious and complex moral issues in 
these novels have tended to be neglected by critics, since 
M[t]he fact that Austen is a female novelist has made assess-
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merits of her artistic enterprise qualitatively different from 
those of her male counterparts. * Johnson cites as an early 
example the 1821 review of Archbishop Whately, who 'praises 
Austen for declining the didactic posture—  . . . and for 
opting instead to hint at matters of serious concern inobtru- 
sively and unpretentiously."14 More recently, C.S. Lewis 
speaks up for Austen's moral assertiveness, but interestingly 
his commendation is also couched negatively in charting the 
moments of "undeception" for her characters. As I have dis­
cussed, his observation that in her novels "[t]he great ab­
stract nouns of the classical English moralists cire unblush- 
ingly and unconpromi singly used"is suggests a presumptuous 
woman out of her element, and Lewis seems to be endorsing 
Austen while at the same time claiming masculine prerogative 
to limit the significance of her presence.
While claiming an equal role for women in shaping the 
discourse of virtue, Austen does not seem to challenge the 
discourse itself. For example, Johnson clearly recognizes 
Elizabeth Bennet and Emma Woodhouse as "empowered," while 
Jane Bennet is certainly "unempowered, * but these "empowered" 
women only find happiness, not by distancing themselves, as 
Elizabeth does from Jane's standards, but by recognizing, ac­
cepting and responding to benevolence and gratitude. The pro­
cess of joining the discourse, as I have suggested, requires 
learning gratitude, while not rejecting "partiality." This is 
the shaping of the discourse, because the "unempowered" Jane
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adheres to a standard of virtue which insists on “universal 
good will" and the suppression of partiality.
Hutcheson's system does allow for “partiality* {or “par­
ticular regard,* as Darcy terms it) as more focused benevo­
lence, so long as the dictates of self-interest are subordi­
nate, and not the “only* motive. Although the successor and 
defender of Shaftesbury, in permitting partiality Hutcheson 
allows a latitude in virtue which Shaftesbury rules out in An 
Inquiry Concerning Virtue (1699).
But lest any shou'd imagine with themselves that 
an inferior Degree of natural Affection, or an im­
perfect partial Regard of this sort, can supply the 
place of an intire, sincere, and truly moral one; .
. . we may consider first, That PARTIAL AFFECTION, 
or social Love in part, without regard to a com­
plete Society or Whole, is in it-self an 
Inconsistency, and implies an absolute 
Contradiction.16
It does appear that Jane aspires to emulate this 
Shaftesburnian ideal of affectionate feeling for the 
"species," or "universal good will," which she combines with 
a sort of stoicism in the suppression of her feelings, seen 
by Darcy as "the serenity of your sister's countenance and 
air." These two value systems, sentimental and stoic, usually 
are presented as incompatible, although each has been inden- 
tified by scholars with Jane Austen's point of view. Hoyt 
Trowbridge traces philosophical influences, primarily as rep­
resented in Pride and Prejudice.
The ethical and psychological premises which order 
Jane Austen's depiction of character and action are 
not stoical, for it is assumed that the capacity to 
think and the capacity to feel are equally human.17
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Yet no definitive conclusion about Austen as "sentimen­
tal* or "stoic" can be supported by the interpretations and 
critique of Jane’s behavior offered either by Elizabeth, 
Darcy, or Charlotte, since the observations of all are unre­
liable or clouded with self-interest. Jane’s predicament 
does, however, ask the question, can partiality work for per­
sonal happiness within a system of virtue? Hutcheson offers 
an affirmative answer, in which benevolence may be necessar­
ily partial, and surrenders none of its power to generate 
gratitude and love by being so focused.
But there is nothing will give us a juster Idea 
of the wise Order in which human Nature is form'd 
for universal Love, and mutual good Offices, them 
considering that strong attraction of Benevolence, 
which we call Gratitude. . . . Now because of the 
vast Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habitations, 
and the incapacity of any one to be remarkably use­
ful to vast Multitudes; . . . whose Interests, at 
vast distances, we could not understand, nor be ca­
pable of promoting, . . . NATURE has more power­
fully determin’d us to admire and love the moral 
Qualities of others, which affect our selves, and 
has given us more powerful Impressions of Good-will 
towards those who are beneficient to our selves; 
which we call Gratitude; and thus has laid a 
Foundation for joyful Associations in all kinds of 
Business, and virtuous Friendships. . .
This universal Benevolence toward all Men, we 
may compare to the Principle of Gravitation, which 
perhaps extends to all Bodys in the Universe; but, 
like the Love of Benevolence, increases as the 
Distance is diminish'd, and is strongest when Bodys 
come to touch each other.18
Hutcheson is notorious, if not unique, for applying mathemat­
ical and scientific analogies to morality, and Newton is a 
favorite, of course, because of his religious orthodoxy. 
However, Hutcheson's claim to scientific method introduces a 
relativism into virtue that "would hardly have satisfied
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Shaftesbury's demand for an * intire, sincere, and truly 
moral• Affection to counter that 'imperfect partial‘ variety 
. . ."19 Further, the scientific calculus of gravitation seems 
to prove that benevolence and gratitude fuse in a kind of 
unity when, under their combined pull, "Bodys come to touch 
each other," without necessarily cancelling each other out. 
That this is the product of such a calculus is suggested by 
Hutcheson's inclusion of gratitude among the "nearer and 
stronger Degrees of Benevolence," and then singling it out 
for special emphasis in the above passage as "that strong at­
traction of Benevolence, which we call Gratitude."
The proof of this calculus in Pride and Pre-iudice is 
that Elizabeth's awareness and experience of Darcy‘s benevo­
lence generates gratitude, which in turn is manifested by a 
desire to return the benevolence,20 and this is the process by 
which gratitude flourishes into love. Even the hard-boiled 
Charlotte Lucas recognizes gratitude's role in prefacing her 
advice with the observation that "[tjhere is so much of grat­
itude or vanity in almost every attachment," although her 
cynicism cheapens the more worthy sentiment with "vanity" as 
an alternative motive. But yet, Elizabeth's feeling begins, 
not in responding to Darcy's direct attentions, but from the 
correction of her earlier flawed observations through the 
testimony of witnesses.21 Before this process begins,
Elizabeth is in the clutches of resentment because of Jane's 
shoddy treatment by the Bingley swells, aggravated by her 
learning of Darcy's intervention. Had Jane's true nature been
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appreciated, gratitude would be the expected response and 
would have been shared by an observer.22
Resentment, as I have suggested, is the basis for 
Elizabeth’s rejection of Darcy's profession of love, even 
though she recognizes that social convention seems to call 
for a different response.
In such cases as this, it is, I believe, the es­
tablished mode to express a sense of obligation for 
the sentiments avowed, however unequally they may 
be returned. It is natural that obligation should 
be felt, and if I could feel gratitude, I would now 
thank you. (190)
Indeed, Elizabeth’s first reaction is that "she could not be 
insensible to the compliment of such a man's affection," be­
fore she is fully "roused to resentment ..." (189). In re­
jecting Darcy, and in holding gratitude to the test of her 
feelings, Elizabeth also claims exemption from "the estab­
lished mode," which seems to find that the award of "such a 
man's affection" by itself creates an "obligation" in its re­
cipient .23
Just as Elizabeth’s resentment arose, not from direct 
offense to herself, but from the injury to her sister Jane's 
feelings, her eventual conversion to gratitude begins with 
the evidence of Darcy's kind and benevolent treatment of oth­
ers, evidence which relies on the testimony of a key witness, 
the housekeeper at Pemberley. Why does Austen choose this in­
direct approach, in which the conversion of Elizabeth's feel­
ings is accomplished without any direct contact with Darcy 
subsequent to her reading his explanatory letter after his
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rebuff, until their awkward encounter in company with the 
Gardiners at Pemberley? That the mind, informed only by the 
passions of the moment, is an unreliable observer is a com­
monplace observation on the theme of this novel. Reliable 
knowledge of truth requires some degree of emotional dis­
tance, and the importance of the truth bears a direct rela­
tionship to the importance of the testimony of mediating wit­
nesses, particularly where judgment based on direct observa­
tion may be skewed by self-interest.
Clearly, “witnessing" is essential to knowledge of the 
highest “truth." Jane Austen's favorite sermon writer, Bishop 
of London Thomas Sherlock, wrote an enormously popular mock 
courtroom drama, The Trial of the witnesses of_ the 
Resurrection of Jesus. The Trial begins as a group of col- 
legeal members of the London bar reflect on the recent con­
viction of Thomas Woolston for publishing tracts denying the 
miracles.24 They decide to argue among themselves, according 
to strict rules of legal procedure, the credibility of the 
witnesses to the greatest attested miracle, the Resurrection 
itself.25 While the cosmic importance of this central event 
for Christians may seem a long stretch from Austen's corned/, 
there is nothing more central to Pride and Prejudice than the 
“truth" of Darcy's character, and the penumbra of Christian 
epistemology shadows the search for this truth.
Witnessing to the events and miracles of Christ's life 
and death is stressed in the narratives of Christ's apostles, 
recorded in the Bible as the "Gospels," as confirmation of
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their historical authenticity. Jesus himself, at his interro­
gation by Pilate on the eve of the Crucifixion, also testi­
fies to his role as a witness.
To this end was I bom, and for this cause came I 
into the world, that I should bear witness unto the 
truth.26
In Sherlock's work, a key argument of counsel defending 
the witnesses distinguishes the Resurrection of Jesus from 
that claimed for "Mahomet," on whose own affirmation alone 
believers in his ascension must rely (349-50). Darcy's testi­
mony in his own behalf, in the letter he hands Elizabeth the 
morning after her spirited rejection, clearly is subject to 
similar discounting as self-serving.
She put down the letter, weighed every circumstance 
with what she meant to be impartiality— deliberated 
on the probability of each statement— but with lit­
tle success. On both sides it was only assertion.
(205)
But the substantive details Darcy's letter recites of 
Wickham's villainy, Elizabeth's inability to recall any posi­
tive contradictory information, and his offer of Colonel 
Fitzwilliam as a corroborating witness, as well as Darcy's 
own justifications for misreading of Jane's emotions, earn 
him at least provisional credibility.
Yet even if Colonel Fitzwilliam or other witnesses were 
to testify in Darcy's behalf, Elizabeth still must accept as 
believable the possibility of his good character, just as 
counsel attack the witnesses to the Resurrection by arguing 
against the very possibility of such an event, so that the 
defense must establish its consistency with natural law.
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And what has the gentleman [counsel] said, upon 
this occasion, against the resurrection, more than 
any man, who never saw ice, might say against an 
hundred honest witnesses, who assert that water 
turns to ice in cold climates? (395)
Quite clearly, a continued insistence on the impossibility of 
well-attested fact would require the maintenance of a blind 
prejudice. Although up to this point in the novel Elizabeth 
■had been blind, partial, prejudiced, absurd" (208), there is 
enough of a residue in her mind of directly gleaned informa­
tion about Darcy, that she cannot reasonably dismiss testi­
mony which is not inconsistent with her own knowledge.
[I]n farther justification of Mr. Darcy, she could 
not but allow that Mr. Bingley, when questioned by 
Jane, had long ago asserted his blamelessness in 
the affair [of Wickham's money problems]; that 
proud and repulsive as were his manners, she had 
never, in the whole course of their acquaintance, .
. .seen any thing that betrayed him to be unprinci­
pled or unjust— any thing that spoke him of irreli­
gious or immoral habits. (207) .
Here, of course, Bingley is the witness, and his testimony 
given not to Elizabeth but to her sister, which emphasizes 
the impartiality of Elizabeth's judgment. Religion rarely is 
foregrounded in this novel, but finding Darcy free of ■irre­
ligious or immoral habits" calls attention to Trowbridge's 
■Christian coloring," and connects Elizabeth's inquiry with 
Sherlock's mock investigation.
Elizabeth undergoes no instantaneous reversal of feel­
ing, although, as she reflects further on Darcy's letter,
■his disappointed feelings became the object of compassion. 
His attachment excited gratitude, . . but she could not ap­
prove him" (212) . Yet the process of love has begun, because
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Elizabeth's compassion is itself a form of benevolence, and 
evidence of the transformation of gratitude and benevolence 
found by Hutcheson "when Bodys touch each other."27 The pro­
cess receives a strong impetus with the visit to Pemberley# 
and the warm testimony on Darcy’s behalf by the housekeeper, 
Mrs. Reynolds, who offers unsolicited praise of her master's 
benevolence, concluding that "[h]e is the best landlord, and 
the best master . . . that ever lived" (249) Elizabeth evalu­
ates the worth of this testimony highly, since "[w]hat praise 
is more valuable than the praise of an intelligent servant?" 
(250).
This entire inquiry, since Elizabeth received Darcy’s 
letter, is conducted in his absence, with Elizabeth sitting 
in judgment on evidence submitted to her. Austen seems to 
"empower" her, as Claudia Johnson observes, for this judicial 
role, although Sherlock, not surprisingly for the verisimili­
tude of his courtroom drama, appoints a male judge to hear 
the trial of the witnesses to the Resurrection. Austen also 
"empowers" the housekeeper, whereas the issue of credibility 
for a female witness remains highly problematic in Sherlock. 
Counsel attacks the worth of women's testimony that they 
found Jesus' tomb empty, except for "an angel, or angels" 
(offered as the first witnesses), who "looked like men to 
women who saw them," and the barrister attributes the un­
likely ability to determine an angel's sex to the women's 
•superstition, ignorance, and fear."
The next witnesses are the women themselves: The
wisest men can hardly guard themselves against the
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fears of superstition; poor silly women therefore 
in this case must be unexceptionable witnesses; . .
(390)
Ihis heavily sarcastic ad hominem. or rather ad feminem. at­
tack creates some real problems for the otherwise effective 
defense counsel, who chooses not to address gender and credi­
bility, but to argue that the women's testimony does not af­
fect his case one way or the other.
But for the women, what shall I say? Silly as 
they were, I hope at least they had eyes and ears, 
and could tell what they heard and saw. . . . And 
if men only must be admitted, of them we have 
enough to establish this truth. (414-5)
This argument rests on the authority that designated apostles 
were the "men1' who were Christ's "chosen witnesses," and this 
proves persuasive in the summary of the case by the judge, 
who nevertheless declines to express an opinion on the credi­
bility of the women.
The objection to the women was, I think, only 
that they were women,- which was strengthened by 
calling them silly women. [But these women] are 
none of the chosen witnesses; and if they were, the 
evidence of the men cannot be set aside, because 
women saw what they saw. (435)
Sherlock, at least, leaves the door open on the admissibility 
of women's testimony in a legal proceeding on the truth of 
Christianity's most important mystery, and Austen moves 
through the opening to set up Mrs. Reynolds as the most reli­
able of witnesses to Darcy's character.
In many respects, The Trial of the Witnesses shadows the 
"trial" of Darcy conducted by Elizabeth, and the religious 
shading can be seen in the reverential approach of Elizabeth 
and the Gardiners as near-pilgrims in the hallowed precincts
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of Pemberley. In a sense, Darcy ia “dead, “ because he has 
been out of sight since handing Elizabeth the letter, which 
event has all the aspects of a final separation, particularly 
since, until Pemberley, she has not “the slightest inclina­
tion ever to see him again" (212). But Mrs. Reynolds as an 
"intelligent servant" has the same status as the apostles who 
were "chosen witnesses" of the Resurrection, and Austen seems 
to demand that readers do not discount her authority because 
of gender. The religious atmosphere is continued with 
Elizabeth's contemplative study of Darcy's portrait, which 
has all the aspects of icon worship, including adoration's 
investiture of the icon with life.
[S]he beheld a striking resemblance of Mr. Darcy, 
with such a smile over the face, as she remembered 
to have sometimes seen, when he looked at her. She 
stood several minutes before the picture in earnest 
contemplation, and returned to it again before they 
quitted the gallery. (250)
Absorbed in this meditation, Elizabeth and the Gardiners 
stroll out in the garden-like grounds of the park, suggestive 
of the garden location of Jesus' sepulchre after the 
Crucifixion, where Mary Magdalene (one of the "silly women") 
encounters Jesus, "supposing him to be the gardener."23 While 
Elizabeth does not make this mistake about Darcy, his appear­
ance to them on the narrow winding walk in one of Austen’s 
most rhapsodic natural settings, after Elizabeth figuratively 
has "given him up for dead," partakes of a reincarnation, and 
is followed almost immediately by what amounts to a religious
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conversion, after hearing "testimony so highly in his 
favour.“
But above all, above respect and esteem, there was 
a motive in her of good will which could not be 
overlooked. It was gratitude.— Gratitude, not 
merely for having once loved her, but for loving 
her still well enough, to forgive all the petulance 
and acrimony of her manner in rejecting him, . . .
He who, she had been persuaded, would avoid her as 
his greatest enemy, seemed . . . most eager to pre­
serve the acquaintance, and without any indelicate 
display of regard, was soliciting the good opinion 
of her friends, . . . Such a change in a man of so 
much pride, excited not only astonishment but grat­
itude— for to love, ardent love, it must be at­
tributed; and as such its impression on her was of
a sort to be encouraged, as by no means unpleasing,
though it could not be exactly defined. She re­
spected, she esteemed, she was grateful to him, she
felt a real interest in his welfare; and she only 
wanted to know how far she wished that welfare to 
depend upon herself, and how far it would be for 
the happiness of both that she should employ the 
power, which her fancy told her she still pos­
sessed, of bringing on the renewal of his ad­
dresses. (265-6)
The elevation of Elizabeth's feelings is certainly appropri­
ate to the close relationship insisted on by Hutcheson be­
tween benevolence and “the DEITY“ that seems to hover over 
the conversion of gratitude into benevolence "when Bodys 
touch each other." Since the novel begins with Elizabeth's 
"resentment" and her inability to "feel" gratitude, the com­
plete reversal of those feelings confirms, as I suggested 
earlier, that Elizabeth has completed her moral journey. 
Further, all this has been accomplished, not by direct bene­
fits to Elizabeth, but by her evaluation of evidence, partic­
ularly the testimony of reliable witnesses, of Darcy's benef­
icence to others. But her "verdict" is not a judicial find-
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ing, like the summary of the judge in the Trial, but her 
■conversion" marked by the "feeling" of gratitude.
Throughout the process of Elizabeth’s conversion there 
is a play between feeling and reason. In my discussion of 
gratitude in Sense and Sensibility. I contrast Balguy's argu­
ment that reason shows gratitude to be "right" in all circum­
stances, with Hutcheson, who claims that virtue is revealed 
and encouraged by the feelings or "senses." Bishop Sherlock, 
however, brings feelings and reason together.
Nor do we teach that nature and reason cannot lead 
to the speculative knowledge of divine truths; for 
the evidence of all divine truth resolves itself 
ultimately into either sense or reason; which are 
the common gifts of God to mankind, by the princi­
ples of which the truth of all things, depending 
upon the deductions of sense and reason, may be 
proved and examined.29
I submit that the interplay of sense and reason in Austen re­
flects their status as "common gifts of God" and is addi­
tional confirmation of the "religious coloring" of Pride and 
Pre-iudice and, indeed, of all these novels.
Sense and reason, functioning in concert, also make pos­
sible the interplay of benevolence and gratitude, "when Bodys 
touch each other." For all their exchangeability, there is a 
hierachical relationship which elevates benevolence, as a 
mirror of God, above the humbler response of gratitude. 
Therefore, for Hutcheson's "exchange" to take place, there 
must also be a least a reasonable basis for a leveling of the 
parties. After Darcy discharges the ultimate in benevolence 
by arranging and funding Lydia's unlikely nuptials with
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Wickham, Elizabeth reflects on Darcy's role, as revealed in
her aunt's letter.
It was reasonable that he should feel he had been 
wrong; he had liberality, and he had the means of 
exercising it; and though she would not place her­
self as his principal inducement, she could, per­
haps, believe that remaining partiality for her, 
might assist his endeavours in a cause where her 
peace of mind must be materially concerned. It was 
painful, exceedingly painful, to know they were un­
der obligations to a person who could never receive
a return. (326)
The crux of Elizabeth's personal predicament is that, if her 
love is to be received as benevolence by Darcy, then he must
be humbled, a requirement not unwelcome to most readers of
the novel.
Hutcheson has supplied the moral reasoning, not only to 
eliminate partiality as the obstacle it presents to Jane and 
Bingley, but also to feature it in the mutual gravitational 
pull of benevolence and gratitude. However, the occasion of 
Darcy's humbling is still wanted. So that the romance doesn't 
stop in its tracks, Austen has recourse to the hallowed de­
vice of the deus ex machina. none other than Lady Catherine 
De Bourgh, who in her stormy visit with the Bennets forces 
the very engagement she demands that Elizabeth renounce. The 
way is cleared, perhaps not too smoothly, for Darcy to con­
fess that Elizabeth has improved his already "good princi­
ples." As I have suggested, Austen makes Darcy see himself as 
the subject of instruction, through his own Stoic commitment 
to education.
What do I not owe you! You taught me a lesson, hard 
indeed at first, but most advantageous. By you I 
was properly humbled. (369) .
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The answer to Darcy's rhetorical question is, everything and 
nothing. The stoic man of reason has learned the understand­
ing that can only be "taught" by the feelings. His unreach­
able benevolence has been overcome and converted to grati­
tude, as Elizabeth's gratitude rises to benevolence. Each 
brings to the other the gifts of themselves and their love in 
a marriage of equals.
In transforming values and uniting opposites, gratitude 
in Pride and Prejudice is at its zenith of power. But it 
could be argued that, by creating assertive and independent 
characters like Elizabeth and Darcy, Austen endows them with 
the power to forge their own future by the force of personal­
ity, funded by Darcy's bank account, more than through the 
workings of gratitude. But true virtue cannot depend for its 
authority on strong characters with the will and capacity to 
drive their own destinies. Does gratitude also serve the 
wants and desires for happiness of the weak and powerless? 
Northanaer Abbev suggests that it might be a useful claim for 
the unempowered Catherine Morland, but the condition prece­
dent seems to be a kind of remorse by Henry Tilney for the 
combined injuries to Catherine inflicted by himself and his 
father. What happens when gratitude is urged by unimpeachable 
authority figures against the wishes of the weak, but unin­
jured? Austen explores this question in Mansfield Park, and 
the answer seems to be that personal happiness may require 
that the manifest duty of gratitude be rejected, or rather 
that one's own feelings determine where gratitude is to be
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placed, not the urgings of external authority. The conflict 
of gratitude and personal happiness is also examined in Emma, 
but comically complicated by suggesting that one may inter­
pose one's own plans and desires to block gratitude's opera­
tion between others. Both novels, then, represent Austen's 
exploration of the limits of gratitude, whose power in Pride 
and Prejudice seems nearly boundless.
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Chapter 4 Notes
1 Samuel Johnson: Selected Poetry and Prose, eds. Brady and 
Wimsatt 158.
2 "The best state of rational Agents, and their greatest and 
most worthy Happiness, we are necessarily led to imagine must 
consist in universal efficacious Benevolence; and hence we 
conclude the DEITY benevolent in the most universal impartial 
manner. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name 
of Perfection but Benevolence, and those Capacitys or 
Abilitys which are necessary to make it effectual; such as 
Wisdom, and Power: at least we can have no other valuable 
Conception of it." Francis Hutcheson, vol. I, Works 276. 
These thoughts conclude Hutcheson's treatise, and the 
comments about "Capacitys of Abilitys" should not be mistaken 
as suggesting that such qualities are integral components of 
benevolence. Hutcheson makes this clear earlier in the 
treatise: "Nor shall we find anything amiable in any Action 
whatsoever, where there is no Benevolence imagagin'd; nor in 
any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd 
applicable to, and design'd for benevolent Purposes" (150). 
Benevolence limited in extent may be "a smaller Degree of 
Virtue, unless our Beneficence be restrain'd by want of 
Power, ..." (166), although the measure of "moral 
Importance of any Character, . . . is in a compound Ratio of 
his Benevolence and Abilitys" (168). Nevertheless, the 
absence of "Capacitys or Abilitys" may make it difficult to 
recognize a benevolent disposition.
3 Vol. 5, Works 69-70.
4 "And yet as soon as any Action is represented to us as 
flowing from Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, a Study 
of the good of others, and a Delight in their Happiness, . .
. we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely action, and praise 
its Author"This increase of Love towards the Benevolent, 
according to their nearer Approaches to our selves by their 
Benefits, is observable in the high degree of Love, which 
Heroes and Law-givers universally obtain in their own 
Conntrys [sic], . . . and in all the strong Ties of 
Friendship, Acquaintance, Neighbourhood, Partnership; which 
are exceedingly necessary to the Order of human Society."
Vol. 1, Works 110-11, 199. "Since benevolence is motivated, 
for Hume as for Hutcheson, by the sight of another's 
benevolence, and it issues in further acts of benevolence, 
social virtues spread by a kind of contagion." Wills 253.
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5 "Our Reason does often correct the Report of our Senses, .
. . and corrects rash Conclusions about the Affections of the 
Agent. . . . But whether our moral Sense be subject to such a 
Disorder, . . . 'tis not easy to determine.* Vol. 2, Works 
283.
6 Hoyt Trowbridge qualifies his own argument that "Jane 
Austen is a rationalist" by adding that "principles are 
dynamic and effective only when they become an inclination, . 
. . a sense of duty, a 1 something within,' as much a matter 
of habit and feeling as of reason itself." Trowbridge 281. 
That Austen sees a valuable role for reason does not make her 
a "rationalist," particularly in the philosophical sense as 
opposed to the authority of feelings. See analysis of John 
Balguy and the "rationalists" or "intellectualists" in my 
discussion of Sense and Sensibility and note below.
7 The phrase is not unique to Hutcheson and may be considered 
a generic expression of "the language of virtue," which "just 
about everybody" spoke in the eighteenth century. See Jack 
Fructroan, Jr., Thomas Paine and the Religion of Nature 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993) 13.
8 "The Golden Sayings of Epictetus" [ca 90 A.D.], trans. 
Hastings Crossley. In The Harvard Classics, Plato. Epictetus. 
Marcus Aurelius (1909; New York: Collier, 1937) 156, and 
"Introductory Note," 116.
9 Antoine Le Grand, Man without Passion: or, the Wise Stoick. 
According to the Sentiments of Seneca. Cited in Crane 199- 
200.
10 The Complete Poetry of John Milton, ed. Shawcross 563.
11 Plato.-Epictetus. Marcus Aurelius 156.
12 Trowbridge 282.
13 Johnson xxiii, xxiv.
14 Johnson xiv, xv.
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15 Lewis, ed. Hooper 178.
15 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, An Inquiry 
Concerning Virtue or Merit (1699: rpt. 1732), vol. 1, British 
Moralists. ed. Selby-Bigge 40.
17 Trowbridge, 284.
18 Works. I, 197-99.
18 Stewart-Robinson 202.
20 Gratitude: "2. Desire to return benefits. ■ Johnson, & 
Dictionary of the English Language.
21 For many readers, Elizabeth seems persuaded rather too 
easily to forgive Darcy for his role in breaking tip the 
budding love between Jane and Bingley, but Hutcheson would 
support both Elizabeth's as well as Darcy's motives. Having 
been convinced of Darcy’s basic benevolence, Elizabeth "buys" 
his explanation that he was entirely motivated by the best of 
intentions for his friend's happiness, a "partiality" 
specifically endorsed in Hutcheson's system. Further, Darcy's 
benevolence is entirely "disinterested," the acid test of 
benevolent purity, since he has nothing personally to gain. 
Nor, as Darcy explains, was he at all aware that his 
benevolently intended acts had the unintended effect of 
wounding Jane.
22 Adam Smith seems to agree with Samuel Johnson and Swift 
on the common source in the “passions" of gratitude and 
resentment, and he finds their kinship in the idea of a 
■spectator’s" "sympathy." Since *[r]esentment is commonly 
regarded as so odious a passion," people recoil from sympathy 
with the aggrieved party.
They will be more willing, perhaps, to admit that our 
sense of the merit of good actions is founded upon a 
sympathy with the gratitude of the persons who recieve 
the benefit of them; because gratitude, as well as all 
the other benevolent passions, is regarded as an amiable 
principle, which can take nothing from the worth of
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whatever is founded upon it. Gratitude and resentment/ 
however, are, in every respect, it is evident, 
counterparts to one another; . . . (The Theory of Moral 
SentiPgPES/ in British Moralists, ed. Selby-Bigge, 294).
23 The idea that there is a required response of gratitude in 
this situation can be attributed to the "rationalists," who 
argue, unlike Hutcheson and other "sentimentalists," that 
reason alone, not our "moral sense, ■ will show us the course 
of virtue. John Balguy's The Foundation of Moral Goodness, 
published three years after the first edition of Hutcheson's 
An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil (Treatise II of M  
Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue 
[1725]), specifically disagrees with Hutcheson and argues 
that even if we have "no kind Instinct toward our
Benefactors: Would Gratitude, . . . have been absolutely out
of our Power? Might we not nevertheless, by the Help of 
Reason and Reflection, discover ourselves to be under 
Obligations, and that we ought to return good Offices or 
Thanks, according to our Abilities." Later, Balguy returns 
more firmly to the same idea: "But when a Man compares the 
Idea of Gratitude with that of a Benefaction received, and 
examines the Relation between them, he cannot avoid
inferring, or concluding that he ought to be grateful." Vol.
2, British Moralists, ed. Selby-Bigge 63, 188. Darcy's offer 
of his love is the highest beneficience.
24 "ultimately Woolston was prosecuted for blasphemy on March 
4, 1729, before Lord Chief Justice Raymond. . . .  He was 
found guilty on four counts, and sentenced to a year's 
imprisonment and a fine of £100. This fine he was unable to 
pay, and he lingered in prison till his death in 1733." 
Overton and Relton 38-39.
25 The Trial of the Witnesses went through eighteen separate 
editions between 1729 and 1830. It was also included with 
other works published in multiple volumes as Discourses 
preached at the Temple Church (etc.) in six editions and 
twelve printings. An 1812 Clarendon Press edition is used in 
this study and possibly may be the edition referred to by- 
Jane Austen in her letter of 28 September to Anna Austen. 
Vol. 2, Letters, ed. Chapman 406.
26 Bible, John 18: 37.
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27 "Let us next consider another Determination of our Mind, 
which strongly proves Benevolence to be natural to us, and 
that is Compassion; ..." Vol. 1, Works 215-6.
28 John 20:15. A number of readers have commented on the 
Edenesque quality of the Pemberley park, and it is true that 
God walks in that original garden, and is encountered by Old 
Testament prophets in garden settings. Nevertheless, the 
garden setting in Pride and Prejudice seems more a 
Christianized version, informed by the Resurrection motif, as 
Darcy is re-presented to Elizabeth and the reader. I also 
cannot escape the association of this garden scene with the 
presence of Elizabeth's uncle and aunt, the "Gardeners," 
although it would be difficult to establish an intentional 
connection.
29 Discourse XVTI, vol. 1, Discourses. 325.
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CHAPTER V
GRATITUDE CHALLENGED IN MANSFIELD PARK AND EMMA
Fanny Price undergoes her most severe personal trial in 
the extended interview with Sir Thomas Bertram, who accuses 
her finally of "ingratitude" in her unshakable refusal to 
marry Henry Crawford. The crushing force of this accusation 
puts Fanny through an emotional wringer, and it is with re­
lief that she listens to the comforting words of her cousin, 
Edmund, for whom her true love is a closely guarded secret, 
who assures her that " [y] ou did not love him— nothing could 
have justified your accepting him."1
Although "Fanny had not felt so comfortable for days and 
days," Edmund is not finished, because he feels this is only 
a stage in Fanny's emotions, and he urges her to "let him 
succeed at last, Fanny, let him succeed at last" (347), 
adding, in surprise at her resistance,
I cannot suppose that you have not the wish to love 
him--the natural wish of gratitude. You must have 
some feeling of that sort. You must be sorry for 
your own indifference. (348)
To Fanny's dismay, after raising her hopes of sympathetic un­
derstanding, Edmund also appeals to her sense of gratitude on 
Henry's behalf, and she again is plunged into despair. 
Gratitude seems to be at odds with Fanny's quest for personal 
happiness, yet she herself on other occasions is its most 
committed advocate. Her moral education is the record of how
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she resolves this conflict between her affections and the 
dictates of “gratitude,“ a term crucial to the moral issues 
of all Austen novels, and whose twenty-six appearances in 
Mansfield Park alone advertise its central importance.
The relation of gratitude to Fanny Price's moral educa­
tion, and to the decisions she must make, bear directly on 
the frequently argued critical issue of whether she demon­
strates admirable growth in self-knowledge and moral develop­
ment, or remains throughout an unchanged and insufferable 
prig. For Gerry Brenner, Fanny is a “moral monolith, and her 
failure to “develop" is read ironically by Brenner as 
Austen's “sustained, oblique rejection of Fanny."2 On the 
other hand, Avron Fleishman and Susan Morgan argue that Fanny 
indeed does develop, and for Fleishman she "is a more complex 
and changeful character" than Elizabeth Bennet of Pride and 
Pre-iudice. “who merely changes her mind. “3 Morgan finds that 
Fanny's growth process anticipates the nineteenth-century 
bildungsroman, and that "[wjithout obvious events, without 
natural gifts, Fanny still grows. It is the chance Austen of­
fers to us all.“4
More recently, Nancy Miller has argued that Fanny "shows 
admirable improvement by the end of the novel: she moves from 
a passive morality that instructs no one to an active moral­
ity that is beneficial to many."5 Miller finds the source of 
Fanny's "improvement“ in Austen's commitment to Christian 
values, as played out in the consequences of the seven deadly 
sins, particularly sloth, that Miller feels afflict all
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Manfield Park characters, except Fanny, in one way or an­
other. Christian values are indeed pervasive in Austen nov­
els, but not as compelled by fear of retributive divine sanc­
tions, which seems implicit in Miller's thesis. Rather, ethi­
cal motivation for her characters is more a blend of reli­
gious values with a pragmatic and flexible approach to daily 
life.
Many of these critics, whether admirers or detractors of 
Fanny, seem more interested in connecting the novel with lit­
erary trends or cultural issues than in understanding Fanny’s 
character and development in terms of the interplay of moral 
dialogue and commentary, particularly discussions of grati­
tude, with dramatic events. For instance, Morgan sees 
Mansfield Park as foreshadowing the *bildungsroman, ■ perhaps 
reflecting the time frame of eight years in Fanny's life, the 
only Austen novel to stay with a central character from 
childhood to maturity as a young woman.6 Patrick Goold sug­
gests that Fanny suffers at the hands of critics because to­
day * [s]ubmissiveness is . . . quite out of fashion," and 
that also the "claim" the novel makes "to 'educating the sen­
timents' offends modern prejudices."7 Goold does consider 
Mansfield Park in the setting of a moral discourse, but the 
Kantian philosophical / psychological reading he offers has 
little relevance to Austen's novels.
This chapter will try to show that Fanny indeed does de­
velop morally, and that her educational process reenacts the 
"moral sense" of Francis Hutcheson, and the practical
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Christian ethics of Thomas Sherlock, imbedded in Austen's 
text. Gratitude is the rock that sustains Fanny from child­
hood in her unswerving but unrecognized love for Edmund, but 
she learns to subordinate if not reject this fundamental 
principle when it is invoked against her in her refusal of 
Henry Crawford.
Edmund suggests that eventually Fanny must give way to 
gratitude, because it is a "natural wish, ■ and nothing would 
seem more "natural" than for Fanny to follow her own "feel­
ings." Where, then, is “nature" to be found, and how do we 
recognize where it leads us? “Nature" also runs a school 
Fanny attends in her moral education, but what she learns is 
that nature is a dangerous and untrustworthy guide. The 
changing role of gratitude mirrors Fanny's own moral develop­
ment and reflects the plasticity given this virtue by 
Hutcheson. Despite appeals to gratitude that seem to threaten 
Fanny's happiness, and even challenge gratitude's authority, 
it survives these tests intact as the most important opera­
tive virtue in the novel.
For Hutcheson, virtue, measured by the standard of 
"Benevolence," thrives best in close family relationships, 
where it becomes identical with "natural Affection and 
Gratitude; . . .8 He frequently singles out parental affection 
as exemplifying the “stronger Degrees of Benevolence," and 
also comments that "there is the same kind of Affection among 
collateral Relations, tho in a weaker degree, . . . "9 In 
Austen's novels, affection among siblings and cousins often
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is stronger than the parental bond, but this distinction for 
Hutcheson is less significant than that virtuous love differs 
only in degree, not in kind, between "universal benevolence" 
and the "natural Affections" uniting close relations.
Virtuous love, of course defines the growth of Affection be­
tween Fanny and her cousin Edmund Bertram.
Hutcheson’s oeuvre does, however, reflect an ongoing 
struggle to account for and rationalize the influence of sex­
ual love, which clouds our understanding, with the virtuous 
love which is supposed to transcend passion. In my discussion 
of Sense and Sensibility. I attempt to show how this novel 
tests the power of virtue in the presence of physical pas­
sion, which Hutcheson tries to write out of his philosophy in
An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil.
The Affections which are of most importance in 
Morals, are Love and Hatred: All the rest seem but 
different Modifications of these two original 
Affections. Now in discoursing of Love toward ra­
tional Agents, we need not be caution’d not to in­
clude that Love between the Sexes, which, when no 
other Affections accompany it, is only Desire of
Pleasure, and is never counted a Virtue.10
"Affections" is a term carrying a lot of freight in 
Hutcheson, but in all its various manifestations, it is dis­
tinguished from "the Passions," which are further distin­
guished from "the Appetites," where we encounter sexual love. 
So long as we form correct "Opinions," we exercise some con­
trol over the "Passions," and the virtues are not threatened.
The Government of our Passions must then depend 
much upon our Opinions: But we must here observe an 
obvious Difference among our Desires, viz. that 
some of them have a previous, painful, or uneasy 
Sensation, antecedently to any Opinion of Good in
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the Object; nay, the Object is often chiefly es­
teemed good, only for its allaying this Pain or 
Uneasiness; or if the Object gives also positive 
Pleasure, yet the uneasy Sensation is previous to, 
and independent of this Opinion of Good in the 
Object. These desires we may call Appetites. . . .
Of [this] kind are Hunger and Thirst, and the 
Desires between the Sexes; to which Desires there 
is an uneasy Sensation previous, even in those who 
have little other Notion of Good in the Objects, 
than allaying this Pain or Uneasiness.11
But these unruly passions clearly can be exacerbated by the 
same proximity that also intensifies virtue, benevolence, and 
gratitude. Hutcheson seems to argue that "nature,* in the 
sense of sexuality, must be kept at a distance if virtue is 
not to be threatened, and in Mansfield Park, the convergence 
of nature with virtue and gratitude in the "wilderness" at 
Sotherton, and in Henry Crawford's direct assault on Fanny in 
the bosum of her Portsmouth family, prove exceptionally dan­
gerous .
How, then, can the relationship of blood, most conducive
to the highest virtue, be protected from the "Appetites" of
sexual attraction, which has no respect for virtue? This
dilemma has intrigued scholars with the shadow of incest it
seems to cast across Mansfield Park, with its marriage of
first cousins, who grow up together as devoted siblings.
Indeed, Glenda Hudson suggests that Fanny Price marries
cousin Edmund as a "surrogate for her beloved brother William
toward whom she feels an intense personal attachment."12
However, Hudson sees Austen endorsing such intimate sibling
relationships.
These joint experiences, Austen shows, create a po­
tent and sympathetic love, a commingling of frater­
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nal and erotic feelings, which although the empha­
sis is very much on the former, we must recognize 
as a kind of incestuous love.13
I agree that Fanny's attachment to both brother and 
cousin must be read as morally constructive, but feel that 
Hudson has clouded her analysis by defining these loving re­
lationships as "incest, * a term used pejoratively, then as 
now, as legally and morally proscribed.14 Hudson notes that 
“there was some sentiment against the practice [of first 
cousin' s marrying] in the eighteenth century, “1S and supports 
her observation by citing Hutcheson, whose principal concern 
seems to be that intra-family marriages work at cross-pur­
poses to the propagation and dissemination of virtue in soci­
ety.16 But in the same section of "The Rights and Duties in a 
State of Marriage," Hutcheson recognizes no adverse evidence 
against first-cousin marriages.
But it often happens that cousin-germans, and re­
moter relations, are educated together in the same 
intimacy [as siblings], and we see no dismal ef­
fects from the permission of intermarriages among 
them.17
This relationship, of course, parallels that of Fanny and 
Edmund, as played out in Mansfield Park's plot, but Hutcheson 
goes further to question cautiously the blanket condemnation 
of marriage between blood relations.
But that there is not a necessary invariable 
turpitude or moral inpurity in all these marriages 
ordinarily called incestuous, antecedently to the 
prohibition of them, must be owned by such as con­
sider that God laid the immediate children of Adam 
under a necessity of inter-marrying, and for some 
political reasons ordered such marriages on certain 
contingincies as were ordinarily prohibited.18
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Clearly, Hutcheson believes that "certain marriages," which 
would include those of first cousins, are entitled to exemp­
tion from the opprobrium associated with the label "incestu­
ous, " and the basis for such a claim is the literal reading 
of biblical scripture. Although Hutcheson argues that close 
familial relationships offer opportunities for the develop­
ment of virtue and its propagation, passionate love is cer­
tainly implied in the development of Fanny's and Edmund's re­
lationship. The latent eroticism that whispers "incest" cre­
ates a tension and airibivilance which implicitly challenges 
virtue's hold.
Austen seems to address this challenge by introducing 
Edmund to his cousin when she is at the tender age of ten, 
and Fanny immediately forges a felicitous bond of gratitude 
with Edmund, when he alone of the Bertram children undertakes 
positive acts of compassion and kindness to the homesick 
waif, soon after her arrival at the Park, in getting her pa­
per and pen to write her brother, and later in providing a 
docile mare for gentle open-air exercise. "He had never know­
ingly given her pain, but he now felt that she required more 
positive kindness" (17). As Fanny matures, the "Appetites" 
implicitly are acknowledged, but virtue has enjoyed a seven 
or eight-year head start and is not about to be displaced.
Seven or eight years should be adequate for an educa­
tional program in gratitude, but Alistair Duckworth finds 
that Fanny's own example seems to subvert the moral message 
of the novel.
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How, . . . are we to account for Fanny's in­
stinctive morality, her innate qualities? . . . But 
when all is said, there is a quality— an impulse—  
which cannot be contained within the educational 
hypothesis.19
Duckworth never successfully explains this "paradox, ■ as he 
terms it, except as it affirms Austen's belief in "a natural 
order stemming from God, ■ and that the required "affirmative 
response" is "in Fanny1 s nature."20 But "nature," as I have 
suggested, seems at critical moments to point in directions 
apparently in conflict with "instinctive morality," and if 
Fanny urges resistance to nature at Sotherton, she also shows 
that nature can lead her, and not unwillingly, as well.
Both Hutcheson and Sherlock are in accord on the process 
of education in virtue, and understanding their approach may 
clear up some of the mystification in the "paradox" posed by 
Duckworth about Fanny's apparently "innate qualities." First, 
Hutcheson specifically insists that his focus on the "moral 
sense" as an "internal" sense expands on, rather than chal­
lenges, Locke, and "no more pre-supposes an innate Idea, or 
Principle of Knowledge, than the external [sense]."21 
■Education" may clarify, inform, and direct the "internal 
sense,* but
Education never makes us apprehend any Qualitys in 
Objects, which we have not Senses capable of per­
ceiving. . . . Education may make an unattentive
Goth imagine that his Countrymen have attain'd the 
Perfection of Archictecture; . . . but he had never 
form'd these Prejudices, had he been void of a 
Sense of Beauty.22
With these somewhat chauvinistic thoughts, Hutcheson wraps up
his first Treatise, but picks up the analogy with the Sense
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of Beauty in the following An Incruirv Concerning Moral Good
and Evil-
It remains then, that as the Author of Nature 
has determin’d us to receive, by our external 
Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, 
according as they are useful or hurtful to our 
Bodies; and to receive from uniform Objects the 
Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, to excite us to 
the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it;
. . . so he has given us a Moral Sense, to direct 
our Actions, and to give us still nobler Pleasures;
But Hutcheson adds, to make sure there is no misunderstand­
ing, that "[w]e are not to imagine, that this moral Sense, 
more than the other Senses, supposes any innate Ideas, or 
Knowledge, or practical Proposition: We mean by it only a 
Determination of our Minds . . . ■ Thus, "Perception of moral 
Good is not deriv'd from Custom, Education, Example, or 
Study. These give us no new Ideas."23
Education, which supports and directs the moral sense, 
enlists the aid of reason, which "does often correct the 
Report of our Senses, "24 but which is similarily incapable of 
revealing virtue independent of the moral sense. Thomas 
Sherlock, writing from the perspective of a practical theolo­
gian rather than that of the moral philosopher, holds that 
both sense and reason function in concert as manifestations 
of God’s grace.
Nor do we teach that nature and reason cannot lead 
to the speculative knowledge of divine truths; for 
the evidence of all divine truth resolves itself 
ultimately into either sense or reason; which are 
the common gifts of God to mankind, by the princi­
ples of which the truth of all things, depending 
upon the deductions of sense and reason, may be 
proved and examined.25
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Fanny may be considered a composite of the complementary, if 
not identical, views of Hutcheson and Sherlock. By God's 
grace, she has a disposition to virtue, which is enhanced by 
Edmund's personal example and counsel, an exemplary educa­
tion. In sharp contrast are the Crawfords, whose defective 
education, and the vicious example of the Admiral, their un­
cle and guardian, allow vices to get the upper hand, and 
their better principles to wither in childhood. Sherlock is 
very emphatic on the widely shared belief in the importance 
of childhood education, and his views might almost serve as a 
preface or gloss on the role of education as played out in 
Mansfield Park.
All wise men, legislators, and princes, have ac­
knowledged, not only the use, but the necessity of 
an early education to form the mind, whilst tender, 
to the principles of honour and virtue; . . . Even 
our unbelievers have seen how far religion depended 
on this care; and, under a pretence of maintaining 
the liberty of the human mind, and guarding it 
against early prejudices, they have endeavoured to 
persuade the world, that children should be taught 
nothing of religion, but be left to form notions 
for themselves. They have had but too great suc­
cess, and we begin to see the fruits of it. The 
children of this age grow soon to be men and women, 
and are admitted to be partners and witnesses to 
the follies and vices of their parents. Thus 
trained and educated, . . . they are often a tor­
ment to each other, and to themselves, . . .26
Echoes of Sherlock's language resonate in discussions of the
Crawfords' education, as well as in narrative commentary on
the deficiencies in the education of the Bertram children,
such as demonstrated by Julia Bertram's petulance at her
"duty of attendance on Mrs. Rushworth and exclusion from the
others' fun at Sothertor..
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[T]he want of that . . . just consideration of oth­
ers, that knowledge of her own heart, that princi­
ple of right which had not formed any essential 
part of her education, made her miserable under it.
(91)
The consequence of neglecting such essentials, as Sherlock 
observes, is that Julia is a "torment to" herself, and pre­
sumably to others. Sir Thomas belatedly recognizes the short­
comings of "his plan of education."
He feared that principle, active principle, had 
been wanting, that they had never been properly 
taught to govern their inclinations and tempers, by 
that sense of duty which alone can suffice. They 
had been instructed theoretically in their reli­
gion, but never required to bring it into daily 
practice. (463)
The "theoretical" instruction in religion proves to be no 
better than the results Sherlock sees from being "taught 
nothing, ■ and both Sherlock as well as Sir Thomas cite the 
lack of education in "principles" as the common failing.
But Fanny's youthful responses at sixteen reflect more 
her disposition than her later education and demonstrate a 
kind of tunnel vision about gratitude, which is at war with 
her own feelings. When Sir Thomas leaves for his West Indies 
plantations, her reaction is one of "relief" at the removal 
of his awesome benevolent paternalism, "but a more tender na­
ture suggested that her feelings were ungrateful, and she re­
ally grieved because she could not grieve" (33). "Feelings" 
are distinguished from "more tender nature,“ which seems 
rather to be the indoctrinated conscience. This kind of con­
flict is also recognized by Elizabeth Bennet in Pride and
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Prejudice in her acknowledgment of Darcy's unwelcome marriage 
proposal.
It is, I believe, the established mode to express a 
sense of obligation for the sentiments avowed, how­
ever unequally they may be returned, it is natural 
that obligation should be felt, and if I could feel
gratitude, I would now thank you. But I cannot—  .
n
Although the feisty and independent Elizabeth has no problem 
discarding “the established mode," Fanny senses a flaw in her 
character, which fails to make emotion subject to the implied 
a priori virtue of gratitude.
Fanny emphasizes gratitude's morally imperative status 
in her discussion with Edmund of Mary Crawford's derogatory 
remarks about "the Admiral," uncle and guardian of Mary and 
her brother. In a conversation about property "improvements," 
Mary volunteers that her uncle's improvements ruined the 
charm of a cottage he had purchased. Later, Edmund asks, "was 
there nothing in her conversation that struck you Fanny, as 
not quite right?"
"Oh! yes, she ought not to have spoken of her 
uncle as she did. I was quite astonished. An uncle 
with whom she has been living so many years, and 
who, whatever his faults may be, is so very fond of 
her brother, treating him, they say, quite like a 
son. I could not have believed it!
"I thought you would be struck. It was very 
wrong— very indecorous."
"And very ungrateful I think." (63)
Edmund recoils from Fanny's verdict; "Ungrateful is a strong 
word," and they wind up their conversation in his scramble to 
exonerate Mary from ingratitude.
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It is quite true that the Admiral “was a man of vicious 
conduct,“ who, after his wife's death, “chose, instead of re­
taining his niece [Mary], to bring his mistress under his own 
roof “ (41), a history of which Fanny is well aware. Yet for 
Fanny, Mary's duty of gratitude is unaffected by the deprav­
ity of her uncle, even though his latest act drove Mary from 
his house. Although this incident occurs two years after 
Fanny's remorse at her own feelings on Sir Thomas's depar­
ture, her belief in the “stand alone* inviolability of grati­
tude remains unshaken.
At this point in the novel, Fanny's attitude resembles 
that of Elinor Dashwood in Sense and Sensibility, an attitude 
that I have argued eventually is discredited, but Elinor goes 
so far as to let gratitude dictate that she accept a sort of 
emotional suicide mission, which facilitates the marriage of 
her lover to a woman both detest. Fanny has yet to confront 
such a direct personal crisis, but is brought face to face 
with the choice between the duty of gratitude and personal 
happiness when Henry Crawford, his uncle's moral heir, claims 
her hand in marriage as the reward for his advocacy and the 
Admiral's influence in securing the lieutenant's commission 
for her adored midshipman brother, William.
Fanny's astonishing, and un-Elinor like, refusal of 
Henry, calls forth the formidable persuasive efforts of Sir 
Thomas, who triggers the emotional crisis of the novel by 
asking, rhetorically, "But, Fanny, if your heart can acquit 
you of ingratitude— ," an implied sin so appalling that the
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italicized incomplete thought testifies to the lack of words 
to express it. Sir Thomas's lecture, for Fanny, has been 
“rising in dreadful gradation! Self-willed, obstinate, self­
ish, and ungrateful" (319), and she twice reflects on the 
combination, “selfish and ungrateful, “ but her final thoughts 
settle on ingratitude as the one truly inexcusable vice. “'I 
must be a brute indeed, if I can be really ungrateful!' said 
she in soliloquy; 'Heaven defend me from being ungrateful!'“ 
(323).
Fanny's interview with Sir Thomas, which culminates in 
this fervent prayer, takes up ten pages in the Chapman text, 
surely a measure of her ordeal, and the pain is intensified 
when her uncle precedes their conversation by expressing sur­
prise at the lack of a fire in her room, followed by his or­
der that one shall be provided from then on. Such a kindness 
under these circumstances adds to Fanny' s burden a further 
degree of gratitude to him, and intensifies the magnitude of 
her rebellion when he speaks to her on behalf of Crawford's 
suit. But even here, at her most ungrateful moment, there is 
a suggestion that Fanny is growing morally, in Sir Thomas's 
opening expression of confidence that Fanny will feel no “re­
sentment," the reverse of gratitude,28 at being previously de­
prived of a fire's comfort.
— You have an understanding, which will prevent you 
from receiving things only in part, and judging 
partially by the event. — You will take in the whole 
of the past, you will consider times, persons, and 
probabilities. (313)
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In the context of what follows, it could be argued that Sir 
Thomas is only trying to flatter Fanny into accepting Henry 
Crawford, because his rhetoric and clearly invokes the apos­
tle Paul's famous letter to the Corinthians.
For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But 
when that which is perfect is come, then that which 
is in part shall be done away. When I was a child,
I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I 
thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put 
away childish things. For now we see through a 
glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in 
part; but then shall I know even as also I am 
known.29
Although Paul seems to refer to a final revelation yet to 
come, Sir Thomas suggests that Fanny's moral understanding in 
this life has matured from the "in part" vision of childhood 
to "tak[ing] in the whole." Further, he allows her the same 
kind of growth that Paul seems to reserve for one's becoming 
a "man."30 Sir Thomas may have intended that his appeal, with 
its imbedded biblical text, would persuade Fanny of the irre­
sistible force of his argument, but what he does is reveal to 
the reader what the reader already knows, that Fanny sees 
"the whole" in a different and more complete way than he 
does.
The forces of gratitude bearing on Fanny in this scene 
are overwhelming. Not only does she carry the burdens of Sir 
Thomas's past and present benevolence, as well as of Henry 
Crawford's successful assistance of the one she arguably 
loves most in the world, she also must recognize that this 
success would not have been possible without the willing help 
of Henry's ur.cle, the Admiral. Fanny already is on record
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that the Admiral1 s depraved morality is no excuse for the in­
gratitude Mary Crawford betrays earlier. How can Fanny shel­
ter herself, behind her abhorrence of their combined immoral­
ity, from the obligations of gratitude due to both the 
Admiral and his nephew, not to mention the claims of Sir 
Thomas, whose perceptions may be faulty, but whose character 
is unspotted?
The answer seems be that the duty of gratitude cannot be 
a “stand alone* virtue, and in the moral conflicts of life 
may be preempted or overruled when the claimant's character 
can be condemned, and his motives shown to be ruled, not by 
benevolence, but by pure self-interest, as Henry's are in his 
pursuit of Fanny. This admittedly oversimplifies an important 
philosophical debate, in which the inflexibility of the re­
quirement of gratitude, and of acting accordingly, were 
staunchly argued by the "rationalist* or “intellectualist“ 
school, as represented by John Balguy in his controversy with 
Francis Hutcheson, which I discuss in the chapter on Sense 
and Sensibility. Balguy insists that there are certain fixed 
principles of virtue, including gratitude, that can be appre­
hended by reason alone, without regard to Hutcheson's "moral 
sense." What Hutcheson does is to argue that the moral char­
acter and motives of benefactors determine the worth of their 
benevolence, and that one's "moral sense" of these factors is 
the best guide to conduct. It is true that "Gratitude arises 
from benefits conferred from good-will on ourselves, or those 
we love," but "neither benevolence nor any other affection or
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desire [which would include gratitude] can be directly raised
by volition.■
If they could, then we could be bribed into any af­
fection whatsoever toward any object, even the most 
improper: we might raise jealousy, fear, anger, 
love, toward any sort of persons indifferently by 
an hire, . . . 31
Hutcheson, then, is saying that where reason leads is, para­
doxically, unreasonable in practical affirs, and he makes his 
point cleverly, if somewhat deviously, by substituting the 
term "bribe" for "reason." By attributing to her St. Paxil's 
process of intellectual maturity, Sir Thomas suggests that 
Fanny's reason should show her the merits of Henry Crawford, 
but behind the arguments of reason is, of course, the “bribe" 
of his influence on behalf of William.
Nevertheless, Hutcheson has some trouble proving that 
his "moral sense" is not a smoke screen for self-love, in 
which personal happiness, as opposed to his guiding principle 
of "universal" happiness, justifies moral decisions.
Our Reason can discover indeed certain Bounds, 
within which we may not only act from Self-Love, 
consistently with the Good of the Whole, but every 
Mortal’s acting thus within these Bounds for his 
own Good, is absolutely necessary for the Good of 
the Whole, and the Want of such Self-Love would be 
universally pernicious; and hence, he who pursues 
his own private Good, with an Intention also to 
concur with that Constitution, which tends to the 
Good of the Whole; and much more he who promotes 
his own Good, with a direct View of making himself 
more capable of serving God, or doing good to 
Mankind; acts not only innocently, but also hon­
ourably, and virtuously: . . .  An thus a Neglect of 
our own Good, may be morally evil, and argue a Want 
of Benevolence toward the Whole.32
Hutcheson continues on with this tortuous argument to discuss
"when Self-Love breaks over the Bounds above-mention'd," but
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his obvious difficulty in articulating a logical and persua­
sive case is the relativism he tries to incorporate in fixed 
principles of virtue. His remarks would apply with equal 
force to gratitude, which becomes synonymous with benevolence 
in intimate personal relationships.33 However, the relativism 
of gratitude which Hutcheson introduces seems to support the 
latitude Austen allows Fanny to follow her own heart and 
judgment.
That this kind of moral liberation challenges an ac­
cepted order is implicit in Hutcheson's philosophical dis­
course with Balguy, and the dispute seems to spill over into 
the popular arena, as suggested by a piece that appeared in 
Eliza Heywood's, The Female Spectator (1744-46), entitled 
"Gratitude sometimes a Vice: the hard Fate of Two Sisters."34 
In this little fable, a lover, faced with the choice of sav­
ing one of two sisters from drowning, rescues out of grati­
tude the one who had helped him win the affections of the 
other, who therefore drowns. In despair at his loss, the res­
cuer commits suicide, and thus is also lost to the surviving 
sister.
The implausibility of this poignant scenario suggests a 
tongue-in-cheek authorship, yet the “serious" question, which 
perhaps could only be floated as a kind of dark humor, is 
whether the inflexibility of gratitude may work against the 
interests of women. Certainly this is the road block to hap­
piness that Fanny confronts, and in the January chill of the 
fire-less East Room, confronted with Sir Thomas’s "cold
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sternness" (318), she looks gratitude in the eye, and rejects 
it, even as she prays for heavenly deliverance "from being 
ungrateful!"
Lurking in Fanny'S heart, but revealed to no one, of 
course, is her love for Edmund, but Edmund helps her plight 
not at all, by invoking the claim on Fanny that "love" is the 
•natural wish of gratitude, * a claim that Austen herself 
seems to endorse. Gratitude is the basis of relationships 
which lead to marriages in Northanaer Abbgv. Sense, and 
Sensibility, and Pride and Prejudice, and at least in the 
last novel, the mutual love of Darcy and Elizabeth grows out 
of experiences that trigger gratitude toward each other. But 
what actual evidence is there that nature operates in the 
service of virtue?
Fanny already has had some experience with what looks 
like the consequences of following a "natural wish, ■ which 
apparently facilitates the workings of Henry's artful and un­
scrupulous mind on Maria's unguarded passion in the "wilder­
ness" of Sotherton. Sherlock condemns this evil collaboration 
of the mind and passion.
Good principles are the seeds of good actions: and, 
though the seed may be buried under much rubbish, 
yet, as long as there is life in it, there is a 
reasonable expectation of seeing fruit from it same 
time or other: but, when reason and tinderstanding 
are depraved, and as far corrupted as the passions 
of the heart; when thus the blind leads the blind, 
what else can we expect, but that both fall into 
the ditch?" [emphasis in text]35
The converse of Sherlock's metaphor is that, in nature, bad
seed brings forth evil fruit. Austen seems to translate
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Sherlock into the language of allegory in Sotherton Park.
Fanny is left behind by the explorers Edmund and Mary 
Crawford to muse in solitude on a bench in "the wilderness* 
(actually a silvacultured woodland) . Her bench is located 
next to the iron gate and fence which adjoins a ha-ha, and 
both separate “the wilderness" from the deeper woods of the 
■park" beyond. "Depraved" Reason, trifling with Passion, ap­
pears in the form of Henry Crawford and Maria Bertram, 
trailed by their dim-witted host and Maria's fianc6, Mr. 
Rushworth. Finding the gate locked to the true wilderness of 
the "park,■ Rushworth, the owner of these vast properties, 
leaves to get the key, and in his absence Maria frets at the 
delay.
But unluckily that iron gate, that ha-ha, give me a 
feeling of restraint and hardship. I cannot get 
out, as the starling said. ( 99)
Henry suggests insidiously to Maria that they might circum­
vent the gate's symbolic authority and constraint.
. . .  I think you might with little difficulty pass • 
round the edge of the gate, here, with my assis­
tance; I think it might be done, if you . . . could 
allow yourself to think it not prohibited. (99)
Others have noted the connotations of Maria's lament in chaf­
ing under the burden of her engagement vows,36 but have tended 
to overlook Fanny's fluttered concern at this scheme. She 
has, by her solitary occupation of the bench, become a sort 
of moral woodland sprite.
"You will hurt yourself, Miss Bertram," she cried,
"you will certainly hurt yourself against those 
spikes— you will tear your gown— you will be in 
danger of slipping into the ha-ha. You had better
not cc." (99-100)
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Hie small voice of Fanny's distress echoes Sherlock's thun­
derous denunciation of the alliance of “depraved" “reason and 
understanding* with “corrupted" “passions." When she warns 
Maria about the ha-ha, she seems to be seeing the perils of 
Sherlock's “ditch" that awaits these “blind" adventurers.
The “natural* setting of these escapades suggests that 
Austen sees in “nature* threats to virtue. But nature at 
Sotherton is “Appetite," in Hutcheson's taxonomy. The “natu­
ral wish of gratitude" implies that nature defers to moral 
law in guiding the emotions, just as within the enclosed and 
cultivated grounds one’s “natural* desires are, or should be, 
constrained by the traditional moral order of the ancient 
Sotherton estate,37 however emptied of content under present 
ownership. The woods beyond the gate offer the opportunity 
for Henry and Maria to escape moral confinement, but the es­
cape is illusory, since Rushworth ownership, and the moral 
authority of the marital engagement, extend even there, how­
ever unenforced his proprietary rights. One may lose sight of 
virtue in nature, but not escape its dictates.
When Fanny sides with Cowper in lamenting the destruc­
tion of the "avenue" of oaks to make way for “improvements," 
(56), she does not embrace raw nature, but rather the mind 
and hand of the planter, whose legacy is preserved in the an­
cient trees, which modem taste would cut down. Fanny's com­
ment, on sitting down on the bench to rest, that “to sit in 
the shade on a fine day, and look upon verdure, is the most 
perfect refreshment" (96), does imply innocent delight in na­
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ture's "smiling scene, “ as Henry later presents it enticingly 
to Maria. But Fanny’s refreshment turns to disappointment in 
the negligent selfishness of Edmund and Mary, who desert her, 
and to horror in the sexual frolic of Henry and Maria. Fanny 
alone stays completely within the moral limits defined by the 
bench, fence and locked gate, and the indiscretion of Edmund 
and Mary lacks the turpitude of Henry and Maria, since they 
themselves do not pass the boundaries of the fence.
The closest Fanny comes to being in a true state of na­
ture herself is in the environment of her own Portsmouth fam­
ily. Their covetousness, her siblings' scrambles for food, 
and fights over possessions, are not far removed from a 
struggle for survival, and Fanny recoils from the moral vac­
uum of existence ungraced by gratitude. The most promising 
child is Fanny’s sister, Susan, who is unrewarded for her ef­
forts at order and economy in the family, since her mother 
dotes on the youngest daughter.
The blind fondness which was for ever producing 
evil around her, she [Susan] had never known. There 
was no gratitude for affection past or present, to 
make her better bear with its excesses to the oth­
ers. (396)
The economic hardship of the Price family, of course, stands 
in contrast with the Bertram's affluence, but even here 
Nature can masquerade its moral poverty and offer a "smiling 
scene" that also masks the real poverty which stalks the fam­
ily. In perhaps the novel's most rhapsodic passage, Austen 
describes the Price family Sunday outing on the Portsmouth 
ramparts, v/ith Fanny on Henry Crawford's arm.
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The day was uncommonly lovely. It was really 
March; but it was April in its mild air, brisk soft 
wind, and bright sun, occasionally clouded for a 
minute; and everything looked so beautiful under 
the influence of such a sky, the effects of the 
shadows pursuing each other, on the ships at 
Spithead and the island beyond, with the ever-vary­
ing hues of the sea now at high water, dancing in 
its glee and dashing against the ramparts with so 
fine a sound, produced altogether such a combina- 
tion of charms for Fanny, as made her almost care­
less of the circumstances under which she felt
them. (409). [Emphasis added].
This canvas is anything but Austen's "little bit (two Inches 
wide) of Ivory on which I work with so fine a Brush, as pro­
duces little effect after much labour,"38 and seems clearly to 
invite the reader to share Fanny's pleasure, including the 
relaxation of her moral scruples against Henry. Like the 
flood tide that covers Portsmouth harbor's low-tide grime, 
Henry's character and fortunes are now at their high-water 
mark. But as the tide falls and nature's smile fades, the
stain on his true character is revealed by his moral perfidy
with Maria that follows soon after.
Nevertheless, gratitude does seem to possess a power to 
dominate nature, which suggests that Fanny's rejection of its 
commands, as voiced by both Sir Thomas and Edmund, might be 
only a temporary rebellion against its authority. In fact, 
gratitude's "natural wish" also operates in Mansfield Park 
and has happened already in the growth of Fanny's secret love 
for Edmund from her earliest child gratitude. Thus Edmund's 
affirmation of "the natural wish of gratitude" is an accom-
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plished face, and Henry’s claims to gratitude apparently come
too late to weaken Fanny’s committed love.
Nevertheless, Austen refuses to deny that the power of
gratitude ultimately could sway Fanny's affection, had Henry
not thrown away his chances by the adulterous seduction of
Maria Bertram.
Would he have persevered, and uprightly, Fanny must 
have been his reward— and a reward very voluntarily 
bestowed— within a reasonable period from Edmund's 
marrying Mary. (467)
One might dismiss this "what if" commentary as an example of
Austen's penchant for postscripts, except for its echo of
Edmund’s comments to Fanny, which immediately precede his
"natural wish of gratitude" affirmation.
I must hope, however, that time proving him [Henry]
(as I firmly believe it will), to deserve you by 
his steady affection, will give him his reward.
(348)
Narrative commentary, by reinforcing the views of the drama's 
most authoritative male figure, emphasizes that the fortunes 
of Austen’s characters cannot, finally, obstruct the pro­
cesses of gratitude. "The natural wish of gratitude," there­
fore, must be strong enough not only to compensate for a life 
of vice, but also to impose its own imperative on nature's 
moral untrustworthiness. Despite its power, however, Fanny 
has refused to be led by gratitude against her own heart and 
has won her fight. The "what if" narrative commentary must 
remain, not a prediction but only a hypothetical possibility. 
Fanny's victory over coercion in the name of gratitude chal-
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lenges its ultimate authority, but Austen seems to tell us 
that it will survive the challenge.
The authority of gratitude in Pride and Pre-iudice is 
supremely powerful and drives the novel to a conclusion that 
promises happiness for all. But in Mansfield Park, gratitude 
paradoxically threatens Fanny Price, Austen's most grateful 
character, with a morally and emotionally repellent marriage 
to the scoundrel Henry Crawford. In Emma, gratitude operates 
indirectly to threaten Emma with the loss of Mr. Knightley to 
Harriet. Despite her position in Highbury at the pinnacle of 
social and economic power, unlike the lowly Fanny at 
Mansfield Park, Emma must learn the humbling, as well as use­
ful, lesson of gratitude for her own happiness. This learning 
process must work against the continuing, rather exotic, al­
lure of Frank Churchill, who seems masterfully to accomplish 
his goals without acknowledging any indebtednness whatsoever 
to gratitude. But what Emma learns is something Frank can 
never learn, and the penalty of his failure is eviction from 
Highbury, as Emma's reward is both happiness and success in 
achieving her objectives.
Nevertheless, gratitude seems a little sullied by Emma's 
success in subverting its force, which might have driven Mr. 
Knightley into the arms of Harriet Smith, and the novel ends 
with an implied question hanging in the air: Is gratitude at 
the service of self-interest? Austen does not answer the 
question, but instead exiles Frank Churchill, whose personal 
history might support an affirmative answer, and she also
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concocts a love-nest for Harriet with Robert Martin among the 
yeomanry, social eviction if not geographical exile. By dis­
tancing Harriet as far as possible, Austen seems to discour­
age connections that might suggest unfavorable conclusions 
about her treatment at Emma's hands.
But the first question leads to another, larger ques­
tion: Is gratitude, perhaps, not the transcendant and power­
ful virtue celebrated in Pride and Pre-iudice? If it is re­
stricted to a closed system like Highbury that also evicts 
nonconformists, then any link with •real1' world morality is 
broken or severely strained. In Persuasion. Austen liberates 
gratitude from the shackles of class and place and gives it 
renewed power to work for personal happiness in a future that 
is shaping itself, freed from a crumbling past.
Emma, however, comically subjects gratitude to its most 
rigorous critical examination, and if this scrutiny reveals 
its flaws, it also confirms its strength. Indeed, the moral 
credibility of Persuasion gains authority by gratitude's acid 
test in Emma. The test process is the comparison Austen in­
vites between the parallel personal histories of Frank 
Churchill and Emma Woodhouse, whose characters are similar in 
many ways. Although their separate interests appear only ca­
sually related, their lives do intersect, in ways often not 
apparent at the time, but which the reader and Emma recognize 
in retrospect.
Emma reflects on the lessons of their personal histories 
in her last conversation with Frank before he spirits Jane
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Fairfax, his bride to be, away from Highbury forever, and she 
claims that "I think there is a little likeness between us.* 
He bowed.
"If not in our dispositions," she presently 
added, with a look of true sensibility, "there is a 
likeness in our destiny; the destiny which bids 
fair to connect us with two characters so much su­
perior to our own." (478).
Frank's bow signals his acquiesence in the "likeness" Emma 
observes, and the novel1s protracted comparison of these two 
blythe spirits supports the aptness of her observation. A 
significant "likeness" that emerges in their parallel histo­
ries is that gratitude appears to exercise little if any in­
fluence on their personal decisions. Emma seems to have no 
occasion for gratitude, since her wealth and autonomy at 
Hartfield insulate her from dependence on another's benevo­
lence. Frank, whose independence is more limited, neverthe­
less rejects the dictates of gratitude, because gratitude ac­
knowledges personal relationships, whose disclosure may 
threaten the secrecy that shrouds his conduct.
Both Emma and Frank seem to defy the central importance 
of gratitude to the virtuous life, emphasized by Francis 
Hutcheson in his A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy. 
Hutcheson lists the rights which others have to our "benefi­
cence, " including "the good offices we formerly received from 
them."
None of these considerations are [sic] to be ne­
glected, and least of all the last one; since 
there's no obligation more sacred than gratitude,_ 
none more useful in life; nor is any vice more odi­
ous than ingratitude, or more hurtful in society.
When therefore in certain cases we cannot exercise
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all the beneficence we desire, offices of gratitude 
should take place of other offices of liberality.39
Gratitude mediates between personal happiness and virtue, de­
fined as one’s contribution to the happiness of others, and 
links the individual with society. Hutcheson suggests that 
gratitude not only is virtuous, but "useful in life." Emma 
ironically discovers that her protege, Harriet Smith, already 
has learned its usefulness, to the peril of Emma's own per­
sonal happiness. Links with society, as his plotting reveals, 
are exactly what Frank seeks to avoid, and it is not surpris­
ing, then, that he shuns gratitude altogether.
Emma, however, does not say that she and Frank are 
"like" each other, but rather that the likeness is "between" 
them, and the reason for this detachment of image from body 
is clarified by the conditional, almost hypothetical, expla­
nation she next offers, "If not in our dispositions." Frank 
could hardly escape Emma's critique implied in suggesting 
different "dispositions," were it not that she then disavows 
their personal moral agency by putting their lives, as it 
were, in the hands of the gods, "the destiny" which will 
unite them with their respective moral "superiors," George 
Knightley and Jane Fairfax. Does Emma really believe that 
"destiny" is in control? Our only clue is the "look of true 
sensibility" that accompanies her spoken "If" clause.
But what credibility is added by "a look of true sensi­
bility, " which had come under attack in the Francophobia of 
the time as both feminine and “French," in contrast with "the
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manlier virtues," as exemplified in the Anti-Jacobin imita­
tion of Pope's The Dunciad.
Next comes a gentler Virtue.— Ah! beware 
Lest the harsh verse her shrinking softness scare.
Visit her not too roughly;— the warm sigh 
Breathes on her lips;— the tear drop gems her eye.
Sweet Sensibility, who dwells enshrin'd 
In the fine foldings of the feeling mind; —
With delicate Mimosa's sense endu'd,
Who shrinks instinctive from a hand too rude;
Or, like the anaqallis. prescient flower,
Shuts her soft petals at the' approaching shower.
Sweet child of sickly Fancy!— her of yore 
From her lov'd France Rousseau to exile bore;40
Janet Todd reminds us of commonplace scholarly opinion that 
■'[sjensibility' is perhaps the key term of the period," and 
she includes Jane Austen with Coleridge and The Anti-Jacobin 
as participants in "the most rigorous conservative attack on 
sensibility" during "the alarmist and military years in 
England, when sensibility was felt to be demoralizing, anti- 
Christian, and childishly French."41 Todd, however, seems to 
accept the anti-Jacobin version of the term's meaning,, rather 
than its connotation of understanding mediated by heart and 
mind working together. Sensibility, as this kind of under­
standing, is never discredited in Austen's novels, although 
the reference to Emma's “look" as "true sensibility" implies 
an awareness of perhaps a false or counterfeit variety.
Emma's "look," however, may well convey a deeper under­
standing and enlightenment, disguised by her graceful words, 
than Frank Churchill or even Mr. Knightley can share. There 
is no need to question her sincerity in acknowledging Mr. 
Knightley as "superior," but it is Emma's own manipulation of
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events, not 'destiny,“ which accomplishes the satisfaction of 
her heart*s desire.
This reading challenges the commonplace interpretation 
of Emma as the scholar who surrenders her self-regard in ex­
change for humilty and marries the mentor who has brought her 
to moral maturity. Warren Roberts offers a fairly representa­
tive version.
So the story proceeds towards its conclusion, with 
Knightley assuming an ever more important role, 
casting his shadow over the woman he was to marry 
and whose transformation he had effected. By the 
end of the story . . . she was assimilated by 
Knightley.42
But feminist scholars consider that critical views which both
conclude and approve of Emma’s abasement are misreadings.
Agreeing that “Mr. Knightley carefully creates a wife for
himself in his own image,“ Jean Kennard argues that, “because
of Emma's strengths, not her weaknesses," their marriage is
“unsatisfactory.“
Jane Austen has suggested qualities in Emma . . . 
which will find no outlet in this marriage. She 
looks forward to the same life, even to the same 
house. “43
This marriage, however, is no capitulation for Emma, but 
rather essential to her objectives of uniting Donwell and 
Hart field, and those plans require that Mr. Knightley also 
live in “the same house," where his status is second to Mr. 
Woodhouse pending the closer union she eventually contem­
plates .
More recently,Wendy Moffat echoes similar feminist 
reader frustration.
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And so it is rather unnerving to find this novel 
repeating the familiar Austen formula of the future 
husband chastening his mate in preparation for mar­
riage, more unnerving still to find the narrator 
herself echoing, even amplifying, Knightley's cen­
sorious voice.44
My main objection to concluding that Emma submits to patri­
archy is that her self-love is intact at the end of the 
novel, despite undoubted humbling experiences, and even sur­
vives the deceit she employs to contend with the forces of 
gratitude working for Harriet which threaten her aims. Robert 
Uphau. marshalls evidence from three novels to challenge the 
submissiveness of Austen heroines.
Elizabeth Bennet and Emma Woodhouse are very 
strong-willed, but even as they later revise their 
behavior they do not abdicate their will in order 
to conform to the desires of their prospective hus­
bands. Conversely, Fanny Price is very compliant, 
and yet she rejects Henry Crawford's marriage pro­
posal, failing to conform to Sir Thomas Bertram's 
will.45
Emma's "true sensibility," feminine or not, gives her a depth 
of understanding over other characters, which she employs to 
her advantage.
Although Emma does suggest that there may be some dif­
ference from Frank in their "dispositions," their close 
"likeness" in other respects demonstrates that subtle differ­
ences, not stark contrasts, define the choice of virtue or 
vice, of good and evil. One difference emerges in Frank's to­
tally insincere protest, to Emma's comment on their approach­
ing union with "superior" partners, that she "can have no su­
perior." Frank admits, however, that it is “most true" for 
him since Jane is a "complete angel." He elaborates with en-
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camiums on her physical beauty, to be enhanced with the fam­
ily jewels set in "an ornament for the head" he plans to com­
mission (479). For Margaret Kirkham, Frank's praise actually 
"reveals the shallowness of his regard for his future wife" 
and "that he values her as a beautiful object."46 Deliberately 
or otherwise, Frank misunderstands Emma, and his gloating 
capture of Jane is confirmed by the crown hs. will create and 
set on her head, symbolizing his possession as her "head." 
Jane becomes his ornament, the reward of the good husband in 
the Bible’s Book of Proverbs.
She shall give to thine head an ornament of grace: 
a crown of glory shall she deliver to thee (4:8).
This and related passages are the subject of Sermon VII in 
James Fordyce's Sermons to Young Women.47 the work selected by 
the sententious Mr. Collins for the unreceptive Bennet sis­
ters in Pride and Prejudice. Frank's character does not gain 
lustre by his echo of these sentiments. In a sense, the 
"likeness" Emma finds "between us, ■ Frank finds imprinted on 
the prize he will carry away.
Emma distances herself from a "likeness" that can be ad­
mired and possessed like an ornament. Emma's observations on 
character address values, not appearance, such as her earlier 
comparison of Mr. Weston, who cheapens friendship by trying 
to be friends with all, with her ideal of male character.
General benevolence, but not general friendship, 
made a man what he ought to be.— She could fancy 
such a man. (320)
Mr. Knightley, of course, is the outstanding figure of "gen­
eral benevolence" in Highbury. Bishop Joseph Butler, whose
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published sermons Hutcheson knew and approved, presents the
portrait of the "benevolent man, ■ in which we can recognize
the presence of power, and the capacity to exercise it.
The benevolent man . . . will be easy and kind to 
his dependents, compassionate to the poor and dis­
tressed, friendly to all with whom he has to do.
This includes the good neighbor, parent, master, 
magistrate: and such behaviour would plainly make 
dependence, inferiority, and even servitude, easy.
. . . [H]appiness grows under his influence. This 
good principle would discover itself in paying re­
spect, gratitude, obedience, as due."48
With the exception of "parent," Mr. Knightley shines in all 
these roles, but years of unconscious and deep denial block 
off Boraa's connection of him with the "such a nan" she could 
"fancy," until walls of denial are blown away by the revela­
tion that Harriet Smith not only loves Mr. Knightley, but has 
persuaded herself that he returns her love. With this shock, 
the truth "darted through" Emma, "with the speed of an arrow, 
"that Mr. Knightley must marry no one but herself!" (408). 
Emma's later musings about her prospective role in the inher­
itance of Donwell, Mr. Knightley's estate, show that she also 
plans to add "parent" to complete the his conformity with 
Butler's list of qualities.
"Fancy" suggests not only the ideal Emma imagines, but 
the desire to possess as well, and this desire suggests the 
"likeness" Emma acknowledges with Frank, a similarity im­
plicit in the exclusive claim she stakes to Mr. Knightley.49 
But although she may assert a claim, she cannot possess him 
as Frank asserts title to Jane Fairfax, whose financial inse­
curity almost guarantees that she will be owned, either as a
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governess in virtual slavery, or by the man who will save her 
from this fate. The union of Emma and Mr. Knightley must 
arise from the interchange of benevolence and gratitude, as 
it does in all 'good* Austen marriages.
Unlike Frank Churchill, Emma does possess real creden­
tials for benevolence, which Austen carefully develops in 
Emma’s charitable visitations to the poor of the parish, with 
Harriet in tow.
Emma was very compassionate; and the distresses of 
the poor were as sure of relief from her personal 
attention and kindness, her counsel and her pa­
tience, as from her purse. (86)
But what role can gratitude have, where the two leading char­
acters have no need of each other's benevolence? The problem 
is, with her social equality and fortune of £30,000, Emma has 
little occasion to feel, let alone express, gratitude to Mr. 
Knightley. The chemistry of love, in Austen, must start with 
some occasion of thankfulness, in which a * benefactor" estab­
lishes a claim to gratitude. This chemistry appears to have 
already started between Harriet Smith and Mr. Knightley, and 
Emma fears that she must suppress the process to gain Mr. 
Knightley for herself. Thus, gratitude seems to have the 
power to frustrate Emma's own objectives as well as her own 
role as a benefactor.
Harriet demonstrates appropriate gratitude for Mr. 
Knightly's kindness in dancing with her at the ball, "when 
Mr. Elton would not stand up with me; and when there was no 
other partner in the room."
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That was the kind action; that was the noble benev­
olence and generosity; that was the service which 
made me begin to feel how superior he was to every 
other being on earth. (406-407)
Until this revelation, Emma mistakenly assumes that Harriet's 
previous testimony of gratitude was directed at Frank 
Churchill for his service in rescuing her person and pocket- 
book from the gypsies, but that her awe and humility at his 
higher social status precluded any thought of him as a possi­
ble marriage partner.
Ohl Miss Woodhouse, believe me I have not the 
presumption to suppose— Indeed I am not so mad.—
But it is a pleasure to me to admire him at a dis­
tance— and to think of his infinite superiority to 
all the rest of the world, with the gratitude, won­
der, and veneration, which are so proper, in me es­
pecially. (341)
Such an outpouring would be appropriate to escape from per­
sonal danger and is not unlike Harriet Byron's effusive grat­
itude for her rescue by the hero of Richardson's Sir Charles
Grandison from the vile Sir Hargrave Pollexfen's evil de­
signs.
But what shall I do with my gratitude? Oh my
dear, I am overwhelmed with my gratitude: I can
only express it in silence before them. Every look, 
if it be honest to my heart, however tells it:
Reverence mingles with my gratitude.50
Austen would expect her readers to be familiar with Sir
Charles Grandison. and Emma's error shows that her idea of
Harriet's transcendent gratitude for rescue from the gypsies
is the creation of fiction. She now has the shock of learning
that, for Harriet, danger to her body is insignificant in
comparison with a cruel snub at a ball, which calls attention
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to her dependent and socially inferior status. Frank's timely 
help pales in comparison with her rescue by Mr. Knightley 
from public humiliation.
Harriet’s reversed priorities of importance suggest the 
immature and shallow values of "the Fair" in Pope's The Rape 
of the Lock, for whom to "lose her heart, or necklace at a 
ball" (Canto II, 109) are equivalent disasters. But Austen 
seems to say that women’s feelings are not to be trivialized, 
because Emma recognizes with horror that she can blame only 
herself for encouraging Harriet’s subservient expression of 
gratitude to flower into love. The consequences may well be 
that Harriet's love will encourage the response of gratitude 
itself from Mr. Knightley, followed by marriage in the pat­
tern of many Austen marriages.
Emma might well have recognized the looming danger of 
this situation from the observations of Mrs. Selby of Sir 
Charles Grandison to Harriet Byron, who not surprisingly 
yearns to marry the novel's hero and her savior.
It is impossible, iry dear, to imagine that such a 
man as Sir Charles Grandison should not have seen 
the woman whom he could love, before he saw you; or 
whom he had not been engaged to love by his grati­
tude, as I may call it, for her love. Has not his 
sister talk'd of half a score ladies, who would 
break their hearts for him, were he to marry?— And 
may not this be the reason why he does not?51
But Emma cannot rely on competitors in gratitude to forestall
marriage between her Harriet and Mr. Knightley, and as yet
does not know that he has already "seen the woman he could
love," who of course is Emma herself. Commenting later on his
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involvement with Emma's childhood moral education, Mr.
Knightley confesses:
I could not think of you so much without doating on 
you, faults and all; and by dint of fancying so many 
errors, have been in love with you ever since you were 
thirteen at least. (462)
Emma's acknowledgment, in the course of this conversation, of
his beneficial influence seems to fall somewhat short of
whole-hearted gratitude.
"I am very sure you were of use to me," cried Emma.
"I was very often influenced rightly by you— oftener 
than I would own at the time. I am very sure you did 
me good." (462)
The repeated insistence “I am very sure" suggests just the
opposite, and after this hedged assurance, Emma trivializes
the subject by introducing the liklihood that Mrs. Weston's
new baby will also be spoiled and in need of Mr. Knightley's
corrective presence, "except falling in love with her when
she is thirteen." Emma is happy to share the benefits of Mr.
Knightley's moral instruction, of which she is "very sure, *
but she stakes exclusive claim to his love.
Gratitude, in fact, is seen by Emma as the enemy in her 
campaign to win Mr. Knightley, and her only hope may be to 
block its operation as a contender. That its danger is a real 
one in Emma as in Sir Charles Grandison is confirmed by the 
discussion of Mr. Weston's two marriages, the first to Frank 
Churchill's mother, and the second to Emma's former governess 
and mentor, Miss Taylor.
In the first marriage, we are told that Miss Churchill 
“fell in love" with then Captain Weston, "whose warm heart
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and sweet temper made him think every thing due to her in re­
turn for the great goodness of being in love with him; . . ." 
(15). His response, then, and the basis given for his mar­
riage, was gratitude for love. This relationship is reversed 
in the happier second marriage with Miss Taylor, “a well- 
judging and truly amiable woman, • who "must give to him the 
pleasantest proof of its being a great deal better to chuse 
than to be chosen, to excite gratitude than to feel it" (17). 
The implication is that Mr. Weston feels a love in his second 
marriage he did not have for Miss Churchill. In addition to 
his love, "choosing" the "portionless" Miss Taylor, and lib­
erating her from even the gentle captivity of being a gov­
erness to Emma, are clearly more than sufficient to "excite 
gratitude." The example of both of Mr. Weston's marriages, 
then, supplies a joint affirmative answer to Emma's rhetori­
cal self-question if this process might not work between 
Harriet and Mr. Knightley: "Was it new for one, perhaps too 
busy to seek, to be the prize of a girl who would seek him?" 
(413), even where class inequalities seem both a formidable 
obstacle for Harriet as well as protection for Emma.
Gratitude is also seen as the enemy by Prank Churchill 
in the clandestine maneuvering of his secret engagement with 
Jane Fairfax. Among the chatter before the ball at the Crown 
begins, Mrs. Elton's voice rises above the others in praise 
of Frank, so "that Emma could not but imagine he had over­
heard his own praises." But Mrs. Elton has also been solici­
tously attending to Jane Fairfax, and in the exchange that
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follows between Emma and Frank, he mistakenly assumes that 
Emma refers to Mrs. Elton*s attentiveness to Jane.




•Ungrateful!— What do you mean?"
Frank fears, as he later reveals, that the suggestion he owes 
gratitude to Mrs. Elton means that Emma has guessed his inti­
macy with Jane. But "changing from a frown to a smile," he 
immediately forces a change in the subject before Emma can 
answer, and she is left mystified at his "odd humor" (324- 
25). Later, after the engagement is revealed, Frank returns 
to this brief conversation in his lengthy letter to Mrs. 
Weston of explanation and apologia, in which he claims that 
Emma had suspected the nature of his relationship with Jane.
You will find, . . . that it [the engagement] did not 
take her wholly by surprise. She frequently gave me 
hints of it. I remember her telling me at the ball, 
that I owed Mrs. Elton gratitude for her attentions to 
Miss Fairfax. (438-9)
In this case, gratitude for Frank seems to mean disclosure, 
which would rend the veil of secrecy shrouding his conduct. 
But his "frown" and immediate resistance to the accusation, 
even if made playfully, of being "ungrateful" suggest a prej­
udice against gratitude bordering on resentment, which may go 
well beyond -the fear of disclosure.
The acknowledgment of a claim of gratitude means accept­
ing one's subordinate position to another, as Emma does in 
referring to the "characters" of their respective marriage 
partners as "superior to our own," but which Frank chooses to
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interpret as physical beauty he can effectively purchase with 
the jeweled hair “ornament." Mrs. Elton, as a character for 
wham he feels only contempt, could not possibly earn his 
"gratitude, “ regardless of what kindnesses and compliments 
, she casts, whether at him or his beloved. Thus, it appears 
that pride may be at the root of Frank's quick hostility to 
suggestions of gratitude, which seems to contradict Emma's 
early appraisal of a buoyant Frank Churchill, throwing him­
self enthusiastically into arrangements for the Crown Inn 
ball, and careless of the blurring of class distinctions 
among the proposed guests.
Of pride, indeed, there was, perhaps, scarcely enough: 
his indifference to a confusion of rank, bordered too 
much on inelegance of mind. He could be no judge, how­
ever, of the evil he was holding cheap. It was but an 
effusion of lively spirits. (198)
But Emma's analysis of this master of masquerade's "pride"
proves incorrect, as betrayed fcy the stress of disclosure he
sees threatened by Emma's remarks on the gratitude due Mrs.
Elton.
Frank may, in fact subscribe to a value system in which 
gratitude has no part and which invites comparison with the 
philosophy of William Godwin, to whose adherents Austen ap­
plies the adjective "raffish" in a letter to Cassandra.52 
Godwin's Encruirv Concerning Political Justice (1798) rejects 
gratitude from his utopian community governed solely by rea­
son.
Gratitude, therefore, if by gratitude we understand a 
sentiment of preference which I entertain towards an­
other, upon the ground of my having been the subject
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of his benefits, is no part either of justice or 
virtue.53
Godwin amplifies on the exclusion of gratitude from his sys­
tem by claiming later that it "has already been proved not to 
be a virtue, but a vice* and his reasoning is that the sole 
criteria for determining an individual's worth should be use­
fulness to society and * intrinsic qualities and capacities.*54 
I take these quotations out of context, and it would be a 
misreading of Godwin to suggest that Frank exemplifies his 
philosophy in other respects, on the sole basis of apparent 
similarities in Frank's character to Godwin's thoughts on 
gratitude. Nevertheless, Godwin's faith in the supremacy of 
reason to guide an enlightened society of virtue without the 
need for "governments" identifies him closely with the 
philosoohes of the French Revolution, a connection that in­
trudes into the argument between Emma and Mr. Knightley over 
Frank Churchill's moral standards.
When Emma describes Frank as "amiable, * Mr. Knightley 
responds by linking the word's French roots with his charac­
ter analysis.
No, Emma, your amiable young man can be amiable only 
in French, not in English. He may be very 'amiable, ■ 
have very good manners, and be very agreeable; but he 
can have no English delicacy towards the feelings of 
other people: nothing really amiable about him. (149)
Frank Bradbrook argues persuasively that Mr. Knightley's com­
ments are a critique of Lord Chesterfield’s Letters to his 
Son and quotes Chesterfield that he “wished to make his son 
'both respectable et amiable, the perfection of a human char­
acter, '" but that the task was difficult since "1[t]he Graces
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. . . seem to have taken refuge in France. *"55 Frank's ties to 
English values do seem weak. Frustrated and distressed at the 
Donwell outing because of the imminent collapse of his secret 
engagement with Jane, he raves to Emma, "I am sick of 
England— and would leave it tomorrow if I could" (365). Mr. 
Knightley no doubt would agree that France would be a more 
appropriate home for him.
Mr. Knightley includes Frank's neglect of the "duty" to 
visit his father in the broader condemnation of his behavior 
as French. Emma equally consistently opposes the pragmatic 
reality of Mrs. Churchill's claims on Frank's attendance and 
his dependence on the Churchill fortune for his financial se­
curity (145-46) . Contrasting Mr. Knightley's stem dictums 
with Frank’s disadvantaged situation in the Churchill house­
hold, Emma objects that he might find it impossible to exer­
cise the independence of action Mr. Knightley would assert in 
a like situation.
The Churchills might not have a word to say in return; 
but then, you would have no habits of early obedience 
and long observance to break through. To him who has, 
it might not be so easy to burst forth at once into 
perfect independence, and set all their claims on his 
gratitude and regard at naught. (147-48)
Emma's preaching of gratitude due the Churchills at the ex­
pense of Frank's attendance on his father may be more rhetor­
ical, for the purposes of argument, than sincere, particu­
larly in view of her own steadfast devotion to Mr. Woodhouse, 
since she makes attention her father's needs a condition 
precedent to her eventual marriage.56 Mr. Knightley, however, 
dismisses these excuses as "expediency" and insists that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
213
"(a]s he became rational, he ought to have roused himself and 
shaken off all that was unworthy in their authority" (148).
This position, however, appears paradoxical. Mr.
Knight ley does not dispute Emma's argument that Frank has a 
duty of gratitude to his benefactors, but shrugs it off and 
instead advocates rebellion against "authority." Is Mr. 
Knightley a Godwinian or a "ohilosophe"? On the contrary, im­
plicit in his moral position is the superior claim to filial 
gratitude of parent over guardian, recognized in legal com­
mentary by Blackstone.
For to those who gave us existence we naturally owe 
subjection and obedience during our minority, and hon­
our and reverence ever after.57
Edmund Burke uses the familiar eighteenth-century analogy of
parent-chiId with the relation of subjects to the monarch,
which Michael McKeon labels "patriarchalism."
The patriarchal analogy works because it is based on a 
hierarchical notion of authority that is implicitly 
analogical: as in the microcosm, so in the macro­
cosm.58
Although allegiance to the monarch is not at issue in the 
conversation with Emma, Mr. Knightley is firm that duty to a 
father takes precedence over other claimants such as the 
Churchills. Burke insists that "revolutionaries are miscreant 
parricides," which in context with his parallel argument that 
"ingratitude to benefactors is the first of revolutionary 
virtues,"59 supports Mr. Knightley's priority of claimants to 
Frank's duty. One would have to say that such views reveal 
Mr. Knightley as, not surprisingly, a counter-revolutionary 
and hostile to the example cf France.
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Mr. Knight ley's political contextualizing of Frank seems
to feed his scorn for Frank as a letter writer.
He can sit down and write a fine flourishing letter, 
full of professions and falsehoods, and persuade him­
self that he has hit upon the very best method in the 
world of preserving peace at home and preventing his 
father's having any right to complain. His letters 
disgust me. (148-49)
How can Mr. Knightley know that Frank's letters are "full of 
. . . falsehoods?" They reveal no such character defect to 
other readers. It seems more likely that Mr. Knightley be­
trays jealousy of Frank, to which he later admits, and by co­
incidence comes close to the truth. "Disgust" may also re­
flect Mr. Knightley's later appraisal of Frank's handwriting 
as "too small— wants strength" and "like a woman's writing" 
(297), thus joining “French" and “feminine" as does the Anti- 
Jacobin poem "New Morality," and at the same time suggesting 
yet another "likeness" between Frank and Emma.
Letter-writing is privileged in most Austen novels, such 
as the sanctity of Fanny Price's correspondence with her 
brother, William, in Mansfield Park, where it is closely 
bonded with gratitude, both in the humility of the letter- 
wri ter, and in Fanny's gratitude for Edmund's bringing her 
the writing materials she lacks. Even Jane Austen's mock 
gratitude for a long letter from Cassandra, when she mis­
quotes the passage discussed earlier from Sir Charles 
Grandison. shadows the true gratitude and humility of the act 
of writing.
Tuesday— Dear me! what is to become of me! Such a 
long Letter! Two & forty lines in the 2nd Page.— Like
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Harriet Byron I ask, what am I to do with my 
Gratitude?— I can do nothing but thank you & go on.60
Patricia D. Davis notes that "Jane Austen's novels are filled
with memorable letters," which "do more than serve the plot."
More often than not, the content of a letter, . . . 
does double or even triple duty in an Austen novel. .
. . Often a letter will reveal something of the char­
acter of its writer; just as often, a letter will re­
veal something of the character of the person who re­
ports or discusses its content; and sometimes a letter 
does both.61
When mis-used by the venial, letters often reveal the true 
character they wish to conceal, whereas personal performance 
in social situations may successfully deceive. Catherine 
MOrland in Northanaer Abbev has no difficulty seeing the 
hypocrisy and double-dealing in Isabella Thorpe's self-serv­
ing and craven letter appealing for her restoration to favor, 
and Fanny Price immediately sees the moral wasteland dis­
closed by Mary Crawford's letter.
In Emma, however, letter-writing is both more critical 
to plot, and more problematic in its moral role, than in the 
other novels. Emma admits that the yeoman farmer, Robert 
Martin writes "a very good letter" proposing marriage to 
Harriet, which was "very much to the credit of the writer," 
and "expressed good sense" (51), but this may be the last 
letter of the novel to join content unequivocally with the 
writer's character. Emma, however, attempts to devalue the 
evidence of merit her own sense confirms in order to dis­
credit the writer and thus prevent an alliance for Harriet 
contrary to Emma's plans. John Knightley terms letters "a 
very positive curse" to Jane Fairfax, whose whole life at
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this time revolves around the post office in her secret cor­
respondence with Frank, and he further considers "letters of 
friendship" to be "the worst," because “ [b]usiness, you know, 
may bring money, but friendship hardly ever does" (293), a 
near paraphrase of Samuel Johnson's observation that in let­
ters of friendship, "[i]t is easy . . .  to glow with benevo­
lence when there is none to be given."
Frank’s final letter to Mrs. Weston becomes a letter 
about letters: Jane has written Frank terminating their en­
gagement, after the quarrel at Box Hill.
I answered it within the hour; but from the confusion 
of ny mind, and the multiplicity of business falling 
on me at once, my answer, instead of being sent with 
all the other letters of that day, was locked up in my 
writing-desk; . . . (442)
Two days later, Jane returns all of Frank's letters and asks
for hers back. The truth which these letters, emblems of
love, should affirm, turns out to be reversible. Lives that
are knit through the agency of the post office unravel.
Finally, can we believe Frank's story that his conciliatory
letter to Jane got lost in the shuffle?
Mr. Knightley's disparagement of Frank's letters as im­
plicitly cursed by French-like qualities may be Austen’s sug­
gestion that Frank's letters are as much a mask of character 
as his behavior has disguised motives and objectives. Frank's 
letter-writing invites comparison with Samuel Johnson's ques­
tioning of letters as a source of truth, which Johnson sees 
as an outmoded and, perhaps worse, a French convention.
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It has been so long said as to be commonly believed 
that the true characters of men may be found in their 
letters, and that he who writes to his friend lays his 
heart open before him. But the truth is that such were 
the simple friendships of the Golden Acre, and are now 
the friendships only of children.62
Johnson's target here, as George Birkbeck Hill suggests in 
his note, seems to be Voltaire's opinion that it is in pri­
vate correspondence, not intended for publication, "that one 
sees the true feelings of men" [my translation]. By discred­
iting Voltaire in particular, and French letter writing in 
general (as he does in The Rambler No. 152),63 Johnson implies 
that Voltaire's "veritables sentiments" is a sham and pre­
tense. He goes on to make this contention explicit.
There is, indeed, no transaction which offers stronger 
temptations to fallacy and sophistication than episto­
lary intercourse. . . . [Unlike conversation] a 
friendly letter is a calm and deliberate performance 
in the cool of leisure, and surely no man sits down to 
depreciate by design his own character.
Friendship has no tendency to secure veracity, for 
by whom can a man so much wish to be thought better 
than he is as by him whose kindness he desires to gain 
or keep?
To charge those favourable representations, which 
men give of their own minds, with the guilt of hypo­
critical falsehood, would shew more severity than 
knowledge. The writer commonly believes himself.
Almost every man's thoughts, while they are general, 
are right; and most hearts are pure while temptation 
is away. It is easy to awaken generous sentiments in 
privacy; to despise death when there is no danger; to 
glow with benevolence when there is none to be given. 
While such ideas are formed they are felt, and self- 
love does not suspect the gleam of virtue to be the 
meteor of fancy.64
Frank Churchill's role in Highbury is all "performance," in­
cluding his final letter of explanation and apology to Mrs. 
Weston. He remains perhaps the most opaque of all Austen 
characters, but as Johnson suggests, "[t]he writer commonly
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believes himself,- and there is no reason to doubt Frank’s 
expressed sincerity. Frank himself observes that ■[m]y 
courage rises as I write- (437) .
Significantly, there is no explicit statement of grati­
tude in Frank’s letter, except for the hyperbole of "a thou­
sand and a thousand thanks" to Mrs. Weston for past unspe­
cific "kindnesses,- multiplied to "ten thousand" for equally 
unspecific future attentiveness to Jane Fairfax (443), an 
empty gesture since she and Frank soon are to disappear from 
Highbury. Further, Emma's argument in her debate with Mr. 
Knightley that Frank is bound by ties of gratitude to conform 
with the wishes of the Churchills is undercut by his subse­
quent precipitate action in publicizing the hitherto secret 
engagement to Jane Fairfax, upon the sudden and unexpected 
death of Mrs. Churchill, whose objection to the engagement 
would have been certain. His deference to the Churchills thus 
is revealed to have been the moral weakness of acting from 
"expediency," just as Mr. Knightley labeled it, without a 
shred of the gratitude claimed for him by Emma.
Not only is gratitude unmentioned in his letter, Frank 
disavows the humility from which gratitude arises, by citing 
his good fortune and observing that " [i]t is very difficult 
for the prosperous to be humble" (437). Professing some "anx­
iety" for his deception and manipulation of Emma, he comments 
that "my father perhaps will think I ought to add, with the 
deepest humiliation" (438). Frank, however, does not say 
whether he might share such an opinion, and in closing his
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letter, he again transfers to another, this time Mrs. Weston, 
the appraisal of his character: "If you think me in a way to 
be happier than I deserve, I am quite of your opinion" (443).
This closure may seem like a literary flourish or defer­
ential gesture of humility, but its indirectness contrasts 
with the playful yet serious remorse of Frederick Wentworth 
in Persuasion for the pride which caused the "six years of 
separation and suffering" before being reunited with Anne 
Elliot: "I must learn to brook being happier than I deserve" 
(247). Awareness of being, at least to a degree, undeserving 
of one's good fortune, is essential to the humility inherent 
in gratitude. Humility and gratitude, in turn are precondi­
tions for self-knowledge. Pride, which prevents humility, 
thus also prevents self-knowledge. Wentworth knows himself; 
Frank can only defer to the opinion of others.
Since Frank rejects the way to self-knowledge through 
gratitude, he cannot even know that he does not know himself. 
His character, then, is incapable of moral choice. Highbury 
is a world of moral choice, not of black and white alterna­
tives, but of judging relative values, even to letting dubi­
ous means serve the choice of ends. There is a "likeness" be­
tween Frank and Emma in that both use deception to their ad­
vantage. Emma even continues to deceive Mr. Knightley about 
Harriet's love, but her choice of deception is nonetheless a 
moral one, based on the self-knowledge which comes with hu­
mility and gratitude.
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Emma seems to learn the meaning of gratitude through the 
experience of pain, an experience unknown to Frank. After be­
ing reprimanded by Mr. Knightley for her flip witticism at 
Miss Bates's expense in the presence of others at the Box 
Hill picnic, she makes a penetential visit to the modest 
apartments of Mrs. and Miss Bates, with feelings of humility 
as she is announced, quite different from her usual self- 
love.
■The ladies were all at home." She had never re­
joiced at the sound before, nor ever before entered 
the passage, nor walked up the stairs, with any wish 
of giving pleasure, but in conferring obligation, or 
of deriving it, except in subsequent ridicule. (378)
■Conferring obligation* arises from the class difference be­
tween the Bates and Emma, and the unspoken assumption is that 
the "obligation* is expressed as gratitude for Emma's conde­
scension in visiting. On this occasion, however, Emma again 
cannot be "in charity with herself, ■ and thus her self-love 
is mortified. Her inquiries concerning the welfare of them­
selves and their niece, Jane Fairfax, prompts Miss Bates to 
insist that Emma is *[s]o very kind* and "you are always 
kind.* For Emma, "[t]here was no bearing such an 'always;' 
and to break through her dreadful gratitude" (380), Emma pro­
ceeds to ask specific questions about Jane. Why does Emma 
find Miss Bates's gratitude to be "dreadful?" The answer must 
be Emma's consciousness that she is unworthy of it, and 
"dreadful" expresses the pain she feels.
Despite the value of this humbling in Emma’s moral edu­
cation, and the gain in self-knowledge which distinguishes
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her from Frank Churchill, Austen's creation of the benevo- 
lence-gratitude relationship between Emma and Mr. Knightley 
seems contrived and lacks the affirmative endorsement of the 
process in other novels, including Persuasion, the next to 
follow Emma. Gratitude may be inferred in Mr. Knightley's re­
lief from jealousy when he discovers that Emma never has. 
loved Frank Churchill. In their conversation just before Emma 
gives him the opening to declare his love, Mr. Knightley com­
ments somewhat bitterly on Frank Churchill as "the favourite 
of fortune" in obtaining the hand of Jane Fairfax.
■You speak as if you envied him. ■
■And I do envy him, Emma. In one respect he is the 
object of ny envy." (429)
Of course, Emma fears that the "one respect" may be Mr. 
Knightley's love for Harriet, but the misunderstanding is 
soon cleared up. However, shortly thereafter Mr. Knightley 
does confess that, with respect to his consistently unfavor­
able opinion of Frank Churchill, "I was not quite impartial 
in my judgment, Emma, * an admission of jealousy (445). Envy 
and jealousy may not be admirable traits, but they bring to­
gether the moral worlds of Knightley and Emma, and on Emma's 
terms.
Even Emma's love for Mr. Knightley is less than ex­
plicit, since her interest in him always seems paired with 
her concern that the Donwell Abbey estate might get diverted 
from the inheritance of "little Henry," who, as the eldest 
son of Emma's sister and John Knightley, would be next in 
line so long as Mr. Knightley remains childless. And this may
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be the only benevolence to him of which Emma is uniquely ca­
pable; she may present him an heir which will preserve the 
dynastic union of Hartfield and Donwell. Austen analyzes 
Emma's musing on her own prospective agency in uniting the 
estates.
It is remakable, that Emma, in the many, very many, 
points of view in which she was now beginning to con­
sider Donwell Abbey, was never struck with any sense 
of injury to her nephew Henry, whose rights as heir 
expectant had formerly been so tenaciously regarded.
Think she must of the possible difference to the poor 
little boy; and yet she only gave herself a saucy con­
scious smile about it, and found amusement in detect­
ing the real cause of that violent dislike of Mr. 
Knightley's marrying Jane Fairfax, or any body else, .
. . (449-50).
The scene suggested here is Emma standing at a mirror with 
her thoughts, since "the saucy conscious smile" is one she 
■gave herself." Austen's narrative and inplied setting seem 
designed to call the reader's attention to the "saucy con­
scious smile," which may reflect a previously sublimated 
erotic fantasy. But Emma's anticipation of producing an heir, 
in her dismissal of her nephew's potential interest, seems 
very clear.
It seems to me that those who write Emma off as submit­
ting meekly to Mr. Knightley's tutelage fail to recognize the 
control she exercises over disclosures that might be danger­
ous to her objectives, a control that undermines Knightley's 
eloquent appeal to "the beauty of truth and sincerity." While 
Austen singles out Emma's deception only to minimize it—  
"Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human 
disclosure" (431)— the fact remains that, after Frank
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Churchill's game of deception is revealed, she and not Mr. 
Knightley is manipulating events.
The benevolent world of Highbury is still a kind of 
closed system. Harriet eventually earns her place in that 
world by attaching herself to Donwell's bounty in marrying 
Robert Martin of Abbey Mill Farm, but Jane Fairfax and Frank 
Churchill are effectively exiled. Many have pointed out the 
similarity between Frank and Emma, to which Emma herself tes­
tifies, and at least part of Austen's reason for evicting him 
and his bride seems to be that there is room for only one ma­
nipulator in town. For Beatrice Marie, Frank Churchill, "not 
Emma, is the master-manipulator of others' desires."65
But Frank's exile, as I have suggested, may also symbol­
ize the ejection of a value system incompatible with the 
benevolent world of Highbury. Far more than from overt evil 
or immorality, Highbury is endangered by the moral vacuum 
created by the absence of self-knowledge. Frank Churchill's 
opacity finally is seen to screen a vacuum, and he has no fu­
ture in Highbury. We are left with the felt presence of an­
other outside world, peopled by lawyers and by romantic, 
selfish, adventurers like Frank Churchill. After Emma consol­
idates Highbury's internal bastions of power, one still won­
ders at the continuing strength of its benevolence to resist 
the world which surrounds it. In Persuasion. Austen seems to 
suggest that Highbury, as a moral universe, may not be worth 
saving.
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While there is comic pleasure in the duplicity that Emma 
employs to frustrate the ominous potential of marriage be­
tween Harriet and Mr. Knightley, a certain insensitivity is 
required to accept Harriet's emotional damage from Emma's 
maltreatment. The inheritance of Donwell, which Enina succeeds 
in controlling, even if at the likely expense of her nephew, 
could turn out to be a blighted legacy. Kellynch, Sir Walter 
Elliot's patronymic estate in Persuasion, may be a shriveled 
version of Donwell and Hartfield on the verge of moral and 
fiscal bankruptcy. Like Emma and her father, Anne Elliot's 
sister presides with Sir Walter over their proprietary es­
tate, but Elizabeth Elliot is Emma with all her vanity and 
pride, but drained of moral feeling, compassion, and intelli­
gence.
Although the reader may feel (as I do) same moral kin­
ship or sympathy with the deceptions and self-serving machi­
nations Emma employs to achieve her objectives, Austen may 
feel that too many concessions to human weakness are neces­
sary for the preservation of Highbury and its component es­
tates, and that gratitude is at a dead end if it serves the 
ends of selfishness and protects a derelict status q u o . It is 
a commonplace that Frederick Wentworth in Persuasion symbol­
izes the new modem entrepreneurial man, but more importantly 
Anne's acceptance of him frees gratitude from the limitations 
of place and ideology, where it seems confined after Emma, 
and it expands to empower the lovers in an open-ended moral 
universe.
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CHAPTER VI
TRUSTING PROVIDENCE: GRATITUDE REAFFIRMED IN PERSUASION
The plot of Persuasion seems to turn on critical acci­
dents. As Anne Elliot prepares for the dreaded encounter with 
Frederick Wentworth after their eight-year separation since 
she broke off their engagement, her sister's child has "a bad 
fall." Anne is willingly pressed into service as nurse while 
the others leave to meet the new tenants of Kellynch, 
Frederick's sister and her husband, Admiral Croft, whom 
Frederick is visiting.
The child's situation put the visit entirely aside, 
but she could not hear of her escape with indiffer­
ence, even in the midst of the serious anxiety which 
they afterwards felt on his account. (53)
Later, when concern for the lad has subsided, his grandpar­
ents urge Anne to join them, but "both father and mother were 
in much too strong and recent alarm to bear the thought; and 
Anne, in the joy of her recent escape, could not help adding 
her warm protestations to theirs" (55).
The boy's accident may have been bad luck for him, but 
Anne clearly sees it as good luck for her. In the game of 
luck, there is a loser for every winner, and the results are 
morally neutral. But there is a bigger game or contest going 
on in Persuasion between luck and "Providence" for control of 
people's lives. Luck's strategy in this game is to delude 
people into thinking that luck is their slave and that they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
233
deserve their rewards. Wentworth believes he controls luck:
■He had been IucJq' in his profession. . . .  He had always 
been lucky; he knew he should be so still* (27). But his last 
speech, and the last words of any character in the novel, 
show that he recognizes this fallacy.
■I have been used to the gratification of believing 
myself to earn every blessing that I enjoyed. I have 
valued myself on honourable toils and just rewards.
Like other great men under reverses, • he added with a 
smile, *1 must endeavour to subdue my mind to my for­
tune. I must learn to brook being happier them I de­
serve." (247)
What Frederick's elegant irony discloses is that he has 
learned gratitude for Anne's love and their reunion, bless­
ings that his own personal success has had no power to com­
mand. If he controlled his luck, he would "deserve* his "for­
tune," and there would be no occasion for gratitude.
Gratitude is at once a more powerful force, but yet more 
invisible, than in Austen’s other novels. The reason is that, 
in Persuasion, the object of gratitude is "Providence." The 
linkage of gratitude with a benevolent providence defines a 
theocentric universe in which religion and morality reinforce 
each other. Luck defines a deterministic world controlled by 
"accidents" in which such values are irrelevant. This is the 
world that Laurie Kaplan sees reflected in Persuasion, where 
"one's fate (like happiness in marriage), was purely acciden­
tal, purely a matter of chance."1 Kaplan relates the accidents 
in Persuasion that mark crucial moments in the plot to popu­
lar medical texts that address environmental hazards and 
claims that these accidents teach the actors "that their
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sense of power is illusory, ■ and that “life is chaotic and 
random" (162) . But Kaplan fails to recognize the unseen con­
trolling agency of "Providence" in the novel.
On the other hand, Anne's bitterness at the misery she
has suffered in her eight years of estrangement from
Wentworth does acknowledge “Providence," and she reproaches
herself for actions which seem to have denied its premise.
She was persuaded that . . . she should yet have been 
a happier woman in maintaining the engagement, than 
she had been in the sacrifice of it; . . . without 
reference to the actual results of their case, which, 
as it happened, would have bestowed earlier prosperity 
than could be reasonably calculated on. . . .
How eloquent . . . were her wishes on the side of 
early warm attachment, and a cheerful confidence in 
futurity, against that over-anxious caution which 
seems to insult exertion and distrust Providence! (29—
30) .
The clinching self-accusation seems to be that hesitating to 
cast their lots together is to “distrust Providence." In 
other words, Anne sees a “rightness" in marrying Wentworth 
that "Providence" will somehow bless. Their love should make 
them specially favored people, a promised future thwarted by 
"over-anxious caution." But Anne is making a mistake, not the 
mistake of a false belief in a beneficent universal power, 
but in feeling that happiness is, or should be, their enti­
tlement, the same mistake that Wentworth recognizes in his 
final testimonial.
His speech follows a thoughtful and lengthy apologia by 
Anne which comments on her earlier rueful reflections and, I 
believe, states the whole moral meaning of the novel. 
Nevertheless, perhaps no passage in all the novels has been
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so misunderstood as this final speech, and, in fact, it does 
seem internally self-contradictory.
■I have been thinking over the past, and trying im­
partially to judge of the right and wrong, I mean with 
regard to myself; and I must believe that I was right, 
much as I suffered from it, that I was perfectly right 
in being guided by the friend whom you will love bet­
ter than you do now. To me, she was in the place of a 
parent. Do not mistake me, however. I am not saying 
that she did not err in her advice. It was, perhaps, 
one of those cases in which advice is good or bad only 
as the event decides: and for myself, I certainly 
never should, in any circumstance of tolerable simi­
larity, give such advice. But I mean, that I was right 
in submitting to her, and that if I had done other­
wise, I should have suffered more in continuing the 
engagement than I did even in giving it up, because I  
should have suffered in my conscience. I have now, as 
far as such a sentiment is allowable in human nature, 
nothing to reproach myself with; and if I mistake not, 
a strong sense of duty is no bad part of a woman’s 
portion." (246) [Emphasis added].
After defending as "right" to Wentworth her submission to 
Lady Russell's wishes, and the termination of their engage­
ment eight years before, “much as I suffered from it," Anne 
volunteers that "It was, perhaps, one of those cases in which 
advice is good or bad only as the event decides; . . .• She 
adds, parenthetically, her own personal disapproval of such 
advice, and resumes her defense on the grounds that "I should 
have suffered more in continuing the engagement than I did 
even in giving it up, because I should have suffered in my 
conscience," since Lady Russell has stood in loco parentis 
for Anne, who considers filial obedience a "duty," and an ad­
mirable one at that (246).
The passage has been seized upon by a number of schol­
ars as a credo of a kind of stoic Christianity, which holds
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that conduct is judged by moral standards unrelated to its 
consequences, and which further proves the influence of 
Joseph Butler on Anne's moral philosophy. However, Anne's ap­
parently digressive aside that their situation may be "one of 
those cases in which advice is good or bad only as the event 
decides" creates difficulties for advocates of a Butlerian 
theory of stoic Christianity. D. D. Devlin, commenting on the 
entire passage, claims that *[t]he language shows how close 
Jane Austen's moral world is to that of Butler and [Samuel] 
Johnson," but he avoids the problem for his argument of this 
key clause by omitting it in his quotation of the text.2 
Philip Drew acknowledges that the clause must be dealt with, 
but disposes of it briefly.
It is clear that while advice may sometimes, as in 
this case, be vindicated or condemned by its outcome, 
conduct must be assessed differently: thus the unhappy 
outcome of Anne's corrpliance has no bearing on the 
moral status of her decision.3
I suggest that nothing is absolutely "clear" in this passage,
except its paradoxical ambiguity. Anne's argument is full of
qualifications, a consistent refusal to state a firm position
on grounds of principle, and finally an appeal that rests on
the avoidance of pain. Ultimately, Anne's summation affirms
personal happiness as the determinant of moral virtue, not
its sacrifice to some more austere concept of Christian duty.
The value system is that of Francis Hutcheson, not 
Joseph Butler. For Hutcheson, "[T]hat Action is best, which 
accomplishes the greatest Happiness for the greatest 
Numbers."4 Virtue is measured by happiness, and thus judgments
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of "good* and "bad" depend upon results. Anne's happiness may 
be virtue on a small scale, but it is still a moral good. 
Further, she demonstrates, in her intuitive negative feelings 
about William Elliot, a Hutchesonian "moral sense" which is 
entrusted with more authority than it is in earlier novels. 
Persuasion represents, then, a complete commitment to 
Hutcheson's philosophy, including the religious basis he 
claims for it.
Hutcheson's system rules out a selfish hedonism, which 
might justify one's happiness at the expense of others, and 
moral worth also requires that favorable consequences be sup­
ported by virtuous intentions.
[W]e often are conscious of the Desire of the 
Happiness of others, without any such Conception of it 
as the Means of our own; . . . The virtuous 
Benevolence must be an ultimate Desire, which would 
subsist without view to private Good.5
I do not deny that Austen intends us to understand Anne as a
person with a "moral faculty," as Butler calls conscience,6 or
that not "submitting" to the wishes of a surrogate mother
would cause her the remorse of disobedience to what she sees
as "duty." However, the "event" which "decides" the rightness
or wrongness of her compliance is, finally, her reunion with
Wentworth, and the quality of happiness they feel on the walk
when they renew their vows is enhanced by their personal
growth during eight years of separation.
[S]oon words enough had passed between them to decide 
their direction towards the comparative quiet and re­
tired gravel-walk, where the power of conversation 
would make the present hour a blessing indeed; and 
prepare it for all the immortality which the happiest 
recollections of their own future lives could bestow.
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. . . There they returned again into the past, more 
exquisitely happy, perhaps, in their reunion, than 
when it had been first projected; more tender, more 
tried, more fixed in a knowledge of each other's char­
acter, truth, and attachment; more equal to act, more 
justified in acting. (240-41) .
Thus Anne’s ultimate happiness, not her previous suffering,
does seem to be the * event” that stamps approval, both on
Lady Russell ’ s advice as "good, * not "bad, ■ as well as on
Anne’s compliance.
It is indicative of Austen’s priorities, I think, that 
the terms "happy" and "happiness" together appear almost a 
thousand times in the novels, far more than any other value 
standard, as opposed to the vocabulary of a sterner morality, 
such as the 115 appearances of "duty," for which Anne ac­
knowledges respect in her compliance with Lacty Russell’s 
wishes.7 But Lady Russell herself, we are told, "was a very 
good woman, and if her second object was to be sensible and 
well-judging, her first was to see Anne happy" (249). 
Happiness, then, is also Lady Russell's objective, not the 
satisfaction of making Anne put on the hair shirt of duty, 
even if her earlier advice seemed to work against it for 
eight years.
Austen mites past and future with the lovers’ reunion 
and grants "immortality" to the "present hour," projecting 
into "their own future lives" their "happiest recollections," 
while they also "returned again into the past." Thus, "as the 
event decides" seems to have been prefigured in their past 
history, as well as to foreshadow the future. The immanence 
of a beneficent providence at work is also evoked in the hush
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of the "quiet and retired gravel-walk" and the "blessing" the 
moment enjoys. The mood represents a complete reversal from 
the bitterness and remorse of Anne's reflections on past suf­
ferings, when she anticipates Frederick Wentworth's reappear­
ance at Kellynch. Further, Wentworth also refers to his hap­
piness as a "blessing," which suggests the gift of God, the 
ultimate source of benevolence for Hutcheson.
The best State of rational Agents, and their greatest 
and most worthy Happiness, we are necessarily led to 
imagine must consist in universal efficacious 
Benevolence, and hence we conclude the Deity benevo­
lent . . . 8
Such transcendent benevolence calls for "a sincere Love and 
Gratitude toward our Benefactor,■ which includes "all the ra­
tional Devotion, or Religion, toward a Deity apprehended as 
Good, which we can possibly perform,"9 and Hutcheson's succes­
sor, William Paley, claims that • [t]he love of God is the 
sublimest gratitude."10 After her walk with Wentworth, Anne's 
emotional state is elation, but her subsequent reflections 
are more devotional.
An interval of meditation, serious and grateful, was 
the best corrective of every thing dangerous in such 
high-wrought felicity; and she went to her room, and 
grew steadfast and fearless in the thankfulness of her 
enjoyment. (245)
Anne's gratitude brings strength and makes her "steadfast and
fearless," since she recognizes that their destinies are in
the hands of a benevolent "Providence," which has proven that
it may be "trusted" by results. “As the event decides" is,
finally, the only possible proof.
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Hutcheson observes, however, that virtue and reward do
not march in lock step.
What should engage the Deity to reward Virtue? . .
. And what Ground have we from the Idea of a God it 
self to believe the Deity is good in the Christian 
Sense, that is, studious of the Good of his 
Creatures? . . .  A Manichean Evil God is a Notion 
which Men would as readily run into as that of a 
Good one, . . . unless we prov'd that the happiness 
of Creatures was advantageous to the Deity.11
This "unless" clause is the challenge of the moral philoso­
pher, and Hutcheson admits that "we shall perhaps find no 
demonstrative Arguments a priori, from the Idea of an 
Independent Being, to prove his Goodness." He finally relies 
on what he sees as the evidence of "vastly prepollent Good" 
over "casual Evils" to support "the great Agreement of 
Mankind" on a benevolent "Deity."12 Hutcheson uses "Manichean" 
in the Western Christian tradition "as a synonym for 
•dualist,’ and any teaching that manifested a tendency toward 
dualism was accordingly called Manichaean. "13 William Elliot, 
the legal heir of Kellynch and promoted by Lady Russell as 
the best choice of husbands for Anne, is an evil and threat­
ening force, but the frustration of his objectives is evi­
dence that satisfies Hutcheson's criteria of "vastly prepol­
lent Good."
Hutcheson's leap of faith, as rhetorical argument, is 
not quite so naive as it may appear, because it throws the 
whole weight of proof not so much on events, as on humanity's 
collective opinion about events. In a sense, happiness is the 
judgment of feelings rendered on the evidence and depends on
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gaining confidence in how to work with Providence, learning 
what Providence demands, and what it can do.
For Philip Drew, the author seems to merge with this
benevolent providence, and he claims that the ultimate "happy
ending" of Persuasion supports his argument that the novel as
genre tends to be constructed on a teleology that judges
moral choices by their outcomes. The author controls events,
and thus by its nature the novel subverts the idea that the
morality of decisions is independent of their consequences.
If Jane Austen believes, as I have argued, that right 
actions are intrinsically virtuous, does she not com­
promise her entire position by arranging for them to 
be vindicated by results?14
Drew's solution to this dilemma is to advance the thesis that 
"the happiness that follows is not the outcome of their [the 
characters'] actions, but the gift of the author to the read­
ers."
Jane Austen deliberately gratifies the reader's sense 
of poetic justice and by the same device brings rather 
closer together the two ethical systems which have so 
far, for the sake of clarity, been kept as distinct as 
possible.15
Nevertheless, Drew does acknowledge that the novelist's "ar­
ranging" of "prosperous consequences" creates a "troublesome" 
problem in supporting his argument, but he claims that, after 
all, we as readers are expected to be aware we are reading 
fiction and "moving in a constructed world."16 It seems to me 
that Drew comes close here to writing an implied "real world" 
ending less frustrating for the theory he advances. However, 
if the author is the only power that can order events to con­
form with "the reader’s sense of poetic justice," the world
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
242
outside the novel is either Kaplan's universe of random acci­
dent, or a system in which evidence of virtue or morality is 
withheld until a final revelation in the hereafter.
Austen, I feel, does not subscribe to either belief. The 
■Providence* whose presence is evoked in Persuasion works and 
manifests itself in the world as it does in the lives and 
comprehension of her characters, and can be understood with­
out concluding that the "happy ending* is the fiction of an 
omnipotent “author.* Instead, the reader is invited to see 
that "Providence* is manifest in nature through the seasonal 
imagery of weather and agriculture. On the November outing 
through the Uppercross countryside, Anne has to endure the 
flirtation of Wentworth with the Musgrove sisters as well as 
his distant formality with her.
Her pleasure in the walk must arise from the exercise 
and the day, from the last smiles of the year upon the 
tawny leaves and withered hedges, and from repeating 
to herself some few of the thousand poetical descrip­
tions extant of autumn, . . . [emphasis in text]. (84)
This reverie is interrupted by her overhearing a particularly
intimate exchange between Wentworth and Louisa Musgrove.
Anne could not immediately fall into a quotation 
again. The sweet scenes of autumn were for a while put 
by— unless some tender sonnet, fraught with the apt 
analogy of the declining year, with declining happi­
ness, and the images of youth and hope, and spring, 
all gone together, blessed her memory. (85)
As the party approaches its destination, farming activities
intrude on Anne's poetic musings, "where the ploughs at work,
and the fresh-made path spoke the farmer, counteracting the
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sweets of poetical despondence, and meaning to have spring 
again, ..." (85).
Anne has been indulging herself in the fallacy of con­
fusing art and life. Poetry presents a fall that is a perma­
nent loss "of youth and hope, ■ like death. But the farmer is 
■meaning to have spring again, ■ and fall plowing is an act of 
trust in "Providence* that spring will indeed return, al­
though there is no indication that as yet Anne shares this 
insight from nature that corrects poetic art. Later, when she 
urges the texts "of our best moralists" as a cure for Captain 
Benwick's melancholia from a surfeit of romantic poetry, she 
reflects that "she had been eloquent on a point in which her 
own conduct would ill bear examination" (101), which reveals 
her own growth in self-understanding.
The cycle of the seasons is Austen's metaphor for 
■ Providence. * Many have observed the loss and recovery of 
Anne's "bloom," her improved appearance to Lady Russell, 
which encourages hopes of "a second spring of youth and 
beauty" (124), and the "spring of felicity" deservedly expe­
rienced by Anne's mistreated friend, Mrs. Smith, when Anne 
and Wentworth bring a return of fine weather through his help 
with her property claims (252) . On her way to visit Mrs. 
Smith, Arine's "musings of high-wrought love and eternal con­
stancy" (at the expense of Frederick's jealousy) were "almost 
enough to spread purification and perfume all the way* (192). 
Jacqueline Reid-Walsh "detect(s) through the imagery the fig­
ure of Persephone bringing an early spring to the February
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streets of Bath. “17 The imagery of seasonal cycles, and their 
mythical personifications, seem to be Austen's way of divert­
ing attention from the omnipotent author to perhaps the most 
ancient symbol of a causal and purposeful “Providence," which 
justifies the “trust" of farmers who plow, "meaning to have 
spring again."
Jon Spence in a 1981 essay offers a close and perceptive 
discussion of "Nature" in Persuasion, but declines to follow 
the logic of his own analysis, which clearly points to na­
ture's metonymic figuration of Providence. Instead, his the­
sis is that *[n]ature itself, haphazard and incomprehensible, 
presides over Anne's destiny."18 Addressing the scene of fall 
plowing, Spence observes that "[t]he farmers, acting with a 
knowledge of and trust in dynamic nature, exert themselves in 
autumn in order to reap the fruits spring will make possi­
ble." Contrary to what seems to me the plain meaning of this 
passage, Spence draws the contradictory conclusion that it ' 
conflates nature and "chance" and supports the argument that 
"Persuasion affirms that chance brings ends that do not re­
sult from a rigorously controlled set of causal actions."19
Spence does not pursue the implications of the farmer's 
plowing as testimony to confidence in a beneficent providence 
because, I believe, he chooses not to lift "that veil which 
Gilbert Ryle suggests Jane Austen draws between her art and 
her religion."20 But it seems to me that the price of critical 
reluctance to engage the religious implications of Austen's 
"creative imagination" is to miss the tension between a
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beneficent providence and the role of "luck* that is played 
out in the novel.
"Luck" is revealed as a kind of temporary possession 
that deludes its possessors with the false sense of worthi­
ness that Wentworth confesses in his last speech. Unlike the 
testimony of the seasons to the reliability of Providence, 
luck betrays the confidence of its believers. However, 
Wentworth's own personal history does seem to testify that 
Anne's termination of their engagement flies in the face of 
fortune's promise.
It seems that Austen wants to fix the reader's eye on 
"luck" and "lucky," which are mentioned five times in three 
pages during the conversation about Wentworth's rising ca­
reer. Admiral Croft claims that his brother-in-law was a 
"[l]ucky fellow" to get command of the unseaworthy A s p , and 
Wentworth concurs that "I felt ny luck, admiral, I assure 
you" (65), which is proven by the absence of "foul weather," 
until he captures and pilots into port "the very French 
frigate I wanted, ■ just ahead of a storm that "would have 
done for poor old Asp" (66). Again on the Laconia his "same 
luck" follows him, and Mrs. Musgrove chimes in that "it was a 
lucky day for when you were put captain into that ship" 
(67), a reference to their son's service as midshipman under 
Wentworth.
Luck, finally, really is chance, a roll of the dice, a 
kind of adversarial economic exchange in which someone's loss 
makes possible another's gain, like the boy's fall early in
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the novel that allows Anne to "escape" meeting Wentworth. The 
losing adversary may be visible, like the French frigate, but 
the invisible adversary is the approaching storm. Wentworth 
puts himself in harm's way to win a "prize," and his "luck" 
holds. Louisa Musgrove puts herself in harm's way in Lyme on 
the excursion to the Cobb, but her luck, as well as 
Wentworth's, fails them.
Hie shadow of some momentous future event for the visi­
tors to Lyme seems cast by "the Cobb itself, its old wonders 
and new improvements" (95), and the setting itself suggests 
that this casual excursion is connected with forces, even 
older than the medieval builders, that still repel the sea 
and protect the harbor. After a painterly narrative sweep of 
surrounding attractions, *[t]he party from Uppercross . . . 
proceeded towards the Cobb, equally their object in itself 
and on Captain Wentworth's account" (96), since his fellow 
officer, Captain Harville, had rented a small house for his 
family nearby. Before leaving Lyme the next day, the group 
seems irresistibly drawn to the Cobb, where they indulge "a 
general wish to walk along it once more" (108), particularly 
since "Louisa soon grew so determined" to do so, and they 
■proceeded to make the proper adieus to the Cobb" (109). The 
narrative now moves in to focus on the vertical structure of 
the Cobb through "antithetical images of high and low, up and 
down, perfectly summed up in the antithetical image of the 
'steep flight' of stairs."21
There was too much wind to make the high part of 
the r.ev: Cobb pleasant for the ladies, and they agreed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
247
to get down the steps to the lower, and all were con­
tented to pass quietly and carefully down the steep 
flight, excepting Louisa; she must be jumped down them 
by Captain Wentworth. (109)
Heights are dangerous, but “steps" offer safe passage for
those who will "pass quietly and carefully," like pilgrims to
a revered shrine, from the perilous altitude of the "new
Cobb" to the safety of the ancient structure.
There are no shortcuts in this pilgrimage, but Louisa
twice tempts Providence on the Cobb, showing contempt for the
hand which, literally, carved the safe passage in stone. Why
should she not? After all, Wentworth caught her the first
time, but "luck" deserts her second try. Later, Anne resists
the even more serious temptation of marriage to William
Elliot, and the two "temptations* seem linked by Austen in a
modem parable of Jesus1 temptation by the devil.
Then the devil taketh him up into the holy city, and 
setteth him on a pinnacle of the temple, and saith 
unto him, If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself 
down: for it is written, He shall give his angels 
charge concerning thee: and in their hands they shall 
bear thee up, lest at any time thou dash thy foot 
against a stone. Jesus said unto him, It is written 
again, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.22
Luck, in a sense, is the devil's alternative to Providence,
and when the two clash, luck is the loser. Even Wentworth
seems to have foreboding of this danger, when he tries to
dissuade Louisa, due to “ [t]he hardness of the pavement for
her feet," which the devil assures Jesus that God's angels
will protect him against. But no angel intervenes to help
Wentworth protect Louisa from her offense.
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Paul Zeitlow, whom Spence cites in his essay as arguing 
■that the novel affirms Providence, the idea that the indi­
vidual is served out rewards and punishments that are his 
due, "23 actually suggests only that this is an incomplete 
view.
It would seen at least partially valid to claim that 
behind what appears to be blind luck is the hand of 
Providence, dealing out just rewards and punishments, 
bringing good out of apparent evil, and happiness out 
of suffering.24
Zeitlow, too, stays on the secular side of the "veil" or 
■curtain* Spence and Ryle see suspended between Austen's re­
ligious point of view, and therefore recognizes no signifi­
cant distinction between "Providence" and "luck." According 
to this theory, luck becomes merely the instrument of 
Providence, "bringing good out of apparent evil," a theory 
that Zeitlow finds "not entirely satisfying.* His alternative 
interpretation is that Austen, by creating "pleasing results" 
out of situations that seem disasters waiting to happen, "em­
phasize [s] the dark possibilities of human life," since the 
reader almost inevitably will contrast the "destinies* of 
characters "if events took their normal course."25 Zeitlow 
does not look at nature as metaphor for providence, and 
Spence, in discussing nature's agency, does not analyze the 
roles of luck or providence, other than to refer to Zeitlow's 
article. Each essay, therefore, suffers by its failure to ad­
dress the linkage of nature with providence and to differen­
tiate the latter from "luck.’ Consequently, both seem to wind 
up with the same random, chaotic, and purposeless world that
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Kaplan also sees in Persuasion, and in which human decisions 
about conduct have virtually no bearing on consequences, nor 
do they justify any trust in “Providence.*
The common shortcoming of all these studies, as I have 
suggested, is their failure to engage the theosophical world 
of the novel, where providence may be trusted, but personal 
decisions must also respect, not abuse, the potential of 
providence for good. Louisa's recklessness contrasts with 
what appeared to be “over-anxious caution* in the breaking of 
Anne's engagement with Wentworth, but caution now is shown to 
be the prudence required of those who would not “tempt" 
Providence. The lesson of the Cobb also teaches restraint in 
embracing an alluring future seemingly full of promise, a 
lesson Anne seems to have learned in rejecting Lady Russell's 
encouragement of William Elliot's courtship. Anne may not 
love her cousin Mr. Elliott, but she nevertheless undergoes 
her own trial of temptation. Since Anne's father, Sir Walter, 
has no son, the wealthy William Elliot is *heir apparent* to 
Kellynch, now an impoverished estate from Sir Walter's finan­
cial ineptness. Lady Russell plays on the appeal to Anne of 
succeeding her dead mother as Lady Elliot, presiding over the 
ancestral home.
Anne was obliged to turn away, to rise, to walk to 
a distant table, and, leaning there in pretended em­
ployment, try to subdue the feelings this picture ex­
cited. For a few moments, her imagination and her 
heart were bewitched. The idea of becoming what her 
mother had been; of having the precious name of “Lady 
Elliot" first revived in herself; of being restored to 
Kellynch, calling it her home again, her home for
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ever, was a charm which she could not inroediately re­
sist. (160)
There is something sinister in the terms •bewitched" and 
•charm,* which suggests that Anne's mind is preyed upon by 
dark forces, but the forces may be less personified in the 
nefarious William Elliot than in the allure of the good 
•luck* such an alliance might bring. At the time of Anne's 
youthful engagement to Wentworth, his ■confidence* that, 
since * [h] e had always been lucfy; he knew he should be so 
still* is "bewitching* for Anne. More than its representa­
tive, it is luck that bewitches.
Anne's decision against William Elliot, however, is not 
a knee-jerk rejection and is preceded by a conscious moral 
choice against the strongest temptation to reclaim the former 
influence and dignity of the baronetcy. The Bible version of 
the temptation continues after the devil's failure to per­
suade Jesus to jump.
Again, the devil taketh him up into an exceeding 
high mountain, and sheweth him all the kingdoms of the 
world, and the glory of them; and saith unto him, All 
these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down 
and worship me.26
With the memorable words, "Get thee hence, Satan,* Jesus rids 
himself of the devil. But Anne's temptation is more persua­
sive, since it is offered by her loved Lady Russell, who un­
wittingly serves as the devil's mouthpiece and gives him an 
advantage he might otherwise have lacked.
Louisa’s reckless leap, and Anne's refusal to "leap* 
into marriage without love, reveal the relationship of pru­
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dence and courage to moral values as Francis Hutcheson com­
pares these "cardinal" virtues.
Every Action, which we apprehend as either morally 
good or evil, is always supposed to flow from some 
Affection toward rational Agents; . . . Or it may per­
haps be enough to make an Action, or Omission, appear 
vitious, if it argues the Want of such Affection . . .
And mere Courage, or Contempt of Danger, if we con­
ceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the 
Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs, wou'd only entitle 
its Possessor to Bedlam. When such sort of Courage is 
sometimes admir'd, it is upon some secret Apprehension 
of a good Intention in the use of it. Prudence, if it 
were only employ'd in promoting private Interest, is 
never imagin'd to be a Virtue: . . .  So that these . .
. Qualities, commonly called Cardinal Virtues, obtain 
that Name, because they . . . denote Affections toward 
rational Agents; otherwise there would appear no 
Virtue in them.27
In the world of moral philosophy, all people are "rational
Agents." Had Louisa loved Wentworth, there might have been
something to be "admir'd" in throwing herself at him from the
parapets of the Cobb, but subsequent events show her leap to
have been simply "Contempt of Danger." Buried in the word
"Contempt" is "Tempt," and Louisa's temptation of providence
is morally wrong, as her supposed "Courage" is "no Virtue"
because not motivated by a worthy "Affection.■
Anne contrasts the "persuasion" exerted by Lady Russell
against marrying Wentworth with the temptation her pressure
aroused in Anne to accept William Elliot.
If I was wrong in yielding to persuasion once, remem­
ber that it was persuasion exerted on the side of 
safety, not of risk. When I yielded, I thought it was 
to duty; but no duty could be called in aid here. In 
marrying a man indifferent to me, all risk would have 
been incurred, and all duty violated. (244)
The key term here is "indifferent," since marriage should be
a commitment of the heart, and in a marriage devoid of love,
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■all risk" of future misery is ■incurred." To love and not to 
marry for reasons of "safety* may mean unhappiness, but the 
concerns may also be extinguished, and if the love is still 
there, then the happiness can follow, as it does for 
Frederick and Anne. Since there is a "Want of Affection" in 
Anne toward William Elliot, she can reject Lacty Russell's 
■persuasion" on the grounds that "all risk would be incurred" 
in the immorality of marriage without love.
Lady Russell might feel that Anne would see the "pru­
dent" advantages of marrying Elliot, but as Hutcheson argues, 
■Prudence, if it were only employ'd in promoting private 
Interest, is never imagin'd to be a Virtue." However,
■safety" is morally justified as "prudence" in the early sep­
aration of Anne and Frederick, a separation that Mrs. Croft 
unknowingly endorses to Mrs. Musgrove in Anne's hearing.
To begin without knowing that at such a time there 
will be the means of marrying, I hold to be very un­
safe and unwise, and what, I think, all parents should 
prevent as far as they can. (231)
The rather precipitous courtship and the succeeding happiness 
of her own marriage perhaps make Mrs. Croft's observations 
gently ironic, but it is that very happiness which gives au­
thority to her unwitting endorsement of Lady Russell's advice 
eight years earlier.
What is the source of Anne's misgivings about Elliot?
Appearances argue in his favor.
That he was a sensible man, an agreeable man,— that he 
talked well, professed good opinions, seemed to judge 
properly and as a man of principle,— this was all 
clear enough. He certainly knew what was right, nor
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could she fix on any one article of moral duty evi­
dently transgressed; . . . (160)
To be sure, there are a few hints about his past, such as the
•Sunday travelling" that Anne disapproves, and she senses
that his surface manners, "Rational, discreet, polished," may
mask a questionable character. His very appearance of being
"rational" becomes a warning for Anne, but whatever their
mix, "[h]er early impressions were incurable" (161). Her
■moral sense" functions as claimed by Francis Hutcheson.
This moral sense from its very nature appears to be 
designed for regulating and controlling all our pow­
ers. . . . Nor can such matters of immediate feeling 
be otherways proved than by appeals to our hearts.28
Certainly the moral sense never had a greater challenge 
than to reveal the character of William Elliot, the most evil 
character in all Austen novels. Like the devil, he operates 
through persona such as Lady Russell and is glimpsed only in 
the background, where he seems engaged in surreptious 
surveillance and mischief. At Lyme, the party from Uppercross 
meets him on the steps to the beach, where "he politely drew 
back, and stopped to give them way. . . . and as they passed, 
Anne's face caught his eye, and he looked at her with a de­
gree of earnest admiration* (104) . A momentary glance, but 
Wentworth notices it. Another brief encounter in the halls of 
the inn, a view from the window of a departing curricle, and 
Elliot is gone. His identity is deduced because he wears 
mourning black for his deceased wife, as does Anne's immedi­
ate family because of their relationship, a connection that 
Mary Musgrove blurts out: "In mourning, you see, just as our
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Mr. Elliot must be" (105). Black, of course, is also associ­
ated with the devil, whose evil spirit seems to hover over 
Louisa’s disaster on the Cobb the following day.
Elliot next materializes in Bath to press the claim he 
has staked by visual possession at Lyme. He has not even the 
justification of greed in his designs on Anne and the 
baronetcy, since he has already made his money by swindling 
Mrs. Smith's dead husband and through his success as a 
lawyer, that consistently contemptible profession in Austen's 
novels, with the notable exception of John Knightley in Emma. 
Further, he will inherit Kellynch, with or without Anne, so 
she is not potentially useful to him, but Mrs. Smith, who is 
privy to those in whom Elliot does appear to confide, tells 
Anne that "he truly wants to marry you" (204). So why does he 
want Anne? There really is no suggestion of love either way. 
Elliot never commits himself; his courtship is carried on 
largely by proxy, and his motives only guessed at through 
hearsay.
On the other hand, Mrs. Clay, through her stalking of 
Sir Walter and, if successful, her potential of producing a 
male heir to Kellynch herself, does represent a threat to 
William Elliot's inheritance. Whatever motives may be as­
cribed to his desire for Anne, they become irrelevant when 
her engagement with Wentworth forces Elliot into what might 
be called “Plan B," and he joins with Mrs. Clay in a strate­
gic alliance of enemies.
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In fact, Kellynch is near bankruptcy, were it not for 
revenue from the lease to the Crofts. Wickham in Pride and 
Pre-iudice and Willoughby in Sense and Sensibility at least 
have money worries to excuse their infidelity. Even Henry 
Crawford in Mansfield Park cuts his own throat in seducing a 
married woman, while his sister seems excused because of an 
absence of proper guidance and example in her education. All 
these are only moral jellyfish compared with Elliot's wicked­
ness. But Kellynch offers this viper the respectability and 
honors of a venerated past, despite its bankrupt present, to 
grace his career of treachery and deceit.
The warnings flashed by Anne’s moral sense are shock­
ingly verified by the subsequent revelations by Mrs. Smith of 
how Elliot ruined them financially and caused the death of 
her husband, after they had helped him in his early days of 
need as an impecunious young lawyer.
It was a dreadful picture of ingratitude and inhuman­
ity; and Anne felt at some moments, that no flagrant 
open crime could have been worse. (210)
"Ingratitude* and "ungrateful* are not terms used carelessly 
by Austen. In Mansfield Park Fanny Price, devastated at Sir 
Thomas’ accusation of ingratitude, fervently prays, *[h]eaven 
defend me from being ungratefulI" (323), and Edmund reacts to 
Fanny’s suggestion that Mary Crawford may be "very ungrate­
ful" by cautioning that "(u]ngrateful is a strong word* (63). 
The association of ingratitude with criminal behavior has a 
long history— Squire Allworthy in Fielding’s Tom Jones con­
siders it worse than a crime1*— but this seems to be the only
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instance where criminality defines an Austen character's in­
gratitude- Applying this label to William Elliott sets him 
apart as the most nefarious character in these novels, and 
his association with the devil that Austen seems to suggest 
invites comparison with God's accusation of Satan in Milton's 
Paradise Lost: "ingrate, he had of mee / All he could have; . 
. ."30 Certainly Eliot "has it all" and therefore turning on 
the source of his prosperity also stamps him as the ■ ingrate" 
of Persuasion-
Anne's "moral sense" is also akin to the growth of her 
feeling that she may be reunited with Wentworth: "Surely, if 
there be constant attachment on each side, our hearts must 
understand each other ere long" (221). This hope is stimu­
lated by Frederick's emotional affirmation that "[a] man does 
not recover from such a devotion of the heart," as he had 
thought Benwick felt toward his dead fiance: "He ought not—  
he does not* (183) . Anne reads "his feelings as to a first, 
strong attachment" as revealing his unchanged love for her. 
This wholehearted commitment to the power and authority of 
feeling makes Persuasion unique among Austen's novels and 
contrasts with the errors in Pride and Pre-iudice of "first 
impressions" (its original title), as well as with the re­
versibility of "first attachments" in Sense and Sensibility.
My discussion has concentrated on the last conversation 
in the novel, when Anne explains her moral decisions in rela­
tion to the standard of personal happiness. Frederick doesn't 
really respond to Anne's exposition of philosophical belief,
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and his own comments reflect his gratitude at the personal 
happiness he has gained, yet may not "deserve." I read their 
statements more like soliloquies directed at the audience, in 
which the didactic moral meaning of what has past is conveyed 
via the speaking voice of a character.
But between these two soliloquies is one true piece of 
dialogue. Frederick asks Anne, hypothetically, if Anne would 
■have renewed the engagement" when Wentworth's earnings and 
career were assured within two years of their separation. 
“'Would II ' was all her answer; but the accent was decisive 
enough." Frederick takes this to mean that "[s]ix years of 
separation and suffering might have been spared" (247), but I 
doubt that Frederick's response can be accepted as the inter­
pretation of "Would I i" When truth and confession are laid 
on the table, so to speak, why would Austen interject a 
rhetorical question? The answer, I believe, is that the hypo­
thetical event never happened, and in a world where "the 
event decides, ■ we only know what we do, not what we might 
have done.
Frederick asks a philosophically unanswerable question, 
and Anne's rhetorically ambiguous response can only under­
score the meaning of "as the event decides." Gratitude for 
the re-discovered happiness that blesses their reunion perme­
ates the lovers' conversation, and therefore the occasion for 
happiness also calls forth the response of gratitude. "The 
event," rather than intentions or motives, creates gratitude, 
just as past ills vanish in present happiness.
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The narrative information that "the accent was decisive 
enough" to convey some sort of unequivocal meaning seems, to 
me,, to be a sort of joke Austen is playing with her readers 
and also to contradict Philip Drew's theory about the omnipo­
tent, God-like, author. What Austen is saying, I believe, is 
that “no honest answer can be given to Frederick's question, 
and I am certainly not going to supply one." However, to tan­
talize readers with the desire for that which they cannot 
have, she adds "but the accent was decisive enough."
There is a peculiar poignancy in this closing conversa­
tion, because they are the last words of Austen characters, 
except for the unpublished fragment, Sanditon. and almost 
Austen's last words, since she was dead within the following 
year. Having closed with a mischievous joke to tease her 
readers, her voice falls silent, and the manuscript of 
Persuasion was published posthumously, with a title selected 
by Henry Austen. Who knows what she might have entitled it? 
Providence would have been unthinkable, because Jane Austen 
would have shared Samuel Johnson's antipathy to the vulgar­
ization of divinity, but I think that Happiness might not be 
a bad candidate.
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CONCLUSION
In all Austen novels, people'assert claims and rights, 
both to property as well as to other people. Mr. Collins 
introduces himself as the claimant to Longboum, the Bennet 
estate, by legal right of entail, and he proposes to extend 
that claim to include Elizabeth as his prospective wife. Sir 
Thomas Bertram must travel to Antigua to protect his claim 
and colonial estates, while at home the alliance of his 
daughter with the Rushworth family brings to Mansfield Park 
the even more opulent and desirable Sotherton property. 
Dynastic plotting is never very far from Emma's mind, and in 
Persuasion, only the "heir presumptive" rights of the morally 
corrupt William Elliot can save Kellynch from the claims of 
creditors, staved off for the time being by surrendering 
proprietary rights to the Crofts as lessees.
Against legally protected acquisitiveness, the novels 
offer another kind of exchange based on giving, not taking. 
Since the benefits are not a matter of right, the 
beneficiary's response is "gratitude" for happiness that 
depends on another's "benevolence." This kind of exchange is 
important in all Austen plots, but in Northanaer Abbey and 
Sense and Sensibility, the first two novels in probable order 
of composition, there is a certain mechanical quality to the 
process that appears to reflect a more rigid view of benevo­
lence and gratitude as a kind of moral cement that preserves
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a superior-inferior relationship between giver and 
beneficiary. Catherine Morland does seem to turn the 
relationship to her advantage, but at substantial personal 
cost, and gratitude marks the sum of her hopes, as it does 
for Marianne Dashwood in Sense and Sensibility. However, with 
Pride and Prejudice, the expression of gratitude, the 
response itself, becomes a kind of reciprocal benevolence, a 
dynamic interchange that energizes thereafter all enduring 
and approved relationships in Austen novels. The power of 
this dynamic seems limitless in Pride and Pre-iudice. and 
although tested and questioned in later novels, survives to 
become the all-encompassing virtue of Persuasion.
Austen's source for freeing benevolence and gratitude 
from their traditional hierarchical immobility appears to be 
Francis Hutcheson's Newtonian model of moral gravitation as 
developed in early editions of An Inquiry into the Original 
of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, and Mark Loveridge's 
scholarship, based on evidence in Emma, has established, I 
feel conclusively, that Austen was well acquainted with this 
work.1 My study looks closely at the ideas that underlie the 
mathematical exercise on which Loveridge focuses and confirms 
Austen’s understanding of Hutcheson, at least as early as the 
revising of First Impressions into Pride and Pre-iudice. The 
“bridge" between philosophic theory and the dramatized world 
of the novels is provided by the Discourses. or published 
sermon texts, of the Anglican latitudinarian bishop, Thomas
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Sherlock, whose concern is the practical application of 
virtue to conduct.
The claims and takings in the novels are shadows cast by 
disputed rights and claims asserted in the world around Jane 
Austen, including both the military and ideological conflict 
with revolutionary France. Thus, the disputes concern not 
only claims to people and property, but also to the moral, 
ethical, and religious legitimacy of the claimants. Upon his 
reappearance in Uppercross, Frederick Wentworth bases his 
right to choose among prospective brides on the wealth he has 
gained by 'taking" French vessels in combat (66). Wentworth, 
as well as Sir Thomas with his Antigua properties, represent 
the intersection of real and novelistic worlds, of substance 
with shadow.
Claims are legitimized by an empowering "system," and 
therefore challenges to legitimacy also attack the "system" 
that supports them. The term "system" is used pejoratively by 
Emma when she labels Frank Churchill’s manipulations as "a 
system of hypocrisy and deceit,— espionage, and treachery" 
(399), a charge that Mr. Knightley anticipates in his 
unfavorable contrast of Frank’s values as "French" with 
English standards (149). Churchill himself implies that he 
has a "right" to Jane Fairfax that justifies his trickery, 
and therefore both Emma and Mr. Knightley, by challenging his 
■system," deny Churchill’s claim of "right."
Law, specifically the English common law and 
Constitution, is the "system" that Edmund Burke defends
t
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against the French challenge and would seem included in Mr. 
George Knightley*s sweeping defense of things English, 
perhaps symbolized by his younger brother's profession as a 
lawyer. But John Knightley is the only lawyer in the novels 
to be treated approvingly, and the law as a "system, • as well 
as its practitioners; fare poorly at Austen's hands. Law 
facilitates claims and takings that impoverish Mrs. Dashwood 
and her daughters in Sense and Sensibility, and William 
Elliot, Lucifer himself, is a lawyer who systematically 
defrauds Mrs. Smith in Persuasion. For Austen, gratitude has 
no role in such a system of legal selfishness, and yet the 
systemization of gratitude was very much an issue in the mid 
to late eighteenth century. Burke accuses French 
revolutionaries of "ingratitude,"2 whereas William Godwin 
claims that, in his system of universal virtue built on pure 
reason, gratitude "is no part either of justice or virtue."3
Godwin's principal objection to gratitude is that it is 
a feeling with no basis in reason, unlike Burke, who defends 
feelings expressed as reverence for traditional authority, 
which would include King Lear's "dues of gratitude." But 
Austen seems to want no part of any "systems, ■ since they 
either serve to legitimatize deception or to enforce 
inequalities, including institutionalized gender inequality. 
The novels give full authority to individual feelings, 
informed by intelligence and not by conformity to the author­
ity of systems, as guides for moral behavior and loving rela­
tionships. Feelings are the verdict of the senses, mediated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
266
by the mind, the union of heart and head that Hugh Blair 
found appealing in Francis Hutcheson.4 For Austen, foremost 
among the feelings is gratitude, supremely powerful as love's 
herald, but a power with the potential for mischief as well, 
as Emma discovers in Harriet's designs on Mr. Knightley, and 
still with the power to oppress when invoked by Sir Thomas 
against Fanny in Mansfield Park.
The authority of feelings, however, does not mean that 
the individual is a law unto itself, and feelings are still 
subject to the test of their contribution to human happiness. 
Hutcheson's standard of happiness as the test of virtue 
identifies his philosophy as a precursor of utilitarianism, 
and Austen's novels also seem to rest on this principle. But 
Hutcheson's theories are always grounded in Christian 
doctrine, and he supports the standard of human happiness by 
arguing that this is also God's wish for His children. Anne 
Elliot discovers that "Providence" works for happiness, and 
if it is deferred, it is not denied. Both Anne and Wentworth 
learn this truth, and their gratitude, ultimately, is for the 
happiness which is the gift of "Providence."
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